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This thesis is a critique and proposed reform of the decision-making process under 
the European Patent Convention 1973, Article 53(a) as it relates to morality. It 
postulates that the manner in which the morality bar is currently managed is 
inappropriate as it relies on patent officials to make the initial decision as to whether 
the patent application is morally permissible or not. In a pluralistic world, morality is 
understood differently by a wide variety of people but this is not currently being 
acknowledged within the patent system. Whilst there is an option to bring opposition 
proceedings to challenge patent grants, this onus is considerable on the challenger 
and any debate is then played out by a very small sector of highly specialised 
experts, often with very differing views on morality. This thesis seeks to broaden the 
decision-making process to reflect society’s pluralism. Officials, it will be argued, 
should instead of trying to decide what constitutes morality in a realm of such 
importance for humanity as a whole, administer a system which facilitates public 
participation and a vote. This will be based on existing models of widespread public 
deliberation and participation, albeit not ones that currently operate in (or near) the 
patent world. At present, criticisms in the legal literature tend to suggest more 
deliberation in the patent field and more participation is recommended in science 
literature but the logistics are unexplored and will be brought together in this work, 
making an original contribution to knowledge. In order to achieve its aim, the thesis 
employs a pluralistic methodology which includes doctrinal, socio-legal and 
interdisciplinary facets which will enable the construction of a model for reform of 
the patent system in the domain of morality. This will come from outside of 
traditional legal mechanisms such as legislative, judicial or patent office reform 
solutions, as a far-reaching paradigm is envisaged. The claim to originality lies in the 
extraction of principles from deliberative and participatory models of democracy and 









This thesis is a critique of the decision-making process involved in morally 
controversial biotechnological patent applications when a patent grant is being 
considered. In Europe, at the European Patent Office (EPO) patents must be new, 
involve an inventive step and be useful in industry but they must also be within the 
bounds of morality. The controversy identified in this thesis is that there is no agreed 
definition of morality, yet the morality bar is applied by patent officials and its 
definition from case to case is unpredictable. If challenged, the various boards of the 
EPO must grapple with applying the morality bar in the absence of guiding 
principles. It is acknowledged that a universal definition of morality does not exist so 
identifying such principles could prove elusive. It is the argument of this thesis that 
our pluralistic society’s mores ought to be reflected in the decision-making process 
and that this can be achieved by reforming patent officials’ responsibilities. Rather 
than arbitrating morality, patent officials could instead manage a system of public 
participation where the citizenry at large can decide on the matter of morality, after a 
period of public outreach and education. A model for such reform can be found in 
participatory and deliberative democratic practices where the entire electorate has the 
right to vote. This thesis identifies principles of participation which can be applied to 
the patent system to ensure a wider and more pluralistic societal input. The original 
contribution lies in the application of these principles to reform the decision-making 













Background to This Doctoral Journey 
 
In this section, I trace the somewhat complex academic journey which started when I 
first began reading on the theme of the patenting of morally controversial 
biotechnological inventions around 16 years ago. At the time I was studying for my 
research LL.M. at the University of Warwick and the controversy about genetic 
modification of crops and other organisms was very current. I was interested in the 
role that social activists played in policy and ultimately legal formation in this area. I 
also was drawn by academic articles and books,1 whose authors argued that the 
patenting process in this realm should be less opaque, given the gravity of what is at 
stake.2 The tensions they identified included how public and private interests should 
be balanced more equitably and that the state, by granting patents over morally 
controversial biotechnological inventions, sanctions and encourages investment in 
particular types of patentable scientific research, often without public consultation. 
Some writers deemed it desirable to engage public opinions on such decisions 
without defining the nature of that involvement. This question piqued my curiosity. 
 
Public consultation, when it occurs, can be illusory and ill-constructed. I had first-
hand experience of this when I attended one of the government consultations on the 
field trials of genetically modified organisms in Birmingham in 2003. The organisers 
were unable to answer my question that despite the fact that the consultation 
purported to inform British policy in this area, Directive 2001/18/EC3 on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms, provided 
that changes to the legal regime could only occur on the discovery of new scientific 
evidence. I also brought to their attention Maria Lee and Robert Burrell’s article in 
the Modern Law Review in which they said that these modified crops would be 
patentable in Britain.4 At that point, industry representatives in the room became very 
hostile and I was left with the impression that my queries were not dealt with in a 
                                                 
1 Elaborated in chapters two and three. 
2 These include Oliver Mills, writing in a European context and O Carter Snead and Margot Bagley, 
writing in the US. 
3 Article 29. 
4 Maria Lee and Robert Burrell, ‘Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the “victim”?’ (2002) 
65 MLR 517. 
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satisfactory fashion. There was a disjuncture between the binding EU law and the 
claimed influence of the consultation making the government’s engagement with the 
publics somewhat illusory. In Ireland, the only remedy for challenging the granting 
of licences for field trials was judicial review, which is extremely narrow.5 Non-
violent direct action became very widespread across the continent and ended up 
shaping much of the policy from below.6 I felt that there must be a better way – a 
manner in which governments talk to the governed, be said by them and make policy 
on this basis as is their mandate. At that point, a seed was sown in terms of my 
interest in deliberation and participatory governance. 
 
In my academic readings which also included material from the US and Canada, this 
lack of authentic public involvement, both at the level of sanctioning the crops and 
their patenting, was perceived to be problematic for a number of reasons which are 
elaborated in chapter two. Several authors advocated public involvement in the 
decisions over patent grants.7 Intimations of a democratic deficit in arbitrating 
morality and other matters in the patent granting process were evident although no 
two criticisms were the same and possible constructive solutions were not explored 
in detail. Sometimes questions are raised as to who should decide and on other 
occasions calls are made for more public involvement but who the publics are 
deemed to be or how they could be involved is not articulated. I elaborate this issue 
substantially in the thesis, outlining some of these criticisms and addressing them 
with a view to reform. 
 
The focus of the thesis is on the patentability of the inventions in question rather than 
the ethics of the scientific research itself, which is outside the scope of the study. I 
am very interested in law’s role in the delineation of property rights and I also teach 
Property/Land law; accordingly, the patenting aspect and its interrelationship with 
the ethical issues appealed to me a lot. Whilst the issue of morality and where it 
should be arbitrated is a topic of significance, the subject matter is sufficiently broad 
                                                 
5 Watson v Environmental Protection Agency [1998] IEHC 148. 
6 This included campaigns by Greenpeace: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/   
campaigns/agriculture/problem/genetic-engineering/, (accessed June 8, 2017) and Friends of the  
Earth: https://www.foeeurope.org/gmos, (accessed June 8, 2017). 
7 Elaborated in chapters two and three. 
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to constitute a doctoral study in itself. In any case, the scope of who decides and how 
this is conducted was of greater concern to me and it drew together a number of 
different interests which have arisen during my studies. My academic background is 
broad and both multi- and inter-disciplinary. I studied Philosophy and English 
literature which included a year of European Studies and History (1985-89) before 
my Law degree (1995-99). Issues of morality were omnipresent in Ireland, given the 
then recent decision in the X case8 dealing with abortion rights, and a subsequent 
referendum and Supreme Court case on the right to die.9 The recent conclusion of a 
Citizens’ Assembly – a deliberative device - to elicit public opinion on the ongoing 
question of abortion rights involved a discussion among 99 randomly selected 
citizens who then reported to the Oireachtas, or Irish parliament.10 Details on these 
citizens are sparse11 and the government is not obliged to act on their advice. Whilst I 
have developed a deep interest in ethical issues, I am aware that debates often 
become unduly polarised. This has led me to acquire an enduring and overarching 
curiosity as to whether this process could be less divisive and more inclusive and 
how best to develop strategies for mediating such fraught issues.  
 
Against the backdrop of this infusion of issues of morality in my legal training, 
during my B.C.L. I decided to specialise in intellectual property. I did a research 
LL.M. at the University of Warwick on the issue of free and open source software 
licensing which focused on copyright but it also brought me into contact with patent 
law and grassroots law-making (free and open source licences have been designed by 
computer programmers rather than lawyers, largely). Warwick’s socio-legal approach 
differed radically to that of U.C.C. where I studied my undergraduate degree. My 
initial legal formation was largely doctrinal with a strong grounding in constitutional 
law and jurisprudence but the inquiry of my LL.M. was on grassroots legal practices 
rather than top-down legislation. At that point in time (2002), I had also lived and 
worked in the Spanish-speaking world for over 12 years and several regional Spanish 
and national Latin American governments started to explore the possibility of 
                                                 
8 AG v X [1992] IESC 1. 
9 Re a Ward of Court [1995] IESC 1. 
10 https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/, (accessed June 9, 2017). 
11 https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/About-the-Citizens-Assembly/Who-are-the-Members/   
Assembly-Members-June-2017.pdf, (accessed June 9, 2017). 
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moving away from using proprietary software and were interested in the study I had 
carried out on the dynamics of open source licensing. I was invited to speak at 
several conferences and as I speak fluent Spanish and have some knowledge of 
Portuguese, I was involved as an advisor to the Brazilian government on its plan to 
switch its administration to free and open source software in 2004. I was 
subsequently invited to participate in a conference in Bogotá by the Colombian 
government in 2007. My work in this area has continued and my most recent 
publication on the topic was in 2013.12 In Brazil I became familiar with some of its 
democratic models such as the participatory budget and of their spread to other Latin 
American countries. I taught at Bristol Law School at UWE from 2003-06 where I 
designed a course on Free Software Licensing and Legislation at Masters level which 
bridged law and socio-legal practices in the free and open source software 
movement. I also taught the intellectual property aspects of an established 
undergraduate course on Information Technology. I took up my current post at the 
National University of Ireland, Galway in 2006 and I have taught the undergraduate 
course on Industrial and Intellectual Property since then. As Ireland suffers a dearth 
of case law, my course includes overseas precedents from the US, Canada and 
Europe to put the matter in an international context, and also draws on the case-law 
approach to teaching at Warwick. I was encouraged by the university to undertake 
doctoral studies and I commenced these in 2010. 
 
Initially, my interest in biotechnology and the patenting of these inventions derived 
from material which I had been reading from the US on the patenting of human-
animal hybrids and chimeras and issues to do with the constitutional rights of these 
beings if the composition was unduly human. The Newman-Rifkin patent application 
in which two activists applied for patents on notional inventions such as a 
“humanzee” and a “humouse” - a mix of chimpanzee or mouse and human cells – 
kept me awake at night. I recalled some advice I had received at Warwick – that if 
you do a Ph.D., “it has to get you excited”. My interests in ethics, biotechnology, 
patents, socio-legal methods and innovative democratic paradigms afforded me with 
several perspectives from which to view Article 53(a) of the European Patent 
                                                 
12 Detailed in chapter six. 
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Convention 1973 (as amended). I was fascinated with the problem of the ethics, of 
course, but what interested me more, not least because it has not been unravelled in 
detail, is who decides on matters of ethics and how this gets to be arbitrated. I 
perceived that participatory practices in Latin America could be tweaked to address 
the democratic deficit in the patent controversy emanating from Article 53(a). 
 
Some other strands of my research and academic activity of relevance were that I had 
a passing interest in animal rights. At NUI Galway I also teach Sociology of Law to 
undergraduate students and since 2007 have started to integrate participatory 
budgeting models and some material on animal rights into a part of the curriculum as 
case studies.13 I was elected Chairperson of the Vegetarian Society of Ireland in 
2013, having already served on the committee as secretary and in 2014, the Oxford 
Centre for Animal Ethics (OCFAE) honoured me with a lifelong fellowship for my 
work on promoting vegetarianism. My first publication on the area of patenting 
human-animal hybrids is forthcoming in the Journal of Animal Ethics and I speak at 
the annual summer school of the OCFAE regularly. I have been a member of the 
Research Ethics Committee at NUI Galway since 2008. I am also part of a research 
group which has been set up by the UNESCO Chair of Bioethics Ireland and the 
ambit of the research includes issues related to biotechnology, including patents, 
deliberation and participation.  
 
This Ph.D. is a kaleidoscope of influences which I have drawn together to break the 
oft quoted, fatalistic mantra of TINA, or “there is no alternative”. If the truth be told, 
there are in fact many ways in which aspects of a system can be reformed. I put 
forward in this thesis one model which I believe is innovative, credible and 
workable. This is applied to the question of who should arbitrate morality in Article 
53(a) EPC 1973 (as amended) and by what means. Participatory models of 
democracy are becoming common throughout the world and they offer a fresh, 
effective and truly reformative manner in which systems can be changed. Not only is 
this thesis highly original but its contribution to knowledge is significant. As I have 
                                                 




extracted principles from a democratic paradigm from Latin America, so too can 
principles be extracted from my thesis and applied in other domains. The scope is 





























Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This chapter first introduces and summarises the subject matter of the thesis and then identifies the 
research question. Next, it sets out the methodological approach adopted and lastly incorporates a 
review of the relevant literature which has informed the work, addressing also the gap in the literature. 
 
The purpose of this doctoral study is to address an unresolved issue which besets the European Patent 
Office (EPO): how to decide issues relating to the morality bar when a patent could be granted 
because the criteria are fulfilled but the invention potentially falls foul of Article 53(a) of the European 
Patent Convention, 1973 (EPC) (as amended). Article 53(a) provides that the invention must not 
offend against morality or ordre public. The EPO faces criticisms of its handling of this issue and this 
thesis builds bridges from this criticism to a model which, it will be argued, addresses this matter and, 
if employed, will increase the legitimacy14 of its decisions. It does not deal with the wider and equally 
vexed question of morality in biotechnological inventions in general but focuses on morality as it 
arises in the context of patent grants. 
 
The premise is simple: the EPC provides a morality bar for inventions that are otherwise patentable. If 
such inventions are within the morality exceptions, a patent cannot be granted. What, though, 
constitutes morality for the purposes of patent grants? The thesis approaches this matter as 
problematic in terms of how this is decided and by whom. It is, therefore, focused on the process 
rather than the outcome of any decision-making and its claim is normative. As everyone’s conception 
of morality in a pluralistic world is likely to vary, an effective way of arbitrating between such 
potential polarities is important. Where decision-making is perceived by some critics as lacking in 
legitimacy as is the case in the interpretation of morality, much time will be spent in challenges to 
patent grants or revocations which could be avoided if such processes were not so contentious from 
the start. Currently, the case law does not predict how morality will be defined, as judges have little to 
guide them. In any case, morality by its nature evokes much disagreement down and standards change 
over time and as a result of technological developments. 
 
The EPO has been criticised for not having achieved a satisfactory way of resolving this question.15 
Devices which seek to elicit public views such as opinion polls and surveys have not been accepted as 
evidence by the EPO.16 The EPO tends to negate efforts by NGOs to involve public voices;17 perhaps 
rightly so. NGOs may not be better placed to elicit public views than officials at the EPO. These 
decisions can, of course, be contested in opposition proceedings. However, this thesis will argue that 
                                                 
14 The use of the term “legitimacy” in this thesis will be clarified on p 28. 
15 Amanda Warren-Jones, ‘Identifying European Moral Consensus: Why Are the Patent Courts 
Reticent to Accept Empirical Evidence in Resolving Biotechnological Cases?’ (2006) 28 EIPR 26. 




this process is not adequate to address my normative claim that when morality provisions are engaged 
by patent applications, public voices should be solicited, in a different way. There is some academic 
literature, explored hereunder, in which lawyers with expertise in the patenting of biotechnological 
inventions call for more public involvement and more transparency in the arbitration of this aspect of 
morality. This thesis argues for the development of a model of how the publics can be involved in 
ways that are meaningful in terms of the decision-making process. However, the critique that the 
domain of patent law is unsuitable for the consideration of ethical issues, will not be explored as a 
remedy because the scope of this thesis is that the law contains a morality bar and the actual situation 
is addressed rather than wishing it were otherwise. The thesis assumes that the morality bar is here to 
stay and there is a pressing need to work out how it should be applied. 
 
Patent officials, asked to rule on morality when their expertise is in technical matters, arguably need a 
model which will assist them in the process through which they currently seem to muddle. Concepts 
of morality differ greatly across Europe.18 It is argued that whenever the morality clause in Article 
53(a) EPC is invoked a direct vote or type of referendum should be in place whereby the publics can 
decide whether the patent should or should not be granted. The EPO, as a public body, may actually 
be better placed to manage the practicalities and cost of organising such deliberative and participatory 
practices than a random array of special interest groups for whom the logistics (in terms of cost, time, 
travel and so on) may prohibit participation in opposition and appeals proceedings. 
 
Engagement on the issue of public debate is not currently being addressed because the EPO tends only 
to name what is not an acceptable way of listening to public voices.19 Given that there is no agreed 
method of ascertaining what publics think about morality in the area of patent grants, the quest of this 
work is to design a model in which a plurality of views can be accommodated. It will propose 
adapting and transposing a paradigm from outside the patent system and will seek to allay the fears of 
the EPO that public opinions as represented in polls or surveys may not actually represent what 
publics truly think. The “devil”, in the adage, is all in the detail. This thesis does not advocate the 
harvesting of ill-informed public opinions. Instead, it will build a case to argue that when the morality 
bar in the EPC in the form of Article 53(a) is engaged, the EPO should, instead of making 
unpredictable decisions behind closed doors which then may be challenged by a laborious number of 
processes, open the decision to education, deliberation and a subsequent vote. This process will elicit 
views from the 38 states20 of the EPO. This draws from the approach pioneered in several Latin 
American countries which have established large-scale participatory democratic models. These 
involve frequent, direct votes on budgets and when those involved lack practical knowledge and 
                                                 
18 This was acknowledged in the “Travaux Préparatoires (EPC 1973)”, IV/2767/61-E, 7, 
http://webserv.epo.org/projects/babylon/tpepc73.nsf/0/A79664CCCE197AC1C1257427004, (accessed 
June 10, 2017). 
19 Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace [1995] EPOR 357, 368-369. 
20 Correct as of June 17, 2017: https://www.epo.org/about-us/organisation/member-states.html, 
(accessed June 17, 2017). 
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education in the subject-matter at hand, local governments pay for their tuition and so equip them with 
the necessary skills. This thesis does not compare budgets and biotechnological inventions but, rather, 
gleans principles from participatory practices and seeks to apply them to certain EPO decision-making 
processes. 
 
Whilst chapter one gives an overview of the thesis, chapter two begins by giving a history of the 
origins and evolution of patent law. It outlines the various legal instruments under which patents 
receive protection whilst noting the extension of patents to cover living matter along with 
globalisation of protection and ongoing efforts to harmonise patent law both internationally and 
regionally. Of note for the purposes of this thesis is the introduction of an optional morality bar in the 
Strasbourg Convention and its conversion into a mandatory provision in the European Patent 
Convention. After the legislative introduction, case law both under the EPC and the EU 
Biotechnology Directive is examined. It shows that legislative clarity may not be possible given that 
the field is very fast moving. Academic critique regarding the perceived lack of involvement of the 
publics in the decision-making process is then explored and some small scale suggested models for 
reform considered.  
 
Chapter three shows that there is some confusion in discussions about morality in patent law and 
debate relating to biotechnological inventions in general. After clarifying that this thesis concentrates 
on the former, it examines a variety of possible solutions to the EPO’s decision-making process, 
including judicial, legislative, patent office reform and the establishment of ethics committees. None 
of these models of reform would achieve the wide-scale deliberation and participation that this thesis 
seeks to establish.  
 
Chapter four examines different models of deliberation and shows that effectiveness will vary 
according to the manner in which deliberation is organised, although deliberative devices tend to be 
very small scale. The right to participate is also identified as a human right and what emerges from 
chapter four is that if meaningful public involvement is to be achieved, deliberation and participation 
should be combined. This may facilitate meaningful societal input. It is argued that in order to allay 
public concerns and to assist the EPO’s duty as a public body to reach legitimate decisions, a much 
more robust and large-scale model is preferable to piecemeal, ad hoc paradigms. This combination has 
been achieved in the participatory budget in Brazil and chapter five carries out a study of the 
budgeting practices, showing that over time, the process has become much more interactive and 
decision-making has become more meaningful. The thesis will extract abstract principles from the 
participatory budget for reform of the decision-making process at the EPO.  
 
Chapter six sketches a model for how a public awareness and educational campaign on issues of 
morality in biotechnological patent applications can be carried out. It also gives an example of how 
the publics can be involved and engaged widely through the use of outreach staff so that they not only 
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deliberate but are also incentivised to participate. It will apply the principles from the discussions on 
deliberation and participation to aid in the drafting of a model of how participatory patents along with 
a plebiscite can be fashioned. It will also address some potential objections but will conclude showing 
that these can be addressed constructively and that an inclusive patenting system where issues of 
morality arise can be created. 
 
1.1 Research Questions 
 
This thesis argues that the decision-making process for morally controversial biotechnological patent 
applications under Article 53(a) EPC 1973 (as amended) is flawed because patent officials have to 
take decisions without guidance. I explore whether judges, legislators or ethics committees would be 
better suited to this task and conclude that as morality is a matter of societal-wide concern, the publics 
should have an input into such decisions. This is especially important given the promise that 
patentable biotechnological inventions hold for curing disease, for instance, which is a matter of 
interest to us all. In light of a morality bar to patents on such inventions, where morality cannot be 
defined by small, expert groups, I wished to examine whether it was justifiable and possible to 
facilitate public voices in an inclusive manner. 
 
The primary research question of this thesis is: 
 
How to broaden the ambit of decision making and makers on issues of morality in morally 
controversial biotechnological patent applications in ways that improve the robustness and 
defensibility of the process of patent grant. 
 
The thesis will investigate how widening the suffrage can be achieved without debate and decisions 
descending into populism or extremism. It searches for a reform model which combines deliberation 
with participation. This is to avoid the elitism that can often restrict deliberative democracy’s ambit 
where discussion is confined to a cohort of experts or a small group of activists. It should also ensure 
that participation is wide-scale, informed and considered. 
 
1.2 Methodological Approach 
 
This thesis is library based and adopts a pluralistic methodology, composed of doctrinal, socio-legal 
and interdisciplinary methods to address the research question, which is who should adjudicate 
morality in grants on biotechnological patents and how this can be carried out. It investigates the issue 
by conducting a review of primary and secondary legal materials, which show a decision-making 
process which I argue can be improved. Some legal academic commentary21 supports this position and 
                                                 
21 Explored in chapters two and three. 
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critiques the decision-making process, arguing that more deliberation or more public involvement 
should take place. Concrete paradigms for how this could be facilitated are not explored and any such 
discussion is absent from the literature in patent law. In order to examine the problem in more depth, I 
rely on political science and sociology materials, to evaluate theoretical literature on both deliberative 
and participatory democracy. This is scrutinised in a context of participatory political systems, whose 
practices are also examined with a view to building an analytical framework through which a model of 
reform is proposed. This is achieved by drawing on principles from long-standing participatory 
regimes and applying them to reform the decision-making process at the EPO in the area of morally 
controversial biotechnological patents. The methodology is pluralistic, incorporating a variety of 
approaches, explained in the next section. 
 
1.2.1 Methodological Pluralism (composed of doctrinal, socio-legal and 
interdisciplinary approaches) 
 
This pluralistic methodology has been devised in order to address a gap in the legal literature by 
drawing on the disciplines of sociology and political science to bring about a proposal for reform.  
Such methodology seeks to do the following, as described by Morris and Murphy:- 
 
some methodologies are analytical in nature; they try to show what the law is, or why the law 
is the way it is; other methodologies are prescriptive, seeking to critique and reform the law 
according to a particular viewpoint or set of principles.22 
 
This thesis does a bit of both, although tangible reform following on from the critique is the 
overarching ambition of the work. The core originality of the thesis, however, lies in the novel 
analysis and (re)framing of the “moral problem” in patent law as an instance of democratic deficit, 
and the proposal for more inclusive and democratic approaches to address it. The methodology casts 
its net widely. Feyerabend’s words reflect the methodology of this thesis whereby it traverses non-
traditional paradigms, when he says the following: 
 
Pluralism of theories and metaphysical views is not only important for methodology, it is also 
an essential part of a humanitarian outlook…This coincidence of the part (individual man) 
with the whole (the world we live in), of the purely subjective and arbitrary with the 
objective and lawful, is one of the most important arguments in favour of a pluralistic 
methodology.23 
 
The major challenge and contribution of this thesis has been to build a bridge between the critique in 
legal literature of decision-making at the EPO under Article 53(a) and the “solution” of extracting 
principles from a deliberative and participatory paradigm with a very different subject matter. 
However, this thesis concerns itself not with the differences or similarities between patents and 
                                                 
22 Caroline Morris and Cian C Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2011) 30. 
23 Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (3rd ed, Verso Books 1993) 38. 
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budgets but, rather, concentrates on deliberation and participation which can be employed on different 
scales and subjects. Principles of inclusivity utilised in budgetary systems can be studied to inspire 
transformation of decision-making processes and are applied in this thesis to the specific case of 
patent applications for morally controversial biotechnological inventions.  
 
1.2.2 How a pluralistic methodology helps to address the research 
question 
 
The methodology in this thesis comprises a doctrinal, socio-legal and interdisciplinary critique, 
analysis and advocacy of reform to address the gap in the literature in the interstices between law, 
sociology and political science, making it methodologically pluralistic. Definitions of what constitutes 
“interdisciplinary” and “socio-legal” abound and we shall see below that they are not always 
consistent and therefore require further exposition. Legal literature does not explore what are 
essentially sociological and political phenomena in this realm. I chose not to adopt a solely doctrinal 
approach in this thesis because whilst I believe that it is possible to write a critique of the patent 
system and suggest either legislative or judicial reform, depending on one’s envisaged outcome, 
neither of these options would have addressed adequately the research questions of this thesis. The 
question to be examined is who decides and how such decisions are made on morality in European 
patent grants under the EPC and reform from outside of traditional models will be advocated. 
 
1.2.3 Doctrinal analysis 
 
The thesis begins with a doctrinal analysis of legislation and case law under the European Patent 
Convention, along with relevant European Union laws such as the Biotechnology Directive, (the 
salient sections of which enshrine a morality clause without much legislative detail) and it also 
analyses attendant case law. These legal instruments are the subject of different interpretations and the 
EPO,24 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)25 and national courts26 have grappled with 
this difficulty for some time. The legal materials are examined in detail in chapters two and three and 
academic criticism suggests either more judge-made law27 or clearer legislation28 as potential 
remedies. However, I did not find these solutions convincing because if laws are too tightly drafted, 
there may be little room for manoeuvre and this may be necessary in a fast moving field. Where 
insufficient legislative guidance is given it falls upon an oft-reluctant judiciary to arbitrate matters of 
                                                 
24 Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace [1995] EPOR 357.  
25 C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV (Grand Chamber) [2011] ECR 1-9821. 
26 C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and 
Trade Marks (Grand Chamber) 18 December 2014. 
27 George P Smith, ‘Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of Biotechnology’ (1999) 13 Notre Dame JL 
Ethics & Pub Pol’y 93. 




which they may lack understanding or social licence. Judges also sometimes make erroneous 
decisions. Hence I sought to analyse the legal problem from outside of law’s traditional boundaries.   
 
The analysis of issues which arise in law is not necessarily confined to doctrine alone. In fact, law has 
been described by Salter and Mason as being capable of being “analysed as the expression of a 
continual social, political and economic debate concerning the appropriate balance between the 
frequently conflicting interests of, for example…the public.”29 Whilst the knowledge involved is 
highly specialised, publics, it will be shown, can come to understand issues of great complexity 
through deliberation. They may later vote on such issues in an informed manner if debate is conducted 
in an appropriate way, based on examples in the literature on deliberation and in other spheres. The 
analysis, therefore, need not be solely doctrinal. More particularly, this thesis studies a model of 
budgeting involving wide-scale deliberation where highly specialised information is transmitted to the 
publics who are educated in such matters by local, state or national governments helping them in turn 
to make informed decisions in a participatory setting.  
 
The gap in the knowledge and literature filled by this thesis consists of addressing the issue of more 
deliberation on complex moral issues in patent applications on a wide scale. It thus bridges the gap 
between calls for a more inclusive process in the legal literature and the process itself by examining in 
depth deliberative and participatory democracy theories. It then adapts a functioning model of 
participatory democracy, with deliberative features, from outside of the patent realm (primarily 
because no such model exists within the patent realm) and applies it to part of the decision-making 
process, as explained above. This makes a pluralistic methodology useful. The particular reasons for 
choosing the participatory budgeting model over other options will be detailed in due course. 
 
It is the aim of the thesis not just to critique from a doctrinal perspective but also to propose reform. In 
Meszaros’ view, methodology serves a dual purpose of identifying precisely the problems which a 
given research setting poses and secondly helping to surmount these difficulties.30 
 
It is fully recognised that wide-scale public input into decisions may not avoid flawed interpretations 
either, but the thesis is more concerned with process than outcome. It does not argue for a specific 
moral conclusion in the case of any given patent application because whilst that aspect of patent law 
merits study, it does not constitute the focus of this doctoral investigation and such aim is therefore 
outside of its scope. Instead, a robust and inclusive process to achieve a relatively harmonious result 
in a pluralistic, multidisciplinary and cross sectoral environment is proposed. The reform model for 
this thesis serves as a loose framework for how a plebiscite on issues of morality which arise in patent 
                                                 
29 Michael Salter and Julie Mason, Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the 
Conduct of Legal Research (Pearson Education 2007) 183. 
30 George Meszaros, ‘Researching the Landless Movement in Brazil’ in Mike McConville and Wing 
Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 133. 
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grants can be achieved. An analysis and model emanating from disciplines outside of law is thus 
utilised. 
 
1.2.4 What do we mean by “socio-legal”? 
 
Salter and Mason have said that socio-legal studies are a subdivision of legal studies which can be 
differentiated from doctrinal research in that research methodologies draw mainly from the social 
sciences. They are utilised for a broader spectrum of materials which highlights public policy aspects 
underpinning doctrinal law. These include data gleaned from interviews, observations, government 
reports and policy documents.31 The sub-disciplines utilised in this thesis include sociology and 
political science – and perhaps law, if one considers this to be a social science. They affirm that: 
“[t]raditionally socio-legal scholars have bridged the divide between law and sociology, social policy, 
and economics.”32 
 
The Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA) notes that there are at least three recognisable strands to 
current socio-legal work, each of which is broadly interdisciplinary in nature. These include 
theoretical approaches which are not empirical; grounded theory which involves empirical research 
findings, and; policy-driven empirical projects which have little or no theoretical input.33 This thesis is 
library based and also falls under the second strand identified. What these scholars have in common is 
the manner in which they approach these studies and they tend to be multi or inter-disciplinary. The 
value of socio-legal research has been identified as providing a means to: 
 
[U]ncover and expose the (previously unquestioned) political nature of laws, show whether 
laws have achieved their intended effect, assist in law reform proposals by linking law and 
policy goals, and reveal how law actually operates in practice by shedding light on the 
experiences of different groups who come into contact with the law…34 
 
A search for universally agreed features of what “socio-legal”, means, however, proves elusive. This 
thesis’ perspective and definition of socio-legal is broad. The thesis also contains socio-legal elements 
in that the proposed reform of the patent system focuses on the role that society may play in 
arbitrating what constitutes morality in such grants rather than leaving it to lawyers, ethicists, 
administrators or other experts. Shaw observes: 
 
There is much debate over the actual content of a socio-legal approach and even the term 
itself. That is not to say that its defiance of fixed boundaries or classification is problematical, 
since its flexibility ensures there is always the possibility of embracing the novel and the 
extraordinary. Some prefer the term sociology of law; there are those who would include the 
                                                 
31 Salter and Mason, op. cit. 132. 
32 Ibid 122. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Morris and Murphy, op. cit. 35. 
9 
 
humanities (philosophy, aesthetics and literature) and others who would restrict the ambit to 
largely empirical sub-disciplines (history, politics, economics) within the social sciences.35 
 
The pluralistic methodology employed in this thesis encompasses inter-disciplinarity in addition to the 
socio-legal focus highlighted in this section. Morris and Murphy opine that socio-legal research is 
inter-disciplinary and they list an array of disciplines from which socio-legal scholars draw, including 
sociology, politics, social policy and ethics. These disciplines serve as a means to analyse law and 
legal practices and to question the role of law in society36 and are used here in order to develop a 
proposal for reform. The next part examines this approach in terms of what it lends to the 
methodology of the thesis.   
 
1.2.5 What do we mean by “interdisciplinary”? 
 
As with socio-legal research, there may not be an agreed definition of interdisciplinary or inter-
disciplinarity. Bankar and Travers explain this by claiming that inter-disciplinarity does not mean the 
same thing to everyone because different researchers employ this methodology for a variety of 
reasons. Moreover, the extent of their borrowing varies and whilst inter-disciplinarity “involves 
integrating and organising traditional forms of knowledge, skill and experience in a new and original 
fashion”, 37 they advise against seeking a comprehensive definition of inter-disciplinarity. They opine 
that this would signal the appearance of a novel discipline, with its discrete paradigms and researchers 
would seek to operate outside of these. They also distinguish multi-disciplinarity from inter-
disciplinarity: whilst the former does not integrate the disciplines from which it draws, the latter does 
provide a synthesis by amalgamating a variety of approaches into a new one rather than using several 
approaches simultaneously.38 
 
As seen above, there is no universally agreed definition of socio-legal and inter-disciplinarity similarly 
defies a single description. My approach to inter-disciplinarity is that the principal analysis, critique 
and reform proposal of this doctoral thesis derives from doctrinal, sociological and political science 
literatures. The reason for this methodological approach is that whilst I found some critique of 
weaknesses in the democratic functioning of the patent system in the area of biotechnology and 
morality in legal academic writings, this did not foray into describing alternative models. The legal 
literature did not explain adequately why a democratic deficit was problematic for society, nor did it 
suggest how to address this problem robustly. My thesis forms an original bridge between critiques of 
law within legal circles and adaptable models of reform from political systems and the reform sought 
                                                 
35 Julia J A Shaw, ‘Reimagining Humanities’ in Dermot Feenan (ed), Exploring the “Socio” of Socio-
Legal Studies (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 116. 
36 Morris and Murphy, op. cit. 35. 
37 Reza Banakar and Max Travers, ‘Law, Sociology and Method’ in Reza Banakar and Max Travers 
(eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005) 6. 
38 Ibid 5. 
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is thus “outside” of the legal system. I believed that a critique without a reform paradigm would not 
add much to the extant literature except perhaps to provide an extended version of the same. I was 
interested in exploring a blueprint for reform from functioning models, albeit not related to patent law 
as they do not exist in that domain but, rather, from budgeting. I certainly could have chosen from 
other areas such as democratic participation in environmental matters but the models available tend to 
differ in the following ways. In the former, participation is grassroots and potentially permeates 
society to the level of the individual, depending on how it is managed and the willingness of the 
participants. In the latter, the model tends to reach only NGOs, which are highly specialised, funded 
organisations and is therefore more deliberative than participatory. 
 
I commenced the studies within the legal literature and academic commentary which asserted a need 
for more deliberation, elaborated in the following literature review, notwithstanding that this lacked 
detail. Next I explored a spectrum of literature in the area of deliberative democracy towards which 
some lawyers had tentatively pointed, relying on works of writers such as Gutmann and Thompson39 
and this helped explain deliberation at a theoretical level and bridged this disciplinary gap. I wished to 
take this theoretical material forward and describe its functioning in practice.  
 
Brazilian participatory budgeting uses deliberation in a participatory setting to involve a broad 
spectrum of the publics in matters considered to be of widespread interest, such as the spending of 
public funds. This literature was sourced in the writings of sociologists such as Santos40 and political 
scientists such as Baiocchi41 who both described and critically analysed the model of the participatory 
budget in detail. The final endeavour of this thesis is to bring together the problem and to apply the 
solution and therefore, the bridge of this thesis is an exposition of a functioning participatory 
paradigm seen through the eyes of sociologists, political scientists and philosophers and extended by 
this work into the legal arena. The literature on deliberative democracy links the participatory budget 
and the controversies of access to decision-making in general. I apply this to the European patenting 
process in the area of morally controversial biotechnological inventions and this is the principal 
original contribution of my thesis. Much of the participatory budgetary procedure employs 
deliberative mechanisms but what distinguishes it from the academic literature on deliberation is that 
it concretises the theories and brings them to life. I foresee similar objectives for the patent system, 
and this further explains and justifies my adopting the budgeting model as an exemplar paradigm for 
democratic reform for patents. 
 
                                                 
39 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton University Press 
2004). 
40 Boaventura de Sousa Santos (ed), Democratising Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic 
Canon (Verso 2005). 
41 Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Militants and Citizens: The Politics of Participatory Democracy in Porto 
Alegre (Stanford University Press 2005). 
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It is true, however, that despite some years spent refining this thesis’ methodology so that all parts 
would fit together, I echo Feyerabend’s opinion when he states, somewhat resignedly: “all 
methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits”.42 [author’s italics]. 
 
1.2.6 Conclusion  
 
At very least, what I hope to have achieved with doctrinal and socio-legal inter-disciplinarity is to 
show that lawyers are not hemmed into reform within a legal arena only: the oft-heard mantra of 
“There is no alternative” or TINA is strongly refuted by this thesis. I believe that participatory and 
deliberative mechanisms can stretch the imagination beyond our comfort zones to provide innovative 
but also realistic reform. Similarly, we can learn lessons from comparatively young democracies from 
the Global South in their efforts to apply new human rights norms to broaden public inclusion in areas 
which have not traditionally been open to decentralised and grassroots decision-making. These 
models, I will argue, can be honed and refined to apply to nuanced, specialised areas such as morally 
controversial biotechnological patent grants. This will amplify the number of means disposable to 
achieve reform. An important contribution to knowledge of this thesis is the fact that I or anyone else 
can extract the principles of participatory patenting and apply them to existing or new, currently 
unforeseen realms. 
 




When I embarked on this thesis, the first phase involved an extensive library-based review of 
primary43 and secondary sources of patent grants on biotechnological inventions, focusing on 
legislation and case law from both European jurisdictions: the European Patent Office and the 
European Union. Preparatory works and guidelines were also included in this review. The principal 
books in this area, including text books and monographs were digested, along with a small number of 
academic articles whose core argument was that the patent decision-making process needed to be 
opened up to a broader input. Why and how this could be done and by whom form the main research 
questions of this thesis. The legal literature was limited in that it identified a problem: that being a 
dearth of democracy in the patent granting process on morally controversial biotechnological 
inventions. However, it did not offer any viable suggestions for remedying the matter apart from 
mentioning deliberation without much analysis.  
 
                                                 
42 Feyerabend, op. cit. 23. 
43 The European Patent Convention 1973 (as amended) and the Directive 98/44 EC on the legal 
protection of biotechnology inventions. 
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I next sourced material on deliberative democracy in sociology and political science literature which 
provided in depth theoretical models of deliberation. These did not envisage widespread public input 
and only offered instances of deliberative practice on a small scale. They would not address the 
concern regarding the patent decision-making process in some of the legal literature over the lack of 
inclusiveness. In order to offer a reform paradigm for arbitrating morality in the European patent 
realm, I searched for an inclusive, deliberative and participatory model which would permeate society 
to the level of the individual rather than penetrating only to NGOs.  
 
Whilst the European Charter on Fundamental Rights has introduced participation to the European 
Union, it is not yet a deeply embedded practice. I wished to source an example which had been 
operative for a considerable period of time so that a fuller picture would emerge. I also wished to 
avoid the populism often associated with participatory democracy when it is not deliberative and 
where scant effort has been made to educate about salient issues in a neutral way. I identified a model 
which combines deliberation and participation in Latin American participatory budgetary practices, 
which were founded in Brazil. Its principles will be used to identify the democratic deficit in decisions 
on morality in European patent law at the EPO and also to propose remodelling current practice. This 
thesis thus connects different bodies of literature, taking each a step further to propose and justify 
novel reform. 
 
1.3.2 Identifying the problem 
 
Among the academics that have various criticisms of the current functioning of the EPO in terms of 
transparency, which is of general relevance to the issue of morality, can be found Peter Drahos.44 
Drahos does not confine his criticism to the area of morally controversial biotechnological inventions 
with which this thesis is solely concerned. His writings indicate that there is some discontent with the 
manner in which the EPO functions across a spectrum of issues and in his view, patent officials often 
manage to meander around the laws by which they are purportedly bound in order to grant patents 
generously.45 As patent offices, or intellectual property offices are self-financing, they may be inclined 
to grant patents more often than they refuse them. He notes that the system is now being scrutinised 
more meticulously by a variety of civil society groups46 and emphasises that patent offices should not 
lose sight of their public service duty47 also pointing out that one of their functions is transparency 
towards those affected by their decisions.48  
 
                                                 
44 Peter Drahos, The Global Governance of Knowledge: Patent Offices and Their Clients (Cambridge 
University Press 2010). 
45 Ibid 16. 
46 Ibid 19, 125. 
47 Ibid 159. 
48 Ibid 34. 
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In another broad critique of how patent systems now operate, Kingston remarks upon the private 
interests behind their expansion. He is concerned that the private-public balance might be out of kilter 
in the area of biotechnological patents. More thought should have been given to the extension of 
patents to these inventions, in his opinion,49 but who should have been involved in this process is 
unexplored in his writings. According to Bagley, when speaking of scientists, they are unaccountable, 
their deliberations are not public and their interests and objectives may not align with those of society 
at large. This lack of accountability also permeates patent law in this area.50 This literature indicates 
that there is a general unease with current patent office practice in that the decision-making process is 
perceived to lack democracy. This diminishing democracy is also remarked upon in the international 
field, which is of relevance to patents due to their growing internationalisation. Nelkin has the 
following to say: 
 
There is an increasingly wide gap between the (global) sites where issues arise and the places 
where they are managed (the nation state)...Instead of governments, the talk now is 
increasingly of “governance” – power exercised at a series of other levels and by other 
institutions, in collaboration or otherwise with state bodies. The “denationalisation” of rule-
making means that transnational public and semi-public networks substitute, to an increasing 
extent, for national governments. Rule-formation and settlement increasingly takes place 
within new agencies of transnational governance, such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World 
Trade Organization, but also in many lesser-known public-private forums.51 
 
Whilst Nelkin does not talk about the patent system specifically, his general comments about 
international organisations do touch on the issue of patents to the extent that the EPC is an 
international convention promulgated by an international body, the European Patent Organisation. The 
morality bar on patent applications is decided by the EPO or the CJEU when cases from national 
courts are referred. Nation states are not allowed to prohibit patents under the Biotechnology Directive 
just because their own laws have certain bars to morality. This may be unconstitutional in countries 
such as Ireland because it raises important issues about sovereignty in a constitution imbued with 
natural law, yet this was never aired by way of referendum. Other writers such as Sell tie the decrease 
in public access and knowledge with the expansion of intellectual property rights52 and this expansion 
is linked with increased globalisation. 
 
The sample of authors in this section shows that there is discontent with the current functioning of the 
patent system and it has become part of a larger global system of governance. Patent or intellectual 
property offices are public bodies with a responsibility to balance private and public interests. 
                                                 
49 William Kingston, Beyond Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar 2010) 132–133. 
50 Margo A Bagley, ‘Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law’ 
(2003) 45 Wm & Mary L Rev 469, 510-511. 
51 David Nelkin, ‘Transnational Legal Processes and the (Re)construction of the “‘Social”’ in Feenan 
(ed) 142. 
52 Susan K Sell, Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust (SUNY 
Press 1998) chapter four especially. 
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However, public voices do not have an authentic means of input into controversial applications when 
proceedings lack transparency and where societal interests are not given their due weight. There is 
some critique in the legal literature, as examined in the next section.   
 
1.3.3 Arguments for reform 
 
Some reforms are suggested in the literature. Harmon proposes that the EPO should acknowledge that 
there are different interests at stake and they should endeavour to articulate these and understand 
them.53 At present, the office lacks the mechanisms to achieve such an aim. Other writers such as 
Shum posits allowing the revocation of patents at national level54 but this would interfere with the 
international trend of harmonisation of patent law. Smith, writing on the US system, has little faith in 
legislative reform, believing that change which would facilitate a more critical approach to granting 
controversial patents must come from judicial activism and deliberation.55 The judiciary, however, are 
less well equipped than the legislature to deal with issues of complexity and how deliberation could be 
incorporated into the decision-making process is not explored. Warren-Jones advocates public 
involvement in the decision-making process but believes that polls for each new invention would be 
cost prohibitive.56 She does not investigate this matter further. Questions are posed by Mills as to how 
the public’s (or publics’) concern over issues raised by biotechnological inventions can be addressed57 
and he believes that this matter has to be resolved prior to patenting.58 Crespi perceives a need to refer 
to competing fundamental belief systems before discussion on matters pertaining to patenting and the 
human embryo can progress further.59 The questions of which creeds would be included and who 
could partake in any discussions are unanswered. During the extension of patents to animals, some 
theologians in the US urged a moratorium. Their arguments included this statement by Rabbi Michael 
Berenbaum who specifically addressed the patenting of animals: 
 
To understand what must be done regarding the issue of animal patenting, we must ask what 
constitutes life and what is merely an inert manufactured commodity. So too we must ask 
what are the limits of scientific knowledge and what are its frontiers. Should there be 
constraints on scientific experimentation and/or industrial exploitation of these experiments. 
And perhaps even more importantly, who shall regulate, who shall decide?60 
                                                 
53 SHE Harmon, ‘The Rules Re-Engagement: The Use of Patent Proceedings to Influence the 
Regulation of Science (“What the Salmon Does When It Comes Back Downstream”)’ (2006) 4 IPQ 
378, 378. 
54 Jenny Shum, ‘Moral Disharmony: Human Embryonic Stem Cell Patent Laws, WARF and Public 
Policy’ (2010) 33 BC Int’l & Comp L Rev 153, 171–173. 
55 Smith, op. cit. 93. 
56 Warren-Jones, op. cit. 28. 
57 Mills, op. cit. 2. 
58 The issue of public input into whether the invention should be allowed, as distinct from whether  
patents should be granted on such inventions is outside the scope of this thesis as the work focuses on  
Article 53(a) EPC (as amended). 
59 R Stephen Crespi, ‘The Human Embryo and Patent Law: A Major Challenge Ahead?’ (2006) 28 
EIPR 569, 579. 
60 Subcommittee Hearings, 1077 Official Gazette of the US Patent Office 24 (April 21, 1987) 405. 
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Traditionally, our legislators decide for us in representative democracies but in an increasingly 
complex area, patent officials determine whether biotechnological inventions are moral or immoral. 
This raises questions as to the quality of their decisions as there is no indication as to how they are 
qualified for such a task, nor do they have a set of principles which highlights the sort of inventions 
that would be subject to such scrutiny. Early case law, such as Plant Genetic Systems,61 was dismissive 
of some structures of public input such as opinion polls and surveys but the same courts did not 
outline how public opinion could be accommodated and hence excluded it. 
 
McBride argues that the publics can be induced to become involved in matters of concern to them62 
and government would bear a responsibility for facilitating such involvement as morality is such a 
concern under human rights and relevant legislation. While patent grants do require technical and 
legal skills, considerations of morality are potentially of interest to everyone. Even if publics are 
disinterested, the opportunity to participate should nonetheless be available as is the right to 
participate in referendums or, indeed, the right to vote. Expertise in scientific or regulatory matters 
does not mean expertise in ethical issues and at the level of ethics or morality, all views should receive 
equal airing, it will be contended. 
 
Rogers, who discusses participatory democracy specifically in science, does not elaborate on how 
participation would operate in practice, but talks about all of society being involved in decision-
making.63 Whilst pleading the case for more participation he does not explore any existing model of 
how this might actually function. Nowhere does there seem to be a mention of participatory 
democracy’s potential for patent reform: discussions tend to be either confined to more deliberation in 
the patent system or more participation in science and this is one of my thesis’ bridges in the literature 
gaps in this area. 
 
What the literature does show is an unease with the decision-making process. Where deliberation is 
mentioned as a desirable feature, within legal literature no model is advanced. The thesis thus sources 
literature on deliberation from other disciplines to connect legal commentary with other ideas that 
explain, justify and operationalise deliberation as part of robust decision-making. 
 
1.3.4 Deliberative models from sociology and political science literature 
 
The profound writing on deliberative democracy is found in the social sciences and humanities, 
particularly in political science and sociology, and also in philosophy. The term “deliberative 
democracy” surfaces in much modern inter-disciplinary literature outside of the patent realm, such as 
                                                 
61 Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace [1995] EPOR 357. 
62 Cillian McBride, ‘Reason, Representation, and Participation’ (2007) 13 Res Publica 171, 188. 
63 Karl Rogers, Participatory Democracy, Science and Technology (Palgrave Macmillan 2008). 
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can be found in some of the writings of Habermas64 regarding the public sphere. This “deliberation” 
seems to be little more than a metaphor for a public conversation which would not interconnect 
recommendations emerging from such grassroots discussions with the various patent decision-making 
bodies so a chasm would still exist. There are a number of deliberative mechanisms mentioned in the 
literature on patents and these are mooted, possibly, to show that such models do exist. However, 
these are not explored in any great depth because much literature centres on the problem rather than 
being solution-oriented. Whilst several academic writers did suggest the use of deliberative devices 
such as citizen juries, deliberative polls or consensus conferences, many of these paradigms when they 
are employed are only used for consultative purposes, as seen in chapter four. Participants can be 
heard but may not be listened to and these examples fall short of the reform envisaged in this thesis. 
 
Some authors such as Fishkin65 have carried out empirical studies, elaborated in chapter four, but 
many of his findings are quite negative as they are polarising or opinions remain unrefined. He 
distinguishes between raw and refined deliberation and what differentiates these is the interposition of 
mediation. Brownsword says that deliberation can lead to an accommodation of radical views which 
can then undermine the legitimacy of the decision66 so the mediating process is likely to be crucial. 
This thesis, therefore, seeks an embedded example which is not just a one-off experiment where 
considerable debate will occur beforehand and, importantly, this will be mediated. Whilst Gutmann 
and Thompson67 do not give many concrete instances of theories put to the test, their work is useful 
because it treats the matter of deliberative democracy as a viable option and identifies both effective 
and less effective models. Top-down facilitation of constructive debate is important and the thesis will 
examine this in practice and demonstrate its operation. Deliberative mechanisms are examined, 
compared and contrasted and the most constructive ones identified: constructive in the sense of the 
ones least likely to polarise opinion and most likely to feed into actual decisions. 
 
Will deliberative democracy, as expounded by patent experts and other academics prove to be a useful 
reform device for the perceived current ills of the system? The thesis explores this matter and argues 
that there is not a clear-cut answer: much will depend on the type of deliberation employed as many 
different ways of conducting deliberation exist in terms of style and scale. Moreover, management of 
the debate which sets boundaries, establishes goals and provides space for everyone’s input in a forum 
which does not permit intimidation or belittling of others, is crucial if deliberative democracy is to 
fulfil any meaningful role. With this in mind, the writings of academics such as John Dryzek,68 Selya 
                                                 
64 Jurgen Habermas, ‘Between Facts and Norms (W. Rehg, Trans.)’ (Polity Press 1996). 
65 James Fishkin, Democracy and deliberation: new directions for democratic reform (Cambridge  
University Press 1991). 
66 Robert Brownsword, ‘Regulating human genetics: new dilemmas for a new millennium’ (2004) 12 
Med L Rev 14, 30. 
67 Gutmann and Thompson, op. cit. 
68 John S Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford 
University Press 2000). 
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Benhabib,69 James Fishkin,70 Stephen Tierney,71 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson,72 and Karl 
Rogers73 to name but a few will be explored and their various theories74 analysed in the context of 
critique and reform. A nexus is established between what patent lawyers have pointed towards and 
what deliberative theorists and empiricists have explored and found useful. With theoretical 
approaches distinguished into those that may address concerns raised about public involvement and 
those that do not, this thesis then seeks out a model where deliberative and participatory practices 
work hand-in-hand and where the matter can be analysed in greater depth. The most relevant of the 
above literature for the purposes of this thesis is that by Fishkin and Gutmann and Thompson. The 
latter two writers hold that mediated deliberation in debates on morality can moderate hard line views 
and this will be useful if disagreement over moral aspects of a particular patent grant is strong. 
 
The academic boundaries between law and the social sciences (sociology and political science) have 
not been traversed in this area. This is an aspect of this thesis’ original contribution and a gap in the 
literature. Even where expanded, deliberative democracy is not necessarily a radical solution. At times 
it fails to be integrated with participation because it does not necessarily connect with the decision-
making bodies and may instead occur in a parallel sphere.  
 
This thesis advocates a particular model of deliberation where public involvement is meaningful 
because it is the site of decision-making. It does, through the particular deliberative mechanisms 
described, seek a model which can soften polarised views although not aiming for consensus. It 
envisages a vote although it strives for a relatively harmonious process whereby a plurality of views 
can best be accommodated and mutual respect fostered. The literature on deliberative democracy 
forms a partial bridge in that it theorises on constructive deliberation. However, it does not go far 
enough in that it does not provide long-lived examples where it has been used by institutions and 
where it was not confined to small groups. This thesis’ focus is on wide-scale deliberation in a 
participatory context. However, there is a small body of literature on the participatory budget in Brazil 
which does possess the characteristics of longevity, a broad base and in-built deliberation. I sourced 
literature on this model to find principles which could inform the decision-making process on moral 
controversies in biotechnological patents at the EPO.  
 
 
                                                 
69 Seyla Benhabib (ed), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political 
(Cambridge University Press 1996). 
70 Fishkin, op. cit. 
71 Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation 
(Oxford University Press 2012). 
72 Gutmann and Thompson, op. cit. 
73 Rogers, op. cit. 
74 All of which are relevant to issues of how public involvement in decision-making is worthwhile 
and/or can be managed effectively. 
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1.3.5 Deliberation in Action: Participation in Budgetary Processes 
 
Arguably, the EPO already has a participatory process in that patent grants can be opposed and the 
opposition proceedings do allow individual representation, but accessibility and deliberation fall 
somewhat short in this paradigm. Radical reform of the triumvirate of patents, biotechnology and 
morality is currently untouched and my thesis’ original contribution is the argument for a universal 
patent suffrage based on participatory practices which are explored to move beyond the theoretical to 
the practical. The case study of the participatory budget in Brazil in chapter five serves to elucidate 
deliberative and participatory democracy in practice and generalisable principles are derivable from 
the model which are applied to the patent system in this thesis with a view to reform. The literature on 
the origin of this model asserts that the participatory budget can, according to some of its most prolific 
authors, Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Gianpaolo Baiocchi, be both adapted75 and scaled up.76 I 
will argue that this model may address this thesis’ identified lacuna: that being the democratic deficit 
when deciding what constitutes morality in morally controversial biotechnological inventions. 
 
The literature on deliberative democracy can traverse the gap between the participatory budget and the 
controversies of access to decision-making on the issue of morality in the patenting process. Much of 
the participatory budgetary procedure employs deliberative mechanisms but what distinguishes it from 
the largely theoretical literature on this topic is that it concretises the theories and brings them to life. 
It therefore serves a very useful purpose for theoretical transplantation of its main principles.  
 
This budgeting style has become an entrenched practice and has outlived the holding of public office 
by its progenitors, although there is not an abundance of literature on the theme. The principal authors 
relied upon in describing and analysing Brazil’s participatory budget are Santos,77  Baiocchi,78 Nylen 
and Dodd,79 and Bruce.80 They show that it has begun to put down deep roots and extend its ambit. It 
may thereby be useful as a paradigm for the patent reform envisaged in this thesis as its longevity 
facilitates the anticipation of difficulties experienced when instituting significant changes to 
established practices. The aforementioned authors show that the participatory budget operates in an 
intermediate political sphere between representative and grassroots democracy, sometimes mimicking 
the election of representatives of the former but always staying close to its roots at ground level. It 
thus adds layers to the gap between grassroots and representative democracy. The literature shows that 
                                                 
75 Baiocchi, op cit. 102. 
76 Santos, ‘Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Toward a Redistributive Democracy’ in Santos  
(ed), Democratising Democracy (Verso 2005) 367 and also in Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a  
New Legal Common Sense (2nd edn, Butterworts 2002) 491. 
77 Santos in Democratising Democracy and Santos and César A Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and  
Globalization from Below (Cambridge University Press 2005). 
78 Baiocchi, op. cit. 
79 William R Nylen and Lawrence C Dodd, Participatory Democracy versus Elitist Democracy: 
Lessons from Brazil (Palgrave Macmillan 2003). 
80 Iain Bruce, The Porto Alegre Alternative: Direct Democracy in Action (Pluto Press 2004). 
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it has been used at state level as well as municipal level, it is employed in over 250 cities in Brazil 
today and the concept of mass voting on a portion of how the budget is spent has been extended to 
children81 in some municipalities.82 It has also been exported to other Latin American jurisdictions 
where it has taken on a life of its own and has been adapted further. For instance, Peru has become the 
first country in the world to enshrine in legislation the right to participate in municipal budgetary 
decision-making by the citizenry83 - in other jurisdictions it exists on an ad hoc basis. The practice of 
participatory budgeting is becoming more widespread in Europe and Portugal is the first country to 
introduce it at national level for its national84 budget in 2017. Nonetheless, its introduction is very 
recent and Brazil has more literature which documents some of the early difficulties and subsequent 
adjustments that were useful for my theory of how such a model could apply to the area of morality 
bars in patent law. I argue that some principles can be gleaned from Brazil’s experience and applied to 
a draft model of governance of the European Patent Office’s dealings with a view to radical reform. 
This extraction and application fills a gap in the literature as to how participatory practices can be 
applied to different systems and subject matter. 
 
Some of the rather sparse literature in the US suggests that similar models have been utilised in health 
budgets. Moreover, participation is not entirely foreign in the area of environmental law. The Aarhus 
Convention provides for public participation in matters concerning the environment. However, to date, 
participation in environmental legislation tends to favour groups such as NGOs over individuals85 and 
this is a key difference in the actualisation of the right to participate as articulated in environmental 
law practice86 and participatory budgeting. Participatory patenting could be an appropriate matter for 
study. In this context, this thesis will argue for individual participation along the lines of the 
participatory budget because the aim of the proposed reform is to represent the plurality of views that 
may exist on the issue of morality in biotechnological patent applications. 
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Features that can be generalised from the budget to the patent system are the Executive’s role or 
potential role in organising and facilitating debate among the general public. Constructive deliberation 
and participation do not appear to spring up from grassroots levels spontaneously. In fact, mediation is 
important; otherwise debate can be fraught, polarising and can foster ill-will. The thesis will link the 
theoretical work on best practice in deliberation with the case study of the participatory budget. This 
will be in order to design a model for patent office reform in the fraught area of morally controversial 
biotechnological patents. 
 
1.3.6 The Gap in the Literature 
 
This thesis addresses a gap in the literature that we currently lack a documented, functioning, adjusted 
and long-lived paradigm for the manner in which the patent system’s decision-making process in the 
area of morality in biotechnological inventions can be opened up to public education, deliberation, 
participation and a vote. This is important because there is a body of thought which suggests that more 
democracy is desirable in this realm but does not develop this aspirational claim by showing how 
participation and deliberation can be combined in a complimentary fashion. This thesis thus makes an 
original contribution to knowledge. It constructs a theoretical model of how principles from the 
participatory budgetary paradigm, as it exists in Brazil can be adapted and scaled up, as some of the 
literature asserts to be possible, to provide a model for patent reform at the European Patent Office. 
The participatory budget has been able to adapt to changing circumstances on many occasions due to 
the flexibility of its participants and structure. As Feyerabend has said, in words that may also be true 
of patenting morally controversial biotechnological inventions: 
 
In a democracy scientific institutions, research programmes, and suggestions must therefore 
be subjected to public control, there must be a separation of state and science just as there is a 
separation between state and religious institutions, and science should be taught as one view 
among many and not as the one and only road to truth and reality. There is nothing in the 
nature of science that excludes such institutional arrangements or shows that they are liable 
to lead to disaster.87 
 
Whilst it might be somewhat unorthodox to go to the Global South in search of a model of democratic 
innovation, the political climate in which participatory models of democracy emerged in Latin 
America features certain factors which may have been missing in Europe when democracy was first 
extended. At first sight what appears unconventional, at second sight may became logical and, indeed, 
modern. In Latin America, many recent constitutions enshrine participatory rights as they were 
gestated within a pre-existing international human rights framework. This contrasts with the formative 
period of other constitutions which were drafted within the nation state prior to the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights and where the right to participate had not received consideration. The outer remit of 
what nowadays are regarded as human rights has expanded notably and has been influenced by 
                                                 
87 Feyerabend, op. cit. preface viii. 
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international and regional bodies’ declarations and conventions, activist judiciaries and socially-
minded legislatures. 
 
The endeavour of this thesis is not to search for an ideal law, but, rather, to look for an adaptable and 
vibrant process that will reinvigorate and remodel decision-making on patents over morally 
controversial biotechnological inventions. The next chapter will provide a chronology of patent law 
and chart the inclusion of morality in legislative provisions. It will examine and critique the law’s 
treatment of morality in order to identify the research problem of this thesis. 
 
1.3.7 Legitimacy and some semantic points 
 
The word “legitimacy” has manifold meanings which derive from several disciplines including law, 
political science, public administration, organisational studies and institutional theory. Two 
predominant threads of this term are present in this thesis where it critiques the current regime and 
proposals for reform: both input and output legitimacy but there are also places in which these two 
understandings are conflated. Kratochwil observes that we use the term “legitimacy” in a procedural 
sense where decisions result from recognised processes – this being classified as input legitimacy. 
Output legitimacy applies where we evaluate a given result or outcome,88 rather than focusing on the 
procedural aspects of the decision-making process. Whilst these two strands of legitimacy may appear 
to be juxtaposed, the term can sometimes be used in an all-encompassing sense where those affected 
by a legitimate decision accept it because of both its procedural qualities and its outcome. Technical 
attributes of a system could result in a legalistic regime that delivered controversial decisions so it is 
not always possible to ignore what results from a tailored system. When speaking about legitimacy, 
Tyler opines that citizens’ acceptance flows from their confidence in the normative appropriateness of 
government apparatus, based on who took the decision and the manner in which it was taken.89 Gaus 
sums up the classificatory conundrum when he says:  
 
I think it should be doubted that the belief in democratic legitimacy refers either to the 
procedural or the epistemic qualities of a democratic process, but is characterised by a 
simultaneous reference to both… In this view, the belief of democratic legitimacy refers to 
two different kinds of expectations directed likewise at the political process – moral 
expectations that the democratic process helps realising political equality and self-
determination (even if they are restricted by the necessity of coercive rule) and epistemic 
expectations that the democratic process is a device to create (normatively and pragmatically) 
adequate political decisions on a regular basis (even if in the single case one personally 
doubts a decision to be the best).90  
                                                 
88 Friedrich Kratochwil, On Legitimacy International Relations 2006 SAGE Publications, London, 
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This thesis principally uses the term “legitimacy” to indicate a critique of the decision-making process 
in morally controversial biotechnological patents but will also indicate, by way of footnotes what type 
of legitimacy is being employed throughout as the usage sometimes varies or, indeed, is broader on 
occasion. This is largely as a result of the term being used in different contexts by an array of political 





































Chapter Two: In Search of a Definition of Morality in 




This chapter traces the origin and internationalisation of patent law, focusing on two European 
jurisdictions: the European Patent Organisation and the European Union. It first sets out the 
international instruments and shows that morality, which originally did not feature in the legislative 
framework, has now become a mandatory consideration for patent officials at the EPO (and in EU 
states) to weigh up where a patent application potentially raises this issue. It will discuss the historical 
origins of the morality clause and will show that the initial purpose was somewhat ambiguous and 
obscure. It also touches on international and European human rights legislation as it refers to the 
protection of intellectual property rights. The position of morality in the case law, especially at the 
EPO, will then be examined critically and I will show that its definition is uncertain, is in a state of 
flux and the current manner in which it is arbitrated undermines the principle of legal certainty. The 
aim of this thesis is not to achieve legal certainty: arguably, morality cannot be universally agreed but 
if arbitrated more effectively, its definition can be more legitimate.91 Instead, it will argue for a model 
that is inclusive of a plurality of views to reflect that the patenting of morally controversial 
biotechnological inventions attracts a variety of opinions. It will seek to give these viewpoints a voice. 
 
The following chronology will show that the nature of patent law has also evolved over time. The 
scope of protected subject matter has been expanded and simultaneously, morality limitations have 
increased as different ethical implications potentially arise with the changing nature of inventions. 
This is especially true where genetic frontiers are crossed and patent law has moved from a national to 
an international context. Whilst there exists academic criticism of the decision-making process of the 
European Patent Office (EPO),92 little of this offers constructive proposals for reform. Many 
proponents of reform tend to confine their criticisms to proposing an alternative of one or the other 
following remedies: if legislation is not working, some writers propose a judicial reform93 and if the 
reverse is the case, then legislative clarity is suggested.94 This thesis breaks this cycle and argues for 
reform from outside the system to address new issues which have emerged, such as the arbitration of 
morality across 38 signatory states of the European Patent Convention (EPC). Here public concepts of 
morality are notoriously difficult to discern. Yet the result is that morality is adjudicated on an ad hoc, 
unpredictable basis. The purpose of this chapter is to show that while this unpredictability is inevitable 
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92 Warren-Jones, op. cit. 26-28. 
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94 Mills, op cit. chapter 9 especially. 
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when adjudicating morality, the manner in which decisions are taken and by whom is currently 
controversial. 
 
The next section provides a chronological account of patent law in order to trace its changes over the 
centuries and also, importantly, to note and analyse the inclusion of morality as a bar to the grant of 
morally controversial biotechnological patents. 
 
2.1.2 Origins of patent law and its evolution until present times 
 
The origin of the patent system is to be found in Venice and it was established by decree in 1449.95 
Initially, the aim of patent law was to encourage traders to introduce products and processes which 
were unknown in the state.96 Letters patent, or open letters, were granted as proof of these privileges 
or monopolies and such letters were indicative of grants to individuals by the monarch.97 In return for 
the monopoly, the grantee was obliged to disclose aspects of the product or process.98 Originally, 
patents were only granted nationally and even though the aim has often been to prevent foreigners 
from dominating a given domestic market, in Venice, patents were granted in order to incentivise 
outsiders to innovate within the realm.99 The balance between a private right in the form of a 
temporary monopoly and an obligation to effectuate public disclosure has, since the outset of the 
patent system, been a fundamental underlying principle. A justification for the monopoly granted in 
the patent system has been explained by highlighting the fact that the patentee is obliged to publicly 
disclose the invention so that the public can work the invention once the protected period has expired. 
Moreover, if the monopoly is broader than the contribution the invention makes to the art, courts can 
revoke the patent.100 Modern practices such as opposition proceedings at the EPO show that this 
understanding has survived over the centuries even if such proceedings are not universal. Initially, the 
duration of the grant was ten years, although Flynn notes that a patent was granted in Venice for a 
perpetual term in the sixteenth century.101 This indicates that there has always been a tension as to the 
exact nature of a patent: whether it be a temporary monopoly or private property right and, indeed, 
there has been a fluctuation in the common understanding of this right over the centuries. 
 
The Statute of Monopolies was passed in England in 1623 and its aim was the curtailment by 
Parliament of Crown monopolies. An exception to this general principle was set out in section 6 of the 
Act which guaranteed inventors an exclusive right over manufactured goods with a proviso that they 
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101 Flynn, op. cit. 10. 
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should not be “contrary to the law or mischievous to the state” and this proviso had moral undertones. 
It stipulated that they should not increase the price of commodities in the state, injure trade or be 
“generally inconvenient”. This statute was the basis for English patents for centuries and these 
covered inventions of new products, machines and manufacturing processes. The focus was on 
stimulating industrial development rather than on inventors’ rights.102 It can be seen even in this early 
legal enactment that patent rights would be curtailed by the parameters of what was within the law and 
not go against the state’s interests. For over a century after the enactment of the statute, it was ignored, 
however, and the royal prerogative and the Privy Council were used instead. The English Common 
Law and Chancery Courts eventually assumed jurisdiction over patent cases and this signified a shift 
away from a system of commodity monopolies to a patent system for inventions.103 This also shows 
that the grant of patents has emanated from both legislation and precedent. 
 
As will be seen by the end of this chronological exposé, the nature of patents is dynamic and their 
form is not impermeable. Nor, indeed, is the manner of their expansion in that they are creatures both 
of legislation and precedent but also of the executive which is charged with the task of applying 
morality bars whose definition remains elusive. Increasingly their parameters are decided by including 
the voices of objectors, such as Greenpeace, other NGOs and social movements,104 which opposition 
proceedings facilitate. 
 
2.1.3 Patent requirements 
 
Generally speaking, inventions must be new, involve an inventive step and be capable of industrial 
application. The criteria for novelty stipulate that the invention has not been made public, taking into 
account prior art or the state of the art,105 which comprises all prior knowledge in the given domain.106 
Neither can there have been any publication, which includes making available to the public either 
orally or in writing, by demonstration or in ‘any other way’ of the invention prior to the application 
filing date.107 The requirement for there to be an inventive step provides that the invention must not be 
obvious to the ordinary skilled worker, in light of the state of the art.108 The invention must also be 
useful in any type of industry, which includes agriculture.109 If this last requirement is not fulfilled, 
there would be no benefit to society. Patent applicants must also disclose the invention, thus satisfying 
the public interest balance in this monopoly.110 
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Patents are negative rights which authorise the patentee to prevent others from using or exploiting the 
invention without permission111 rather than a positive right to actually use and exploit the invention 
commercially. The grant of a patent does not amount to a licence to practise the invention.  The use of 
the invention can be restricted or prohibited on ordre public or morality grounds nationally or 
internationally.112 Even where exploitation is prohibited, this does not mean that the patent can be 
denied as patents are negative rights which restrict the actions of others. Patents currently last for 20 
years from the filing date of the application in most jurisdictions and for most inventions.113 The US 
used to employ a first to invent system but has relatively recently114 altered this practice, bringing it 
closer to the European regime. As national rights, they are only valid in the jurisdiction where granted 
although as explained hereunder, the EPC’s remit will be expanded under the Unitary Patent System. 
 
As we shall see, attempts have been made for the last century at least to introduce an international 
regime and this endeavour is ongoing. The internationalisation aspect of the patent system is 
important for this thesis because it will show that the breadth of patent law has expanded considerably 
in the last hundred years and many actors have conflicting interests when it comes to patent grants. 
The inventions covered by patent law have also increased to include, for instance, biotechnological 
products and processes. The next section traces legislative developments which have expanded the 
scope and subject matter of patent law. It also notes the introduction of morality clauses in recent 
legislative enactments. 
 
2.2 National to International Coverage: changes in protection in both 
form and substance 
 
2.2.1 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
1883 
 
The first endeavour to introduce an international patent filing system was the International Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883), also known as the Paris Convention and this is 
administered by the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). This agreement created a union 
among contracting states which is advantageous for non-nationals seeking patents in other countries. 
The operation of a principle of national treatment means that nationals of other member states must be 
treated equally to the host country with regards to patentability criteria. The priority period is 12 
months from the date of filing in a signatory country. A priority period means that the applicant is not 
obliged to file for a patent in all designated countries at the same time. A second advantage is that the 
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Convention allows inventors to exhibit their work before securing a patent and not fall foul of the 
novelty requirements in patent law which normally prohibits disclosure prior to the grant of a patent. 
 
The Convention leaves the duration of the right to national law. It does not deal with many substantive 
matters of patent law such as the criteria for patentability but its scope covers patents and utility 
models along with a number of other intellectual properties such as industrial designs and trade marks. 
Countries can make further agreements amongst themselves as it has proved difficult to amend. It has 
a substantial number of contracting parties and was most recently amended in 1979. 
 
No provisions on morality are included in this legislation. The issue of morality appears in other, later 
international patent laws that deal with substantive issues and is engaged most in the area of 
biotechnological inventions. Intellectual property rights also enjoy general protection under 
international human rights law as can be seen in the next section. 
 
2.2.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides for intellectual property rights, stating that: 
 
[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.115  
 
A number of other human rights instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights also 
provide for intellectual property rights116 as does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.117 No 
mention of morality is made in any of these instruments but in any case these rights are articulated in 
very general language and merely acknowledge the right without further details. Human rights law 
will be revisited at a later point in the thesis as it establishes a hierarchy of rights which may bring 
some clarity – or otherwise – to tensions which exist between private and public rights in the 
intellectual property realm. 
 
2.2.3 Strasbourg Convention 1963 – an optional morality provision 
 
The Strasbourg Convention 1963 was the brainchild of the Council of Europe and came into force in 
1980. It was open for membership only to Member States of the Council of Europe. Its main aim was 
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to create common criteria for patentability, which were lacking in the Paris Convention. Article 1 of 
the Convention stipulates that in order to obtain patent protection, the invention must be susceptible of 
industrial application, be new and involve an inventive step. It signalled an attempt to harmonise 
patent law at an international level. It also spawned the European Patent Convention 1973 which was 
largely based on the Strasbourg Convention. Whilst the latter had optional moral exclusions to 
patentability, the former’s exclusions are mandatory showing that morality occupies an increasingly 
prominent place in patent legislative reform in Europe.   
 
2.2.4 Patent Cooperation Treaty 1970 
 
The Patent Cooperation Treaty 1970 was drafted as an attempt to simplify the patent application 
process and it facilitates multiple national applications through the use of one procedure. An 
application is made to the patent or intellectual property office of a member state, a regional office 
such as the EPO or at WIPO’s office in Geneva. An international preliminary examination is carried 
out to give an opinion as to whether the invention is novel, involves an inventive step and is useful in 
industry. This opinion is non-binding, given that the criteria for patentability are not harmonised. This 
treaty is administered by WIPO and makes no reference to morality, perhaps reflecting that European 
institutions such as the Council of Europe and the EU have a broader approach to patenting, taking 
within their ambit ethical concerns which imbue this domain. Morality considerations are brought into 
account at national or regional level. The Patent Cooperation Treaty has 151 contracting parties. 
 
2.2.5 European Patent Convention 1973 - morality mandated 
 
Negotiations for the drafting of a Convention on European patents took place throughout the 1960s 
and the intention was to establish a system which encompassed more countries than within the 
European Economic Community which, at the time, had only six members. The European Patent 
Office (EPO) opened in 1978 and it grants “European” patents. In actuality, there is no such thing 
within the jurisdiction of the EPO as it merely provides a single office at which an applicant can lodge 
a patent application which is examined once. If one wishes to apply for a patent under the EPC one 
may file an application at the Irish Patents Office or other national office or at the EPO, and they act 
as a receiving office even though the EPO is the granting body. Similarly, the EPO acts as a receiving 
office for applications under the PCT and such applications can be filed, searched and examined at the 
EPO. This allows patent applicants considerable flexibility and national patent or intellectual property 
offices may also act as receiving offices for WIPO. Any number of countries in which patent 
protection is sought may be designated and patentees therefore get a bundle of national patents rather 
than a European patent covering all contracting states. Whilst examination is dealt with at European 
level, infringement proceedings take place at national level. This means that harmonisation is partial at 
best. Under the new patent system introduced in the EU which employs the EPC as its overarching 
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legislation,118 harmonised European patent protection will be available. Specialised patent courts are a 
feature of this reform, and this is detailed later in this chapter. 
 
The European Patent Organisation has been established in conformity with the norms of the Vienna 
Convention on International Treaties 1969119 and is a conventional intergovernmental organisation 
based on the EPC.120 It has two principal branches: the European Patent Office (EPO) which occupies 
an executive role and the Administrative Council, which exercises a quasi-legislative function. It also 
supervises the Office’s activities and takes charge of the Organisation’s policy issues. Membership of 
the Administrative Council is almost entirely comprised of the directors of national patent or 
intellectual property offices,121 giving a sense that there is a blurring between the executive and 
legislative functions. Regardless of the fact that the EPO lacks formal legislative powers, the Enlarged 
Board of Appeal (EBA) stated in the WARF case122 rather controversially that the Administrative 
Council is the EPO’s legislator.123 In fact, in order to amend the EPC, a full diplomatic conference 
must be held in accordance with Article 172 EPC and the procedure to revise the Convention is quite 
complex.124 The Boards of Appeal are bound only by the provisions of the Convention, under Article 
23. The Administrative Council is vested with significant legislative and rule-making powers. It may 
amend the Implementing Regulations of the Convention125 and has powers to authorize the EPO’s 
President to negotiate agreements on its behalf.126 These powers have been bolstered in revisions of 
the EPC which enable the Council to bring the EPC into line with European or international patent 
legislation. 
 
Given that the governing legislation is so difficult to alter and that biotechnology is a rapidly 
advancing field, when the Biotech Directive came into force in the EU, the Administrative Council 
incorporated the Directive’s articles into the Implementing Regulations of the EPC as an interpretive 
aid, by way of a decision in 1999. The legitimacy of this sort of legislative enactment is 
questionable127 for reasons of transparency and sovereignty as the jurisdiction of the EPO is greater 
than that of the EU. Therefore the ten non-Member States of the EU who are part of the EPO had their 
governing legislation amended without a formal amendment process taking place. Such legislative 
                                                 
118 The EU will employ the existing European Patent Convention rather than drafting a new law. 
119 Article 5. 
120 Article 4. 
121 https://www.epo.org/about-us/organisation/administrative-council/representatives.html, (accessed 
June 10, 2017).  
122 G2/06 WARF/Stem Cells [2009] EPOR 15. 
123 Ibid 137 Westlaw. 
124 Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, ‘Institutional and Jurisdictional Aspects of Stem Cell Patenting 
in Europe (EC and EPO): Tensions and Prospects’ in Aurora Plomer and Paul Torremans (eds), 
Embryonic Stem Cell Patents: European Patent Law and Ethics (OUP 2009) 247. 
125 Article 33(1)(b) EPC. 
126 Article 33(4) EPC. 
127 Decision of the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation of 16 June 1999, 
(1999) OJ EPO 7, 437. 
30 
 
activity will often only attract attention if there is a subsequent negative consequence for any of the 
states in question, which does not appear to have been the case. 
 
2.2.5.1 Patentable and non-patentable inventions, morality and other 
exemptions in the EPC 
 
The revised text of the EPC now provides the following in respect of patentability. Article 52(1) 
states: 
 
European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of technology, provided 
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application. 
 
This language is similar to the language authorising patent grants in many other legal instruments 
around the world. Article 27(1) TRIPS, discussed below, is echoed in these amended provisions which 
provide for patents on inventions in “all” technological fields. The Convention does not attempt to 
define “invention” but provides a list of things which are excluded, whether or not they would be 
regarded as inventions and interpretation is left instead, to the boards. Pumfrey J in Shopalotto.com’s 
Application128 stated that it was not possible to provide a thorough definition of invention. 
 
Excluded inventions are now listed in EPC 2000, the final version of which came into force in 
December 2007. Article 52(2) excludes from patentability the following inventions, within the terms 
of (1): 
 
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; (b) aesthetic creations; (c) 
schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, 
and programs for computers; (d) presentations of information. 
 
This is circumscribed somewhat by Article 52(3), the terms of which provide: 
 
Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject-matter or activities referred to 
therein only to the extent to which a European patent application or European patent relates 
to such subject matter or activities as such (my italics). 
 
The term “as such” has no specific legal meaning but has been used to restrict the ambit of the 
exclusion, especially in the sphere of computer programs where its interpretation has given rise to 
controversy. In T-1173/97 Computer program product/IBM,129 the patent claims covered a computer 
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program which could be directly loaded onto a computer and also a stored computer program product. 
The claims were rejected initially as constituting a computer program “as such”. IBM argued that the 
EPC legislators had not wished to exclude from patentability all computer programs, meaning that the 
words “as such” had to be defined. The Board distinguished between computer programs without a 
technical character which were not patentable and those which did have such features, which could be 
patented.130 Despite the exclusion to patentability in the legislation, the Board concluded that 
computer programs were, after all, patentable,131 thus circumventing the legislative constraints. 
Sterckx and Cockbain132 note that IBM sought to override the exceptions and were heeded by the 
Board which conducted what they describe as a “perverse” reading of the expression “as such” in 
Article 52(3) EPC by conflating the interpretation of Articles 52(2) and (3).133 This shows that the text 
of the Convention has been interpreted controversially and in the biotechnological patent realm, the 
question of morality, ordre public and their definition are similarly the source of some polemic, as 
explored hereunder. 
 
Article 53 enumerates the exceptions to patentability. This section states that European patents shall 
not be granted in respect of: 
 
(a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to “ordre public” or 
morality; such exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is 
prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the contracting States; 
 
The Working Party on the EPC in the Travaux Préparatoires opined that there is no European 
definition of morality.134 They believed that arbitration of this issue should be left to European 
institutions but neglected to denominate which institutions had responsibility or, indeed, competence 
to carry out this task. A morality bar was included in the Convention because it already existed in the 
patent laws of several states but it was not defined in the same way in each one. For instance, Sterckx 
and Cockbain note that Belgian law does not have a morality or “ordre public” bar on patentability.135 
Other countries that do have morality provisions apply them very rarely but they would be engaged if 
the sole purpose of an invention were illegal, in which case a patent would be denied. However, 
patents may be granted on inventions where the exploitation is not allowed or is partially permitted. 
Examples would include patentable genetically modified organisms whose cultivation might be 
curtailed by national regulation or abortifacients with multiple uses such as for elective abortions or in 
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cases of medical emergencies. The UK Patents Act of 1883 gave the Comptroller a right to refuse the 
grant of a patent the use of which would be contrary to law or morality136 and patents have been 
refused on grounds of morality for contraceptive devices.137 Such patents were refused even where the 
device did not claim to be a contraceptive.138 Armitage and Davies observe that in their experience of 
practice at the Patent Office, under the 1949 Act, morality provisions were invoked almost exclusively 
on grounds of sexual morality.139 The Working Party of the EPC also found that ordre public was 
similarly undefined and therefore lacked a uniform meaning.140 Leaving these terms without definition 
is questionable as when they arise, the boards of the EPO have little guidance as to their application 
and this has created an inconsistent body of case law, which will be explored and critiqued later in this 
chapter. 
 
Article 53(a) EPC is the focus of this thesis as its invocation has not clarified or resolved the problem 
of what is meant by morality in Europe. The EPC does not define “ordre public” or morality, in line 
with the recommendations of the Working Party. We shall see the development of the jurisprudence 
unfolding through legislative amendments and case law which endeavour to keep up with rapid 
technological change.  
 
The EPO first published Guidelines for Examination in 1977 and these are regularly updated, the most 
recent edition being November 2016 at the time of writing.141 These guidelines address the policy of 
Article 53(a) which provides that a fair test of what was considered moral could be judged by 
indications that the public in general would abhor the granting of a patent on a given invention.142 
How this was to be ascertained across the now 38 states was not articulated but will be explored 
further in this chapter. 
 
Other exclusions to patentability are found in Article 53(b) and (c) which omit the following from 
patentability: 
  
(b) plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals; this provision shall not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof; 
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(c) methods for the treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and 
diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body; this provision shall not apply to 
products, in particular substances or compositions, for use in any of these methods. 
 
Additional changes brought about by EPC 2000 include the fact that Article 53(c) EPC now provides 
that methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods 
practised on the human or animal body are expressly excluded from patentability. In the previous 
version of the EPC, these were omitted for not demonstrating industrial applicability. What constitutes 
the state of the art has been extended by Art 54(3) EPC: this now includes the content of all European 
patent applications filed prior to the filing date of the instant application thus making obtaining a 
patent somewhat more difficult. 
 
Post-grant amendments may also be made under the revised EPC as heretofore, these were permitted 
only as part of opposition proceedings. Patentees may request revocation of or limits on the patent 
under Article 105a EPC 2000. The next section details the application process along with procedures 
available for patent opponents. 
 
2.2.5.2 Filing and oppositions 
 
Anyone who wishes to apply for a patent has a number of options available. Classical European 
patents can be filed in EPO filing offices in Munich,143 in the Hague144 or in Berlin145 or at national 
patent or intellectual property offices if permitted in the country where sought.146 They can be filed in 
English, French or German or another language and translated into an official language.147 After a 
novelty search relating to prior art is carried out, an Extended European Search Report is issued. The 
patent application is published as soon as possible after 18 months from the filing date. Although 
anybody may submit written observations regarding the patentability of the invention, there is no right 
of audience. Neither is there any official communication about any effect of the observations. There is, 
therefore, a right to be heard or, rather, a right to be read which does not necessarily encapsulate a 
right to be listened to, to get a response, a justification or an explanation. Moreover, as secrecy is a 
prerequisite for inventions prior to patent applications, scant opportunity exists for debates which 
engage society and this raises “questions about the legitimacy of quasi-regulatory decisions about the 
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value, or otherwise, of a particular invention”.148 A devolution of this decision-making process could, 
if managed appropriately, enhance the legitimacy of decisions on morality by being more inclusive of 
a broader spectrum of viewpoints. 
 
An opposition procedure is provided for in Article 100 EPC 2000, Part V and this must be filed within 
nine months of the patent grant. Standing to oppose is open and this Article stipulates the grounds for 
opposition. The first is that the invention is not susceptible of industrial application, is not new and/or 
does not involve an inventive step or that the basic criteria are not fulfilled so the patent will not be 
granted. The next condition is that the invention is not patentable subject matter and such an invention 
should be excluded. The following ground for opposition is where the publication or exploitation of 
the invention would be contrary to ordre public or morality. The matter of ordre public and morality 
has been modified to reflect a bar where the invention is to be exploited commercially and these 
changes will be described hereunder. The other two grounds for opposition are insufficient disclosure 
of the invention and that the subject matter of the European patent extends beyond the content of the 
application. When opposition proceedings are commenced, the EPO’s Opposition Division invites 
observations from the parties under Article 101(2). A number of outcomes may ensue which are that 
the patent may be revoked under Article 102, the opposition may be rejected or the patent may be 
amended and maintained after an oral hearing. Waelde et. al. describe opposition proceedings as:- 
 
a valuable social device which gives access to the patent system to groups who may have 
legitimate concerns about how well the granting authorities are striking the balance of 
interests at stake.149  
 
The opposition proceedings do not address the concerns in this thesis of widespread public 
involvement adequately for a number of reasons. These include the fact that the bargaining powers of 
the parties are not equal – patent grants favour patentees and it requires much expertise to engage in 
these proceedings. Moreover, it is not a remedy available equally to all contracting states to the EPC 
simply because it is territorially bound – the opposition will have to appear physically which involves 
much expenditure both of time and money and favours those living locally. Whilst this process is a 
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2.2.5.3 Appeal procedures 
 
Where a patent has been granted or refused, there are provisions in the EPC which facilitate the appeal 
of decisions to the EPO Boards of Appeal, giving further options to opponents of the patent grant. As 
will be seen in the case law analysis in this chapter below, these are used frequently. Such appeals 
must be filed within two months of the decision. There is no appeal to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, given that such a decision would not bind all signatories to the EPC and, moreover, 
the CJEU lacks jurisdiction to reopen controversies relating to the examination of patents issued by 
the EPO.151 The EPO and the CJEU operate in separate jurisdictions. Patents may also be granted by 
national patent offices. National courts, the final court of appeal of which is the CJEU, handle 
infringement proceedings so case law on this issue arises from time to time within the European 
Union. This will undergo some change as the unitary patent system gets underway and an extra layer 
or layers of procedure are added to this area. 
 
Another appeal process was introduced by the revised EPC 2000, which facilitates petitions for review 
to the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) of the EPO. Such appeals relate to procedural defects and 
questions of principle referred by the Boards of Appeal. Where the EBA accepts an appeal, 
proceedings before the Board of Appeal will be reopened. Appeals go from the Examination Division 
to the Technical Board of Appeal or the Legal Board of Appeal. These boards are composed of a 
mixture of technical and legal expertise but there is a deficit in the field of ethics which is surprising 
given that some of the appeals invoke Article 53(a) EPC.152 Both these boards can refer matters to the 
Enlarged Board of Appeal. Furthermore, the President of the EPO may issue opinions on significant 
cases and seek clarification on particular areas of law from the Enlarged Board of Appeal. 
 
As stated above, the EPO administers the EPC through its Administrative Council, which also plays a 
legislative role. Of note is that the EPO’s Working Party on Litigation advocated the establishment of 
a specialised court, which has already been done in the US in the form of the Court of Appeal for the 
Federal Circuit. This has also now been achieved in the EU and such courts are currently being 
established under the Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court. The timeframe is currently somewhat 
delayed beyond 2017, due to some states’ tardiness in ratifying the UPC Agreement.153 
 
Other international patent treaties had not achieved harmonisation of substantive patent provision and 
so the World Trade Organisation (WTO) initiated the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
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Rights (TRIPS) Agreement in 1994. This treaty has continued the trend to include within its 
provisions a morality threshold, as can be seen in the next section. 
 
2.2.6 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 1994 
 
TRIPS is a substantial international treaty on intellectual property rights and patents are dealt with 
under Articles 27 to 34. Member states must make protection available for any inventions in all 
technological fields, regardless of whether the inventions are made locally or imported.154 Exclusions 
are permitted and these include inventions, the commercial exploitation of which would raise ordre 
public or morality concerns.155 Encompassed by this provision are the protection of human, animal or 
plant life or health and prevention of serious prejudice to the environment, so long as exclusions are 
not made only because the exploitation is prohibited by law in contracting states. The TRIPS 
Agreement contains morality provisions largely at the behest of European states156 given that there 
already is a morality bar in pre-existing European patent legislation. As Europe maintains a 
commitment to morality’s place within patent law, it would make sense for this bar to patenting to be 
as clear as possible but TRIPS does not add anything to the definition of morality or ordre public. 
 
Exclusions from patentability may also be made for the following: (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals; (b) plants and animals other than micro-
organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and micro-biological processes. Members shall, however, provide for the protection of plant 
varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. 
Signatories to TRIPS are obliged to adhere to core provisions of the Paris Convention. 
 
2.2.7 Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions 
 
Despite the existence of the EPC it was deemed desirable to introduce patent legislation at EU level. 
In 1988, the European Commission proposed a Directive in order to endeavour to harmonise the law 
on biotechnological inventions157 as at the time, there was no overarching Union law to achieve this 
purpose. The EPC is broader than EU law, in that it currently covers 38 states and, in any case, its 
judgments are not binding on national courts. Initially morality did not play a role as the motivation of 
the Commission was to emulate the US and Japanese relatively permissive patenting regimes in order 
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to increase European competitiveness.158 However, European civil society activism and NGOs such as 
Greenpeace159 and Friends of the Earth160 mounted many campaigns against genetic modification and 
commodification of genetic material and the directive proved to be a controversial legislative 
proposal. In 1994, France introduced a bioethics law which prohibited the patenting of human genes 
on ordre public and morality grounds even if the invention satisfied patent criteria because the genes 
had been extracted from the human body and, therefore, isolated.161 
 
In 1995 the European Parliament vetoed an early draft of the Directive162 because MEPs had been 
concerned that ethical issues had not been given their due weight. Not all of the amendments they 
proposed had been accepted by the Commission when an amended draft was submitted to the 
Parliament in 1992.163 The Parliament proposed further amendments, some of which were accepted by 
the Council and after a protracted period in which conciliation proceedings between the Council and 
the Parliament took place, the jointly produced text was vetoed by the Parliament.164  
 
It may be that in the domain of intellectual property laws, the European Parliament is receptive to 
public opinion given that its members are directly elected. The Commission, by way of contrast, is the 
Union’s executive branch and its members are appointed by the Council of the European Union and 
not by nationals of Member States. The Commission promulgates trade and promotes harmonisation 
of the internal market. It proposes legislation which is voted on in a co-decision procedure by the 
Council and the Parliament. Notably, the EPO does not have such a direct connection within its 
jurisdiction. Aerts observes that the EPO lacks both a democratically elected body and judicial 
review165 and he opines that patent law under the EPC lacks the democratic legitimacy of the EU and 
US.166 It would appear that the Directive caused a lot more controversy than the EPC. Some reasons 
for this were that advances had been made in biotechnology, over two decades had elapsed between 
the two pieces of legislation, the issue of morality had been flexed and, moreover, genetic 
modification of plants and animals had stoked public interest in the European Union.167 
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Eventually, in 1998, a revised Directive was adopted after ten years of negotiation although it was 
challenged before the CJEU by the Netherlands,168 Italy and Norway. The Netherlands contested the 
Directive on six grounds, those being that Article 100a of the Treaty was not the correct legal basis for 
the Directive and that there was a breach of the principle of subsidiarity. The third challenge was on 
the principle of legal certainty. Article 6 of the Biotech Directive provides that patents should not be 
granted where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to morality or ordre public. The 
Netherlands deemed that the language of the Directive is too general and equivocal and that there was 
insufficient guidance to determine when to apply this Article. The CJEU disagreed saying that the 
provisions of patent law which would apply where a patent was refused on morality or ordre public 
grounds were well known and were also present in the international legal instruments. These were not 
denominated by the court, however. Further claims included a breach of international law, a breach of 
the fundamental right to respect for human dignity and a breach of the procedural rules in the adoption 
of the Commission’s proposal.169 The Directive was upheld in 2001, yet eight Member States were 
referred to the CJEU in July 2003 for their failure to implement it and were threatened with fines.170 It 
took until 2007 for all Member States to comply with the requirements.171 
 
This legislation authorises patents on biotechnological inventions. Art 3(1) provides that patents are 
available for inventions which are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial 
application. Patentability is assured where the invention consists of or contains or involves a process 
through which a biological material is created, prepared or utilised. Thus the legislation ensures that 
patents are available for living matter, which potentially raises issues of ethical concern in that some 
of these inventions may cross a threshold from the inanimate to the animate for the first time in EU 
law. Such patents had already been granted at the EPO since the mid-1980s172 and were first upheld in 
the US in Diamond v Chakrabarty173 in 1980, therefore, the terrain is not new. Nonetheless they 
continue to cause controversy among environmental groups such as Greenpeace174 and Friends of the 
Earth.175 
 
Art 3(2) of the Directive states that “[b]iological material which is isolated from its natural 
environment or produced by means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it 
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previously occurred in nature”. This provision is controversial in that it blurs the distinction between 
invention and discovery. Drahos analyses this provision by commenting that isolated genes can be 
regarded as inventions because, regardless of the fact that they have been discovered, in their isolated 
and purified form, they can no longer be described as existing in nature. He observes that the 
sequences are the same and that all that has been changed is that some redundant codons have been 
removed.176 Nonetheless, such tinkering renders the modified organism sufficiently novel to attract 
patent protection. Isolated biological material has had its properties identified but has not been 
genetically modified and the extent to which it fulfils the novelty requirement in patent law is unclear. 
Brabin comments that as genes are “products of nature”, the information garnered by understanding 
the genes is, intuitively, a process of discovery rather than invention177 and probably should not be 
patented. When the Directive refers to biological material “produced by means of a technical process” 
it refers to a situation where cells have been replicated but not modified. 
 
Article 4(1) stipulates that plant and animal varieties are not patentable because they are genetically 
fixed and would therefore fail the novelty test. Plants and animals that are genetically modified are, 
however, patentable. The definition of “variety” in relation to plants was to evoke some controversy 
before the enactment of this Directive178 in cases heard under the EPC 1973 as amended179 as the term 
is not defined either in the EPC or in the Directive. In Ciba-Geigy/Propagating Material180 the EPO 
looked at the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) system when 
seeking to define “variety”. Patent protection was possible only because the subject matter fell outside 
the UPOV definition of “variety” as the invention in question was generic so it related to more than 
one variety.181 The board read the provision narrowly and opined that as the patent claim which 
focused on the chemical treatment available was broader than a claim only to a plant variety, it was 
permissible. On this interpretation, more than one plant variety treated in this way can be patented, 
which broadens patent coverage by restricting the interpretation of the exclusion. 
 
This outcome was criticised by Mills because importing nomenclature from one legislative instrument 
to another courts controversy as the purposes of the legislation may differ from those under 
consideration by the court.182 A dictionary definition or expert advice may have been preferable. 
 
Under Article 4(2), there is also a criterion that essentially biological processes for the production of 
plants or animals are not patentable. These are defined in Article 2 as comprising natural techniques of 
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cross breeding and selection. This provision is circumscribed, however, by Article 4(3) which provides 
patents for inventions using a micro-biological or technical process or products resulting from such 
processes. The issue of essentially biological processes has given rise to controversy between the EPO 
and the European Commission. In 2015, the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO considered 
granting patents for products which were brought about as a result of essentially biological processes 
so the product of a non-patentable technique could avail of patent protection.183 The Directive is silent 
as to whether these products are patentable but the Commission has issued a Notice, indicating that 
products resulting from essentially biological processes are not patentable.184 Even though the EPO is 
not bound by this notice, it works closely with the EU and has announced its intention to stay 
proceedings in all examination and opposition cases involving animals or plants produced by 
essentially biological processes.185 
 
Patents are not available for “the human body or its parts in their natural state or for the simple 
discovery of one of its elements”, under Article 5(1). Article 5(2), however, confirms that patents are 
available for: 
 
An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical 
process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, even if the structure of that 
element is identical to that of a natural element. 
 
This section specifies that propagation or replication of biological material which does not strictly 
involve invention can be patented so a reward for expertise and specialised labour is permissible. 
Where technical processes have been applied, the biological material will have been replicated. 
Despite the legislative authorisation of this technology, the European Group on Ethics expressed 
qualms about the patentability of this isolated material.186 Protection for such material has also stoked 
controversy in the US, as will be shown. 
 
This interpretation of this aspect of patent law first came to light in the US Californian Supreme Court 
case of Moore v Regents of the University of California.187 In this case, Moore was a cancer patient 
who found out that without his consent, his doctors had carried out research on his tissue samples and 
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had gained lucrative contracts for this work. Moore was unsuccessful in his claim under the tort of 
conversion in which he sought a share in the profits of this research. The majority of the court opined 
that his oncologists had earned their reward and hence were entitled to be compensated for their 
labour and expertise. Moore, however, was the mere source of the cells in the court’s view and he 
would receive nothing for this part of his claim, although he did recover for the absence of consent 
and breach of fiduciary duty. In this case, his cells had been propagated in the laboratory but not 
modified and were, arguably, a discovery rather than an invention. 
 
Patents on isolated genes will no longer be granted in the US since the Supreme Court decision in 
Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad188 in which Justice Clarence Thomas stated that “[a] 
naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has 
been isolated”. Some change must have been made to the organism in order to attract patent 
protection, in his judgment. No method or process claims had been made in this case as the methods 
employed were not novel, so his judgment referred only to the product. Had the processes employed 
in making the invention been novel, they would have been patentable but they were well known. This 
case represents a surprising turn in US patent adjudication, considering that an earlier Supreme Court 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty189 had pioneered the extension of patents to living organisms and 
“anything under the sun” in the courts. Given the legislative specifications in European laws, which 
permits patents in such circumstances, neither the EPO nor the CJEU are likely to follow suit and so 
patents on isolated cells are likely to be more easily granted in Europe. 
 
The Directive, like the EPC also precludes patentability of some inventions on certain grounds. The 
Directive’s parallel provision to Article 53(a) EPC is to be found in Article 6(1), which provides: 
 
Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be 
contrary to ordre public or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so 
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation. 
 
Interpretations of the Directive are binding when the CJEU pronounces on the Directive and this 
occurs where there has been a referral for clarification from a national court. Examples of such 
referrals include the Brüstle190 case from the German Federal Court of Justice and International Stem 
Cell Corporation from the UK High Court.191 Interpretations of the Directive may vary at national 
level, especially if the enacting regulations do not conform strictly to the text of the Directive. Due to 
differing jurisdictions the jurisprudence of the EPO and the CJEU may, in the future, diverge 
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somewhat – or significantly, especially with the creation of the unitary patent system, discussed 
below, and the fact that not all EU members are full participants in this new process. Moreover, the 
future of this system may be affected if the Brexit process is completed. 
 
The Directive clarifies the morality and ordre public provisions further by means of a non-exhaustive 
list of what cannot be patented, although rapid advances in technology means that the wording of the 
Directive will continue to be unclear. 
 
Art 6(2) provides, in relation to paragraph 1, the following in particular shall be considered 
unpatentable: 
 
 (a) processes for cloning human beings; 
 
This does not indicate whether the products resulting from such processes are patentable although a 
cloned human being could not be patentable by virtue of Article 5.1 of the Biotech Directive, 
especially if read in conjunction with Recital 40 which prohibits modification of the germ line genetic 
identity of human beings. The Edinburgh patent which was granted by the EPO in 2002 caused much 
controversy before its amendment because it had the potential to cover human cloning.192 The 
situation in Europe contrasts somewhat with US patent law practice in which process patents which 
potentially193 or overtly194 cover human cloning have been granted by the PTO. The status of the 
products of such techniques is uncertain. Since 2011 no patents can be granted in the US on “human 
organisms”195 but the scope of such terminology is unclear. In Europe, the processes may be 
unpatentable but could be legal, giving rise to products which may be patentable depending on the 
drafting of the claim and the admixtures of DNA. However, a second prohibition is as follows: 
 
 (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; 
 
This provision presumably seeks to deny patents on inventions where heritable traits have been 
introduced to human beings possibly also from other species. Whether this would apply to animals 
modified with a large percentage of human DNA is not clear – we do not possess a definition of what 
constitutes a human being. Given that definitions such as “chimera” and “hybrid” have been added to 
by German researchers who have coined the term “chimbrids”196 to denote genetically modified living 
beings which do not fit neatly into either category, this section could do with further clarification. 
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The next subsection in the legislation prohibits: 
 
 (c) uses of human embryos for industrial and commercial purposes; 
 
The principal source of human embryos are surplus embryos which have been created for IVF 
treatment. At present, their fate varies depending on the jurisdiction. In the UK, for example, it was 
reported in 2012 that nearly two million embryos had been destroyed since IVF began,197 whereas in 
Ireland their destruction is not permitted so they languish indefinitely in an icy limbo. In the 
exploration of the case law hereunder, the matter of morality and how it impacts on patenting 
inventions using these embryos will be scrutinised. 
 
In a further restriction on patentability relating to animals, patents will not be granted on: 
 
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them 
suffering without any substantial benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from 
such processes. 
 
Sub-section (d) is a statutory enshrinement and modification of the Harvard/ Oncomouse198 balancing 
test, elaborated below in the case law section. The balance between the interests of animals and human 
beings has been enshrined in the Directive and altered to reflect that substantial benefit is now 
required to outweigh potential suffering to the animal. Previously, the interests of animals were not 
taken so seriously and, for instance, the Technical Board of Appeal in Harvard/ Oncomouse199 opined 
that the suffering of animals and environmental risk would have to be weighed up against the 
usefulness of the invention to mankind. Thomas and Richards are critical of the Opposition Division’s 
assessment of morality and ordre public200 when it said that in order to assess what would be 
acceptable, legislation is the best guide.201 The rationale was that if animals were used in medical 
experiments then that would indicate that few people would object to their patentability. However, 
they dispute this claim, saying that public views are much more nuanced and that while the public 
may approve of experimentation for specific purposes, the modification of animals to cause cancer 
and death would probably not be viewed in the same way.202 In any case, they also point out that: 
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[s]ince the European public knew little or nothing about the oncomouse at the time of the 
patent application, it follows that it had had no opportunity, indeed no reason, to form its 
view about the morality of the invention or of its being patented.203  
 
Therefore, the principle upon which the Opposition Division relied is unclear. Animals’ interests will 
now be given more consideration but how the necessary calculations will be made is not predictable. 
If there is a shift in the way in which we treat some animals from welfare to rights, this may have a 
significant effect on interpretations of morality in this domain and, consequently, on whether 
particular inventions are patentable. This may be relevant to some classes of animals, given that there 
is currently a legal initiative to have all apes in captivity in New York State recognised as persons, 
through the use of habeas corpus.204 The Director of the Non-Human Rights Project, Steven Wise who 
is an attorney has said that although he has not been successful to date, he will not give up until he is. 
Should some animals be recognised as persons, morality may take on a bigger role although such 
rights are unlikely to extend to the animals most used in experiments which are mice. 
 
Article 6 of the Directive is bolstered by Recital 38, which adds that processes whose use offends 
against human dignity, examples being processes to produce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent 
cells of humans and animals, are also excluded from patentability. The discourse on human dignity is 
increasingly permeating patent cases given invocations of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
which, unusually, positions dignity (Article 1) before life (Article 2) in the denominated rights. The 
CJEU has clarified that Article 6(2) leaves no discretion regarding the unpatentability of processes and 
uses which it sets out.205 Of note is that plants are omitted from this list, although patents on 
genetically modified plants have, on occasion, been interpreted restrictively by the CJEU.206 
Moreover, groups such as Greenpeace regularly challenge the grant of such patents because of 
concerns such as commodification, risk to the environment and human health.207 
 
The Biotechnology Directive was devised at a time of significant change in European patent granting 
practice in that the European Commission wanted to ensure competitiveness with other markets and 
biotechnological research was increasing. Moreover, biotechnology is a very fast moving field and 
shortly after the passage of the Directive, the isolation of human embryonic stem cells, which could 
greatly advance medical therapies, became possible.208 No mention was made at the time of human 
embryonic stem cell technologies in the Directive which left this to the courts to resolve. The 
reticence to enshrine a lot of detail in legislative instruments is at least in part due to the difficulties 
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involved in revising regional legislation. Porter points out that much debate has ensued about Article 
6(2)(c) and how inventions involving these cells should be treated under the legislation. This has taken 
place in legal, ethical and policy fields.209 Yet the means of guarding morality in the legislation is not 
clear. 
 
In the wake of the introduction of the Biotech Directive in the EU in 1998, the EPC was amended to 
align many of its provisions closely with the Directive. 
 
2.2.8 Amendment to EPC 2000 
 
The EU Directive has now been integrated into EPC 2000, and this was done by means of a Decision 
of the Administrative Council of the EPO in 1999. Article 53 of the EPC 2000 has been aligned with 
27(2) of the TRIPS Agreement, as it was not previously fully compliant. Nor should it have been, 
necessarily, given that the EPO, along with Serbia which is a member of the EPO but not of the WTO, 
are not signatories to TRIPS.210 
 
Articles 5 and 6 of the Directive have been incorporated into the EPC 2000 as Rules 28 and 29. The 
Rules provide that under Article 53(a) EPC, Rule 28, patents will not be granted on the following: 
 
 (a) processes for cloning human beings; 
 
 (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; 
 
 (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; 
 
(d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them 
suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals 
resulting from such processes. 
 
Rule 29 provides: 
 
(1) The human body, at the various stages of its formation and development, and the simple 
discovery of one of its elements, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot 
constitute patentable inventions. 
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(2) An element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical 
process, including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable 
invention, even if the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element. 
 
(3) The industrial application of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene must be disclosed 
in the patent application. 
 
These provisions align the EPC more closely with the text of the Directive and whilst the European 
Patent Organisation and the EU operate within separate legal orders, such voluntary legal 
approximation shows a desire for the two regimes to coincide in their decisions. 
 
There has been a shift in the scope of the ordre public or morality exclusions to patenting from 
publication or exploitation of an invention to a focus on commercial exploitation, meaning that these 
exceptions have been narrowed. The patent or intellectual property office may approve an invention 
but its commercial exploitation may offend. Yves Bôt, the Advocate General in Brüstle211 defined 
industrial or commercial purposes as being a matter of large-scale production that was out of 
proportion to the applied treatment.212 However, precise definition may not be so clear and a fine line 
may have to be drawn to differentiate between “exploitation” and “commercial exploitation” in future 
case law. It is likely to be drawn where the invention presents no advantage to the embryo itself. 
 
The purported purpose of the “ordre public” exception has been up to recently “to exclude from 
protection inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder or to lead to criminal or other generally 
offensive behaviour”.213 This exception was much more circumscribed than morality until a decision 
in 2013 in which human rights considerations were invoked to invalidate parts of a patent grant under 
the heading of ordre public rather than morality.214 This will be explored further in the case law, 
below. 
 
This legislative alignment, as heretofore mentioned, is controversial. Moreover, courts from varying 
European jurisdictions are not bound by each other’s judgments so such homogenisation of European 
patent law does not have any ramifications in terms of precedent. With the introduction of the new 
European patent system, discussed hereunder, there will be a further jurisdiction to consider and 
although the governing legislation is the EPC, the court system will be novel and specialised. 
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2.2.9 Patent Law Treaty 2000 
 
This treaty is administered by WIPO and its aim is to simplify and streamline formal procedures for 
patent applications, both at national and regional level. Although dated from 2000, this treaty entered 
into force in 2005 and it harmonises patent procedures and formalities for filing, obtaining and 
maintaining patent protection. It does not concern substantive patent law and therefore does not deal 
with moral issues. The then-Director General of WIPO, Dr. Kamil Idris, commented when the treaty 
was completed, that: “The next step is to work towards harmonisation of legal substance, and 
eventually towards a single global standard of protection”215 showing the ambition of a globalised 
patent protection. 
 
In addition to international patent harmonisation, protection within regional organisations such as the 
EU and the EPO is also progressing. 
 




Despite the fact that the EPC covers 38 European states in which all EU Member States are included, 
and the Biotech Directive also applies to all EU members, so there is no shortage of legislation, the 
goal of introducing an EU-wide patent has been ongoing for decades. Many efforts have been made so 
as to simplify the process in Europe. An early precursor of current reform was the Draft Convention 
for a European Patent Law in 1962. According to Ilardi,216 one of the concerns expressed about this 
legislation was whether non-Member States could avail of it, showing that there was a goal to create 
an international, or at least a regional patent system. This initiative culminated in work carried out on 
the EPC in 1973 and the Community Patent Convention 1975. The latter document was ultimately not 
adopted although it was signed by all EU Member States and sought to create a community patent 
system. It involved a single application to the EPO and aimed to harmonise the granting of patents 
throughout the EU. The centralised litigation procedure, which involved the setting up of a European 
Court to deal with patent appeals, would have created a single community patent and not a patent 
which is subject to national laws. However, it was unpopular due to its high cost. The aim of 
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2.2.10.2 Unitary Patent Protection 
 
Efforts to introduce legislation did not abate and a unitary patent protection has now been approved. 
This legislation217 promises to enhance patent protection among participating member states by 
creating a unitary patent which binds everyone with the intention of fostering innovation and 
enhancing the internal market. A European patent with unitary effect will also prove much more cost 
effective than the current system, according to Recital (5) of the Regulation. This is disputed in the 
literature, however by Sir Richard Kitchin who has said that the appeals process could result in 
litigants having to appear in more than one jurisdiction. He believes that costs will be inflated by the 
new system.218 McMahon also argues that the unitary patent package is likely to augment rather than 
reduce the complexity in the patenting process, given that there are now four overlapping European 
regimes under which patents may be sought.219 Procedural aspects are dealt with in further legislation 
which regulates principally translation and compensation along with the identification of who is 
responsible for litigation costs.220 
 
The establishment of a unified court points to the perceived desirability of legal certainly and 
harmonisation. The unitary patent is classified as property. The reform includes legislation which sets 
out the procedural aspects of the establishment of the courts’ structure and affirms that the CJEU 
retains jurisdiction to ensure harmonisation and compliance with European Union law, under this 
agreement.221 The courts will have a plethora of legal instruments to consider from the abovenamed 
regulations to national patent law, the EPC – a surprising inclusion given that this is not part of EU 
law - and, of course, EU law itself. The court retains the power under Article 45 to close the 
proceedings to the public, should it so choose. This marks a departure from the principle of justice 
being done in public and being seen to be done. It also deals with remedies and appeals. 
 
The new European-wide patent will not change anything regarding the definition of morality in the 
legislation as the EPC is employed. However, specialised courts may have some effect on 
interpretation. Mills argues that such courts tend to favour patent holders and to be quite pro-patent222 
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and it is notable that the courts are set up, under Article 15, to provide for judges with legal 
qualifications but also technical ones.223 The technical judges are not required to have a grounding in 
morality so how Article 53(a) will be competently applied is unclear. As the courts are still in the 
process of being established, no evidence-based assessment can currently be made about outcomes 
and any predictions are therefore speculative. 
 
The above chronology of doctrinal elements of patent law highlights a number of factors. The first is 
that patent law has expanded its breadth significantly in the last century as can be seen from the 
introduction of several international and regional agreements. Secondly, the subject matter covered by 
patent law has increased and now includes living organisms of plant, animal and human origin. 
Finally, the nebulous concept of morality (and ordre public) has been incorporated into several legal 
instruments such as the EPC, the Biotech Directive and the TRIPS Agreement. Its definition, as 
indicated, has not been without difficulty during the legislative process. The interpretations of the 
provisions on morality in the boards of the EPO and the courts of the EU are now explored in order to 
examine whether or not judicial exposure and examination has brought clarity to this domain. 
 
2.3 European case law on morality and ordre public 
 
2.3.1 At the EPO 
 
This section of the chapter will explore case law on the interpretations of morality and ordre public 
and will highlight the fact there is an awareness at the EPO that there is not a uniform standard of 
morality. On occasion, nonetheless there are assumptions that the majority of Europeans will feel the 
same way about particular inventions where the boards refer to concepts such as “universal 
abhorrence”, as explored in this section. This thesis will show that ordre public and morality are not 
easily defined and are not uniformly understood in different states. At times the EPO conflates the two 
standards and at others, they are treated separately. As courts struggle to decide the issues, morality 
and its judgement has come under several headings. Therefore, looking for solutions to identified 
problems within the legislation may be somewhat redundant and judicial interpretation may prove 
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2.3.2 The drafting intentions of the EPC 
 
As already noted, in the Travaux Préparatoires of the EPC,224 the definition of “ordre public” was 
found to differ, depending on the jurisdiction. It was defined widely in the Netherlands but in other 
states, whilst the concept existed it was not deemed to be important. The Working Group considered 
excluding it or else defining it but the latter option could have violated national laws. Ultimately the 
bare term was included without further embellishment.225 Similarly, morality was not delimited as no 
universal concept existed within the EPO’s reach and this was to be left for European institutions to 
work out.226 These institutions were not named, nor was the issue of their jurisdiction considered. 
 
The following selection of cases will show that there have been a number of different interpretations 
of morality and ordre public in Article 53(a) EPC where references have been made to various 
standards or tests by which these criteria can be applied. They do not add up to a coherent formula 
because of the lack of principles on which such decisions are based. There is also an appreciation of a 
public voice when the boards refer to concepts such as “universal abhorrence”227 and “universal 
outrage”228 but no path has been charted for how these views can be ascertained or accommodated and 
this is the focus of this thesis. 
 
2.3.2.1 Morality: universal abhorrence (plants) 
 
In an early case decided under the EPC, Lubrizol/Hybrid Plants,229 an application was made to the 
EPO for a patent on processes to develop hybrid seeds speedily. The claim was refused by the EPO on 
the grounds that the processes were “essentially biological” and these were unpatentable within 
Article 53(b) EPC. The rationale for this exclusion from patentability is that the processes involve 
traditional techniques such as cross-breeding and therefore are not novel. Had microbiological 
processes been used, there would have been potential for patentability. An appeal with amended 
claims was made and was successful as the Board of Appeal deemed that the processes invoked in the 
patent claim were not “essentially biological” but instead involved specialised techniques. Neither 
were the plants considered to be varieties due to the fact that they were not stable and were therefore 
novel. 
 
                                                 
224 In section 2.2.5.1. 
225 ‘Travaux Préparatoires (EPC 1973)’ 16, IV/2767/61-E 
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An opposition was mounted to the patent and the Opposition Division held in this case that the Article 
53(a) exclusions of morality and ordre public only applied to cases where the invention was 
universally regarded as abhorrent. This was the first case in which Article 53(a) was applied to plants. 
How universal abhorrence would be assessed is not clear from the case. Sparse guiding principles give 
courts much leeway but such cases do not appear to serve in helping to establish any precedent in the 
area either. This case evoked relatively very little controversy and decisions involving animals and 
human genetic material rather than plants stirred more public debate until the wide-scale cultivation of 
genetically modified plants became possible in the mid-1990s.230 
 
2.3.2.2 Morality: balancing test (animals) 
 
In HARVARD/Oncomouse231 a patent was granted by the EPO on transgenic animals which had been 
bred for use in researching cancer. The mice in question were genetically engineered to contain a gene 
which would greatly increase their susceptibility to cancer. The lineage of this case is that the USPTO 
granted a patent on this same subject matter to the president and Fellows of Harvard College in 1989. 
Both a product and a process claim were made to the EPO and it is the former application which 
caused the controversy. It was initially rejected by the EPO on a number of grounds and with 
reference to Article 53(a), the Examining Division deemed that the EPC was not an appropriate forum 
for regulating potential problems associated with genetic modification. However, the Technical Board 
disagreed and engaged in a weighing-up exercise which sought to balance risk and suffering of the 
animals on the one hand with the benefits to humans on the other, thus elucidating Article 53(a) by 
means of a balancing test.232 The case was remitted to the Examining Division which decided in the 
applicant’s favour. 
 
Matters did not rest there, however. Objections raised included that patenting life was immoral when 
the life had been created solely in order to suffer. Thomas, who represented the British Union Against 
Vivisection in the case and Richards point out that the case focused on morality rather than ordre 
public and observe that arguments under this umbrella included animal welfare and religious 
objections about patenting life-forms. The objections on animal welfare grounds include a belief that 
it is wrong to genetically engineer animals and furthermore, the financial incentive through the patent 
monopoly is a double wrong, in their view.233 This case occurred before the enactment of Article 
6(2)(d) of the Directive and its subsequent incorporation into the amended EPC, Rule 28(d) in which 
the balance between the interests of humans and animals is now weighted less towards humans than 
                                                 
230 Maureen O’Sullivan, ‘Governing Against the Grain?: Overseas Perspectives on the UK 
Government’s Impending Decision on the Commercialisation of GM Crops’ (2004) 16 ELM 16. 
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before. The Examining Division held any potential suffering was outweighed by benefits to human 
beings and there was, therefore, no impediment to patentability. The application did not fall within the 
bar to patenting animal varieties as the claim was made in relation to “non-human mammals”, which 
was much broader. This decision does not seem to be very logical in that the ban on patenting varieties 
can be avoided by developing processes that apply to a much wider scope of organisms.  
 
With regard to the Examining Division’s treatment of animals, its decision reflects the law’s general 
approach – that they are regarded as property and patent law does not consider whether they have 
rights. Protection of their interests is based on concepts of welfare and this may be problematic if an 
application were to be made for a patent on a so-called “higher” mammal, such as an ape or cetacean 
whose intelligence is now receiving closer attention than before in light of animal rights activism. The 
Examination Division noted that patenting higher organisms had encountered ethical objections in the 
US234 but no further heed was paid to this. 
 
One of the problems with this test, according to Bagley, is that the Examining Division did not define 
morality, nor did it articulate why it chose the factors that it did, rather than any others. Morality is 
contentious. Of course, the Examining Division was following instructions from the Technical 
Board235 but the case has not served to clarify what constitutes morality. Opposition proceedings were 
commenced invoking Article 53(a). The Opposition Division indicated that legislation was the best 
guide to applying morality, saying that if one wanted to ascertain what was considered right or wrong 
in European society, the legislation rather than public opinion polls should be consulted.236 As already 
mentioned, public opinion on the uses of animals in different situations can be quite specific: whilst it 
may approve testing on animals where there is a recognised human benefit, it does not mean that all 
suffering would be tolerated.  
 
The case was eventually resolved in 2001 when the claim was amended and restricted to “transgenic 
rodents containing an additional cancer gene” rather than “any non-human transgenic mammal” on 
grounds of Article 53(a). The opponents filed an appeal and the claim was restricted even further by 
the Technical Board of Appeal in 2004 to cover only “transgenic mice”237 given that not all rodents 
were considered to satisfy the morality test in Article 53(a) and Rule 23d(d) EPC, whereas mice are 
standard laboratory test animals.238 Such differences between boards on what is deemed to be 
acceptable shows that outcomes are unpredictable and making applications which are subsequently 
restricted suggests that there needs to be vigilance about overly broad initial claims. A troubling 
feature of this case and others like it is that the granted patent was in force for the intervening time 
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before it was greatly curtailed and perhaps it would be wiser to extend the law incrementally rather 
than restrict it as a result of opposition proceedings. Moreover, public voices are all but absent in such 
prolonged processes. 
 
2.3.2.3 Morality: morality sidelined? 
 
Other patents have since been granted on animals with the EPO ruling in Leland Stanford/Modified 
Animal that patents were not excluded on grounds of moral controversies surrounding the nature of 
the technology. In the view of the EPO, genetic engineering does not, as a technology, raise any moral 
issues. The Opposition Division declined to act as a “moral censor”239 although Article 53(a) obliges it 
to give morality and ordre public its due weight. Given the fact that genetic engineering is a new 
technology, perhaps it should have exercised more restraint in weighing up the issues, although it was 
also bound by the law. Of note is the fact that the law in this realm is now experiencing a process of 
constitutionalisation whereby it is being infused with ethical norms derived from the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and also the European Convention on Human Rights, which will be explored 
later in this chapter. 
 
In Upjohn’s Application240 the invention was for a mouse which had been genetically modified to 
provide a model for research into stimulating hair growth. The mouse would suffer baldness as a result 
of the transgene. The examiners’ main objection related to the lack of inventive step as regards the 
invention as a whole but they also found a breach of Article 53(a) on moral grounds. One of the 
modified genes which had been engineered into the mouse was an oncogene which could be deleted 
without affecting the breadth of the main claim. Upjohn duly redrafted the application to exclude the 
oncogene and the patent was granted.241 This shows a change in policy and treatment of animals in 
that in this case, unlike in Harvard/Oncomouse, the oncogene was taken out of the claim in order for it 
to be allowed.  
 
How the balancing test was applied is not clear except that greater cognisance of potential animal 
suffering is becoming common and the interests of animals is likely to receive more serious 
consideration than before. However, there still are no further morality guidelines on these issues and 
decisions are, therefore, unpredictable. We lack a framework of principles on how we ought to treat 
mice or animals with greater cognitive skills, such as apes. Without guidance, the legislation does not 
really clarify controversial issues. Tests will depend randomly on the knowledge of board members or 
in opposition proceedings, on the interest groups that are able and willing to take part. The application 
of morality and ordre public provisions in Article 53(a) is hardly satisfactory and, of course, it does 
                                                 
239 Leland/Stanford Modified Animal [2002] EPOR 2. 
240 Re Upjohn’s Application, No. 89913146.0. 
241 Mills, op. cit. 61. 
54 
 
not address at all the plurality of views on morality that exist, or would exist if there were more public 
knowledge. The next case alludes to public voices in this domain but struggles to find an appropriate 
means of accommodation. 
 
2.3.2.4 Morality: risk of harm – polls and survey evidence 
 
In Plant Genetic Systems,242 the EPO found itself grappling with applying concepts of morality in a 
case involving genetically modified crops which had been engineered to be resistant to a glutamine 
synthetase inhibitor. Greenpeace had opposed the patent, claiming that the use of herbicides would be 
increased by the company seeking the patent and that there were also unknown risk factors associated 
therewith.243 The EPO held that challenges to patentability based on morality would only be 
entertained if there was demonstrable actual evidence of harm to society. Greenpeace’s challenge was 
unsuccessful in the Opposition Division and they then appealed to the Technical Board of Appeal. The 
Board stated that, in order to engage Article 53(a) EPC, it would require verifiable data that these 
crops posed a risk to the environment before it would consider applying the Oncomouse balancing 
test. It is not clear in any case how a test balancing the rights of humans and animals would be applied 
to a different set of species. Moreover, data on risk is very difficult to acquire especially when the 
technology is novel and has not been tested over an extended time. Such stringent conditions could 
not be satisfied, they set a very high bar and so the patent was duly granted.  
 
The Board in Plant Genetic Systems244 stated that morality signifies an opinion that there is right and 
wrong behaviour and these can be distinguished by deeply rooted European cultural norms, for the 
purposes of the EPC. Under Article 53(a), where the exploitation (before the amendment of 2000) of 
inventions does not conform to these norms, the patent grant cannot be made on moral grounds.245 At 
very least, the refusal of the grant of a patent would be difficult to justify with any certainty, given this 
hazy guidance. The Board went on to postulate that a singular version of culture could be identified 
within European society and civilisation and that this metaphorical sieve would enable the separation 
of the patentable wheat, as it were, from the morally unacceptable chaff under Article 53(a) EPC.246 
This conceptualisation of “particular culture” is problematic: it is unlikely that even within any society 
there is to be found a unitary belief system or a single moral standard. It would have been useful had 
the Board articulated clearly what that version was so it could guide future cases but it did not do so 
because perhaps it cannot do so. In any case, national courts are not bound by decisions of the EPO or 
its boards so consistency cannot be established through precedent. Viens says that this clashes with the 
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reality of the pluralism which pervades both the European Union and its Member States.247 This 
applies on an even wider scale to the 38 states of the EPO’s jurisdiction. McMahon indicates that 
states are normally deferred to on morality issues within both the EU and the ECHR systems248 and 
that this should also infuse proceedings of the EPC.249 Moreover, how can established moral norms 
inform how people will view new technologies, such as biotechnological inventions? Public opinions 
might be completely unpredictable so, arguably, assumptions should not be made. 
 
The Board disregarded the fact that an elevated level of moral distaste for such inventions was present 
in Europe. It opined that survey evidence and opinion polls indicating disapproval of patents on 
genetically modified organisms would not be relied upon in order to assess overarching European 
morality.250 Such polls and surveys can be unreliable and often people gain their information through 
media which may not represent the full facts. There may be more reliable methods for ascertaining 
public views but these were not explored. 
 
2.3.2.5 Morality: universal outrage 
 
The concept of “universal outrage” was relied on by the EPO in the next case, Relaxin/HOWARD 
FLOREY INSTITUTE251 to circumscribe the parameters of the morality bar. Here, the patent 
application related to a protein produced by women in childbirth which helps to relax the uterus. The 
patent was granted by the EPO and was subsequently opposed by individuals associated with the 
Green wing of the European Parliament. They challenged the patent on a number of grounds including 
novelty, inventive step, morality and ordre public. They asserted that the subject of the application was 
a discovery and not an invention and therefore did not qualify for patent protection. Given that the 
subject matter of the patent was a human gene, the opposition included claims that the grant was 
tantamount to slavery and that human dignity was offended. 
 
The challenges were unsuccessful as was the opponents’ subsequent appeal. The EPO found that 
whilst the gene itself was a discovery, the process of isolation and characterisation was patentable. 
They did not regard the gene itself as representing life but rather described it as “one of many 
chemical entities participating in biological processes”.252 What this does show is that there is a 
significant dichotomy on how genetic material is viewed: for some it is synonymous with life itself 
and for others it is a chemical entity which, if novel, may be patentable. Each viewpoint represents a 
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standpoint on a wide moral spectrum. The EPO stipulated that Article 53(a) EPC should only prevent 
the grant of patents which would universally be considered to be outrageous without indicating how 
this could be assessed. The dismissal of public concerns and the setting of opaque standards to define 
morality delineated by the use of words such as “universal” brings the adjudication of morality into 
disrepute because the manner in which a successful claim can be constructed is unclear. As a process 
for opposition is established in the legislation, its use should be transparent. 
 
2.3.2.6 Morality – a case of doctrinal confusion? 
 
The Relaxin “overwhelming consensus” test is judged by Mills to be more practical than the “balance 
of interests” test by the Examining Division in Onco-Mouse253 although it is unclear how such 
consensus could be established. A balancing test is certainly more difficult to apply especially when 
considerations such as human health, animal cruelty and disease prevention are all in play. However, it 
is also difficult to keep abreast of changes in public opinion and, for example, patents on animals 
created solely for testing cosmetics would be unlikely to be granted given the ban on such use within 
the EU since 2013.254 At present we lack mechanisms to weigh up such balances. In any case, how can 
we make judgments about what the majority of people think when there is acceptance that Europe 
does not have a uniform standard of morality? Moreover, the majority of the publics are unlikely to 
have known much about the Relaxin case or other patent cases which engage the morality bar. 
 
Legislative harmonisation regarding patentability criteria and the place reserved for morality within 
the patent system has been advocated.255 A difficulty with legislating for morality is that the public 
views of what it means are likely to change. Moreover, society is unlikely to have a unitary view. 
Legislation freezes a time-specific definition which, as society evolves, may quickly become 
redundant but fossilised nonetheless. An examination of court judgments shows that this area is very 
unpredictable. Arguably, it is a realm outside of law and so legal certainty cannot apply. Moreover, if 
we leave decision-making to the judiciary, many judges study law at schools which do not even teach 
Jurisprudence, so they may be unfamiliar with varying theories of law or the place or even existence 
of higher order norms.256 A positivist will have difficulty arbitrating morality which is not articulated 
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clearly and may rely on instinct or just sideline the matter altogether, especially where its definition 
proves elusive. 
 
Whilst the cases just examined have focused on different legal provisions, the subsequent case law 
will show that predictability on the scope of the morality bar has not improved over time. 
 
2.3.2.7 Morality parameters: narrowing or broadening? 
 
The Edinburgh patent,257 granted after the introduction of the Biotech Directive, concerned the 
isolation, selection and propagation of animal transgenic stem cells. The main issue focused on 
whether the patent extended to human embryos. The Opposition Division held that the exclusion from 
patentability on morality grounds has to be interpreted broadly so as to include not only the 
commercial or industrial use of human embryos but also the human embryonic stem cells obtained by 
destroying human embryos. They also stated that reliance must be made on principles of human 
dignity, personal integrity and autonomy. The patent was amended so as to exclude human embryonic 
stem cells. The Opposition Division eventually held that while the original application violated Article 
53(a) EPC, the amended claims did not. Even though the patent was initially wrongly granted, it must 
be opposed in order to potentially be revoked. If there were widespread public input on such 
applications, it is less likely that overly broad patents would be granted as many more perspectives 
could be accommodated. This might help all participants to appreciate that there is a multiplicity of 
considerations in these patent applications. 
 
2.3.2.8 Morality and human embryos: a more restrictive approach? 
 
The boundaries of morality, which had been stretched to accommodate living matter, including plants 
and animals, as noted above, were further tested in the context of human embryos in G2/06 Stem 
Cells/WARF.258 In this case, the Examining Division heard a claim for a patent sought by the 
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. The Foundation developed the first techniques to isolate 
human embryonic stem cells in 1998 and the application concerned primate embryonic stem cells.259 
All the claims which could encompass human embryonic stem cells were invalidated on grounds of 
immorality as human embryos were described in the application as indispensable starting materials 
and their use would be for industrial purposes. The only source of the cells were pre-implantation 
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embryos.260 WARF asserted that it was necessary to “use” embryos to create the claimed invention 
which would have resulted in their destruction. The Examining Division equated the use of an embryo 
as starting material for the generation of a product of industrial application with the industrial use of 
this embryo. The refusal to grant the patent on grounds of immorality was an expansive interpretation 
of Rule 28(c) (formerly Rule 23(d)(c)) EPC which stated that “European patents are not to be granted 
in respect of...inventions which concern...uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes.” This broke with the convention of reading Article 53(a) restrictively as set down in the 
Guidelines for Examination to the EPO261 which states that this provision should only be invoked 
rarely. The patenting of human embryonic stem cells has evoked a previously unseen level of 
controversy. 
 
Several questions were referred to the Enlarged Board of Appeal in 2005, seeking clarity on whether 
Rule 28(c) EPC applied retrospectively to an application which had been filed before the rule was 
enacted and if so, whether the patenting of such claims was forbidden under Article 53(a) EPC. It was 
also sought to ascertain whether it was relevant if other methods which did not involve the destruction 
of human embryos had become possible after the filing date. The President of the EPO proffered an 
opinion on the questions and contrary to the practice to date in which Article 53(a) had been 
interpreted narrowly he believed that this would undermine the spirit of the morality exclusions 
enshrined in this Article. 
 
The Enlarged Board of Appeal found that patents are not available for products which could only be 
prepared by a method involving the destruction of a human embryo which was the source of the 
products. A later technical development would not affect this decision.262 The EBA made it clear that: 
 
it is important to point out that it is not the fact of the patenting itself that is considered to be 
against ordre public and morality, but it is the performing of the invention, which includes a 
step that has to be considered to contravene those concepts.263 
 
This interpretation of the morality bar is quite complex. The EBA’s commentary suggests that the 
grant of the patent is inconsequential yet a patent gives rights to exclude others which brings it into 
moral terrain. Moreover, it is unlikely that it would be universally agreed that patenting human 
embryos is morally acceptable so long as the performance of the invention is not allowed. Patents are 
defined as property rights. The principles to which the EBA is referring are not clear and in such an 
ethically fraught area, it is problematic that decisions of magnitude are made that appear to be ad hoc. 
Golden observes that in the US, the issue of the provision of public funding for human stem cell 
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research is more controversial than whether to issue or enforce patent rights264 and that this is due to 
differences in the legislative provisions in the US, as compared with Europe.265 Whilst US 
jurisprudence has developed a “moral utility”266 bar, this is not enshrined in legislation. Furthermore, 
this restriction has not been applied in cases of biotechnological inventions. 
 
Plomer describes the task of the examiners when trying to decipher the meanings of “contrary to ordre 
public or morality”267 in relation to inventions as a continual puzzle and she questions whether they 
are supposed to look for the morally reprehensible factor in the nature of the invention, the patenting 
process itself or the commercialisation of the invention,268 thus making a threefold puzzle. In WARF, 
she states that the prohibition pertained to the nature of the invention rather than to the patenting 
aspect. In her view, the performance of the invention rather than the patenting raises the controversy in 
this case, in the eyes of the court269 and this would mean the actual destruction of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes in the creation of the invention rather than possession of exclusive 
rights to prevent others from doing likewise. This demonstrates that opposition to the invention and to 
the patenting thereof are often mixed up and this is manifested also in the courts. She alludes to the 
“systemic conflict” within laws of the EU which pertain, respectively, to legislation which allows 
destructive and commercial use of human embryos on the one hand, and those which prohibit patents 
on associated inventions on grounds of immorality, on the other. 
 
Undoubtedly the examiner’s task is daunting. Whilst this study does not advocate ethical training as a 
panacea for the lack of representation of public voices in the patenting process, neglecting to offer 
officials instruction on what constitutes morality and ordre public when the bar must be applied does 
not ease interpretation. Some endeavours could be made to draw up guidelines or a non-exhaustive list 
of principles. Moreover, arguably patents on morally controversial biotechnological inventions raise 
distinct issues from those which relate to allowing the creation of the invention. Whilst this distinction 
will be explored further in the next chapter, the matter of who develops the invention – whether this be 
a publicly funded body or a private corporation incentivised by potentially lucrative patents – may 
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2.3.2.9 Arbitration of morality: who should be responsible? 
 
It is questionable whether patent offices are the appropriate place in which morality can be defined, 
although members of the office believe that it is their responsibility to do so. Treichel, from the 
Directorate of International Legal Affairs of the EPO, has asserted that it is the responsibility of the 
office to use its judgement on the matter of morality and this can be done by: 
 
[I]ncorporating higher-ranking norms into patent law...one of the essential objectives of the 
Biotechnology Directive is to protect human dignity. Hence, G2/06 is to be seen as a 
fundamental step towards the “constitutionalisation” of European patent law. In the present 
case, the relevant higher-ranking norms governing Rule 28(c) EPC have been identified as 
the principle of respect for human dignity and the prohibition of the commercial exploitation 
of human embryos.270   
 
It would be helpful if it were made clear how patent officials are to determine such norms. Mills 
argues that governments should delineate the boundaries of morality271 but societal views change a lot 
faster than legislative endeavours. As legal definitions will trail scientific advances,272 perhaps 
legislation does not offer a solution. Nonetheless, the view has been expressed that it is the legislator’s 
role to determine the moral consensus and this is reflected in Rule 28(c). These provisions have been 
described as “absolute or binding prohibitions [which] may thus not be questioned or qualified since 
they constitute the moral judgement of the legislator himself.”273 Although the incorporation of the 
Implementing Regulations into the EPC has added some clarity to the question of morality, such 
provisions are still open to interpretation and must be questioned and, indeed, qualified depending on 
the case. Perhaps the legislature rather than the individual legislator relying on his moral judgement, 
should decide this matter: to suggest otherwise, as does Treichel,274 implies that personal rather than 
representative, democratic opinion suffices to arbitrate the meaning of morality for everyone. 
 
Whilst there is some discussion in the academic literature that the current set up is not satisfactory, 
there are few suggestions for other decision-making practices. Should decisions be handed over 
instead to ethics committees which may be composed of a group of individuals trained to consider an 
abstract public good? This question will be explored in more detail in the next chapter but, briefly, 
some ethics committees may contain within their ranks corporate lobbyists and also house extremist 
views so they may not represent an ethical or an independent standpoint. It is doubtful in a pluralistic 
world whether such a standard could be useful, especially given that morality at the frontiers of law 
and technology is fast-moving. Furthermore, Waelde et. al. express concern that the role of moral 
arbiter may be “usurped by an unelected administrative body that is able to pass judgement on the 
                                                 
270 Pierre Treichel, ‘G2/06 and the Verdict of Immorality’ (2009) 40 IIC 450, 450. 
271 Mills, op. cit. 57. 
272 Treichel, op. cit. 459. 




morality of new technologies”,275 identifying this as in contravention of the UK’s policy of significant 
investment in stem cell research. They ask whether it is satisfactory for these policies to potentially be 
frustrated by the EPO showing that there are tensions between national policy and processes which 
occur at the upper echelons of patent decision-making at the European level. Beyleveld and 
Brownsword did suggest the establishment of an ethics committee to hear any opposition on moral 
grounds with a right of appeal to the ECtHR over 20 years ago but this has not occurred.276 What is 
clear is that the application of the morality bar at present by the EPO and its boards is the subject of 
criticism and it is arguable that the decision-making process needs refinement. 
 
There is no definition of “human embryo” in the Directive, other European or international legal 
instruments and where such definitions exist at a national level, they tend to vary. Bearing this in 
mind, an alternative to legislative reform would be a case-by-case evaluation if such reform had 
difficulty keeping up with advances in science. Given that there is no consensus on morality across 
European countries, it does seem odd that an unequipped body is setting moral standards on the 
patentability of biotechnological inventions for all citizens without guidance, training or significant 
consultation. 
 
2.3.2.10 Morality beyond WARF at the EPO 
 
The WARF case was recently applied in Technion/Culturing Stem Cells277 where a patent was refused 
on an experiment which used publicly available established cell lines that once involved the 
destruction of a human embryo. The patent was not granted because even though the established cell 
lines had involved an earlier rather than a recent destruction of an embryo, such time shifting was not 
permitted to be used to evade the restrictions in WARF. Technion, therefore broadens the ambit of 
WARF and shows consistency in its treatment of the human embryo across varying time frames. 
Regardless as to whether the invention involves the present or past destruction of a human embryo, it 
will not be patentable. 
 
Mahalatchimy et. al. observe that Technion has made law emanating from the EPO and the EU in this 
realm more uniform.278 Evidence on the methods to obtain human embryonic stem cells that do not 
involve prior destruction of human embryos must now be part of the patent claims. What is missing in 
the judgment, however, is a definition of a human embryo which means that law at the EPO currently 
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diverges from the judgments of the CJEU in Brüstle279 in which human embryos were defined and 
later redefined in International Stem Cell Corporation.280 This redefinition reflected that parthenotes 
were not, after all, to be classified as human embryos as whilst they could commence the process of 
embryonic development, there are not able to complete it. Nordberg and Minssen observe that WARF 
and Technion oblige patent applicants to verify that source material involving the destruction of a 
human embryo has not been used and that therefore the morality bar is not engaged. They say that this 
conflicts with the traditional narrow construction of exceptions in the EPO’s jurisprudence and also in 
the intention of the drafters of the EPC. They point out that exceptions should be invoked against the 
applicant rather than being treated as a positive requirement.281 
 
Clearly the application of the morality bar is in a state of flux at the EPO and, as shall be noted below, 
is similarly evolving at the CJEU. The departure from a narrow application appears to have surfaced 
in the area of the use of human embryos. Moreover, courts have now built up a broader understanding 
of the multidisciplinary nature of the issues which controversial biotechnological inventions raise and 
these include not only law, technology and science but also questions of morality on which there has 
been little guidance. The next section will show how the criteria to satisfy ordre public have quite 
recently been dramatically broadened in a case which also concerned the use of a human being, albeit 
not in embryonic form. 
 
2.3.2.11 Ordre public: the EPO’s new morality? 
 
“Ordre public” is terminology which has traditionally been poorly defined and, as previously noted, 
does not have universal meaning within Europe. It is rather odd to take this untranslated expression 
from private international law and act as if it can have universal application across 38 states in the area 
of patenting without clear definition. Some efforts have been made to signal what it might mean,282 
and even where ordre public is equated to “public policy” concepts, this ignores the fact that it will 
inevitably differ from state to state and that it is a creature of civil law jurisdictions somewhat 
uncomfortably transplanted. Legal transplants can be of problematic application, not least when they 
are undefined and applied to a new area without adjustment or adaptation. In Plant Genetic Systems283 
the Board noted that the drafters of the EPC had acknowledged that there was no European definition 
of ordre public (and they said the same about morality).284 The EPC Working Party also recognised 
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this matter and in the Travaux Préparatoires of the EPC,285 it was accepted that this concept varied 
according to different countries. The Working Party was of the opinion that interpretation of the 
meaning of ordre public should be a matter for European institutions286 (as, indeed, should the notion 
of morality).287 The identity of these institutions was not indicated. The Technical Board of Appeal in 
Plant Genetic Systems,288 described ordre public in the following terms as covering “the protection of 
public security and the physical integrity of individuals as part of society” and added environmental 
protection to the list.289 In some cases, such as Oncomouse290 the Technical Board did not distinguish 
between morality and ordre public and whilst boards of the EPO often conflate the two, there are some 
exceptions,291 as examined later in this section.  
 
Attempts have been made to add clarity to some of the nomenclature of the European patent 
legislative instruments. For example, the UK Banks Report has advocated that “ordre public” should 
be interpreted to mean public policy and public order292 but the parameters of these concepts in the 
realm of morally controversial biotechnological patents is not clear. The UK Intellectual Property 
Office’s recent patent examination guidelines293 gives clear guidance on how to apply principles of 
morality based on the case law but “ordre public” receives barely a mention. Moreover, these reports 
are at national level. Warren-Jones correctly claims that the terms “ordre public” and “morality” have 
been treated abstrusely by the EPO Appeal Boards, despite there being an appreciation of a difference 
in their meaning.294  
 
It would be helpful if the Boards were to develop a practice of referencing previous cases if they are 
guided by their obiter dicta. Otherwise, the endeavour to make sense of their interpretations is 
arduous. Despite the fact that ordre public is often used in a public order sense, Beyleveld and 
Brownsword contend that if an invention could harm human beings, the provisions on “ordre public” 
would raise an issue as to whether principles of justice, freedom and freedom from interference were 
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contravened.295 Given the established practice of the EPO in referencing morality when Article 53(a) 
is engaged, T 0149/11 as explored hereunder has not helped to make the interpreter’s task any easier. 
 
In a recent case at the EPO, Method and device for processing a slaughtered animal or part thereof in 
a slaughterhouse,296 ordre public rather than morality became the focus of the Appeal Board’s 
interpretation of Article 53(a) in a case which concerned a patent application for a means and 
instrument to process slaughtered animals. The Board distinguished between the invention which 
would be made regardless and its exploitation which was the concern of the patent. The application 
related to an invention for both a method and device for processing a slaughtered animal or part of a 
slaughtered animal in a slaughterhouse. The controversy in this application arose because the 
application required that at least one observer be positioned at the slaughter line. This was understood 
by the Board to mean that such a person would comprise part of the patentable invention, although the 
inclusion of a human being in the patent application, on reading the case, appears to have been 
inadvertent. Nonetheless, the patent was not granted and it is clear from the EPC that human beings 
cannot be patented. Moreover, given the recent constitutionalisation of law in this area, patent 
arbitrators are increasingly aware of the need to take human dignity issues into consideration. The 
patent application should have been drafted with greater care to avoid the inference. 
 
What is exceptional about this case is that in upholding these objections to the patent, the Board 
associated human rights violations as being contrary to ordre public rather than the broader category 
normally used of morality. Moreover it was also associated with the protection of fundamental values 
and rights such as the right to life, physical integrity and human dignity. The European Convention on 
Human Rights was invoked, and ordre public was found to be underpinned by fundamental rights and 
freedoms contained in this legislation. Reference was made to rights of integrity, liberty and the 
prohibition of slavery within the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which came into force in the EU 
in 2009 with the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon. However, these are extraordinary references, 
given that EU legislation is not binding in the EPO’s wider remit. It would suggest that the EPO lacks 
a set of principles within its jurisdiction and, therefore, considers it appropriate to search outside. 
Whilst it may be considered a positive development to seek out a moral compass in an area imbued 
with ethical issues, ideally, if the EPO lacks principles, it should surely draft its own. Principles 
written for one purpose may not transplant smoothly into another system, especially where its 
jurisdiction is broader than that of the EU. The Travaux Préparatoires of the EPC acknowledged the 
multiple moralities existing within European states, it was decided not to define morality in the EPC, 
institutions were supposed to provide guidance and yet, forty years later the EPO still grapples with its 
dearth of written values. Clearly some precision is needed but importing evolving values from another 
legal system may well add to the confusion in this area rather than quietening it. 
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This case also signifies a vast expansion in the potential scope of ordre public as heretofore it had 
been confined to devices likely to disrupt public order and its ambit was therefore narrow. The case 
thus blurs the lines between ordre public and morality, especially given that morality was the banner 
under which cases such as WARF concerning human embryos was decided. What it also signifies is 
that patent law at the EPO is becoming increasingly constitutionalised and infused with higher order 
norms of ethics and morality. These influences are emanating from the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Human Rights and the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. Whilst it is 
not undesirable for the EPO to seek a moral compass, clarity as to its guiding principles and how these 
have been reached would be welcome. 
 
The section has shown that morality and ordre public under Article 53(a) EPC (as amended) are not 
easy to adjudicate and, in the absence of principles, the Boards have struggled and produced a body of 
case law which is inconsistent. This thesis is not arguing for the delineation of morality and ordre 
public by a legislative body: such a task may not foster clarity as technology advances rapidly and the 
law struggles to keep pace. It is more concerned with how decisions regarding patents on morally 
controversial biotechnological inventions are taken and by whom. The next section explores the issue 
of morality as it arises under the Biotech Directive and the case law which this legislation has 
spawned. Unlike the EPO, the CJEU has not made ordre public the focus of any of its case law in 
biotechnology to date. 
 
2.3.3 Morality in the case law of the CJEU 
 
The CJEU in recent years has considered its first important case on equivalent provisions in the 
Biotech Directive as it is the final court of appeal from national courts under the Biotech Directive. 
The Brüstle297 case was the first case in which the CJEU decided on the patentability of certain 
inventions under the Directive. The EU in relative terms, is a late-comer to the realm given that the 
Biotech Directive was passed in 1998 so other patent legislation, such as the EPC, predates it by more 
than twenty years. In Brüstle, the court considered Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive on a referral from 
Germany’s Federal Patent Court. Greenpeace initially had argued before the German courts that the 
patent was invalid because it breached the terms of the Directive, Article 6(2)(c) of which states that 
the “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes” are unpatentable. Greenpeace was 
partly successful at first instance but on appeal, the action was stayed pending the aforementioned 
referral. The court sought answers from the CJEU to the following questions: 
 
1. What is meant by the term “human embryos” in Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC? 
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(a) Does it include all stages of the development of human life, beginning with the 
fertilisation of the ovum, or must further requirements, such as the attainment of a 
certain stage of development, be satisfied? 
 
  (b) Are the following organisms also included: 
 
unfertilised human ova into which a cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been 
transplanted; 
 
unfertilised human ova whose division and further development have been 
stimulated by parthenogenesis? 
 
(c) Are stem cells obtained from human embryos at the blastocyst stage also 
included? 
 
2. What is meant by the expression “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes”? Does it include any commercial exploitation within the meaning of Article 6(1) of 
the Directive, especially used for the purposes of scientific research? 
 
3. Is technical teaching to be considered unpatentable pursuant to Article 6(2)(c) of the 
Directive even if the use of human embryos does not form part of the technical teaching 
claimed with the patent, but is a necessary precondition for the application of that teaching. 
 
(a) because the patent concerns a product whose production necessitates the prior 
destruction of human embryos, 
 
(b) or because the patent concerns a process for which such a product  is needed as 
base material? 
  
Prior to its judgment, Advocate General Yves Bȏt issued an opinion. In essence, clarification as to 
what constitutes a human embryo for the purposes of the Directive was sought. The Advocate General 
opined that a Community-wide definition of human embryo is necessary in order to deter forum 
shopping for a favourable regime,298 effectively recommending a constitutionalisation299 of the status 
of the human embryo through the mechanism of patent law. This has not even been achieved by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in its interpretation of the right to life, and it 
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has shown restraint in the extent to which it is willing to circumscribe this right.300 The Advocate 
General showed no such reticence. He reasoned that as both totipotent cells and blastocysts can 
develop into human bodies, they come within the definition of “embryo”. Pluripotent cells cannot 
develop into a complete human body but they arise in the blastocyst and give rise to foetal or adult 
cells. If a prior destruction of the embryo is necessitated by the technical process, the invention should 
be unpatentable even where the use of the embryo is not mentioned. Bȏt also indicated that whilst in 
some countries, the human embryo is considered to exist from fertilisation, in others, implantation is 
the embryonic threshold.301 In a somewhat conservative approach, he considers that it is illogical to 
deem that legal status should only arise with “nidation” or implantation. He brings some clarity to 
what may be considered as use for industrial or commercial purposes, saying that: 
 
[u]se for industrial or commercial purposes requires large-scale production, which is in any 
case out of all proportion to, for example, the number of operations carried out or potentially 
carried out in utero on an embryo to correct a malformation and to improve chances of 
survival.302 
 
The CJEU held that “human embryo” under Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive 98/44 includes any human 
ovum after fertilisation, any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature 
human cell has been transplanted, and any non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further 
development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis. The CJEU left it to the referring court to 
decide whether pluripotent cells taken from a blastocyst would constitute a “human embryo”, leaving 
open a very wide interpretation of patent exclusion. Human embryos used for scientific research will 
also be excluded from patentability and patents will only be permitted for therapeutic or diagnostic 
purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it.  
 
The CJEU confirmed in Brüstle303 that commercial exploitation would be defined in accordance with 
the recommendation of the Advocate General, so adjudication comes down to a question of scale – in 
this case, at least. A parallel patent application to the EPO resulted in a revocation of the patent in 
opposition proceedings for insufficient disclosure.304 The EPO has chosen to incorporate the principles 
from the CJEU’s decision into its guidelines for examination,305 signifying an ongoing tendency to 
approximate its laws to those of the EU. The EU’s reading of morality provisions is not restricted by 
guidelines recommending that the provisions of the Directive be read narrowly. The EPO, despite such 
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restrictions is choosing to align its principles with those of the CJEU, in cases concerning human 
embryos at least. Whether such voluntary convergence continues remains uncertain and will 
undoubtedly depend at least in part on what material or matter the patent application covers. 
 
The inherent tensions in the Directive between promotion of investment and the protection of the 
dignity of the person are evident. These points of conflict are unlikely to abate because on the one 
hand, biotechnology is a growing industry and promises cures for currently untreatable diseases and 
there may be a moral imperative to encourage its growth. On the other hand, many aspects of 
European law are becoming increasingly constitutionalised with more and more references to the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. If a more 
conservative era in the framing of the rights of the human embryo emerges at the European or supra-
national level, these instruments may be used to rein in biotechnological exploration and their patents 
under a morality banner. Who makes these decisions and how they are taken will be an important 
consideration. 
 
Subsequent to the judgment in Brüstle, the understanding that parthenotes should be classed as 
embryos has been overturned in International Stem Cell Corporation306 which was a reference from 
the UK High Court. Parthenotes are not now considered to come within the definition of human 





The Brüstle decision has been criticised for seeking to establish a European-wide definition of human 
embryos through patent law.307 Nordberg and Minssen argue that by basing the exception to 
patentability on human dignity, the CJEU equates, for the purposes of patent law, a life in being with a 
fertilised ovum.308 O’Sullivan also indicates that the decision leaves an area of ambiguity in that 
embryos which have been created through SCNT/therapeutic cloning are unlikely to have capacity to 
develop into a human being and, regardless of the fact that these are totipotent, they are still likely to 
be excluded from patentability.309 This area is currently unsettled.  
 
It remains to be seen whether this construction of human life informs other areas of the law involving 
the right to life, such as abortion law or the status of embryos left over from IVF processes. Harmon 
                                                 
306 C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation v Comptroller General of Patents Designs and 
Trade Marks, (Grand Chamber) 18 December 2014. 
307 Nordberg and Minssen, op. cit. 144. 
308 Ibid 152. 
309 Ella O’Sullivan, ‘International Stem Cell Corp v Comptroller General of Patents: the debate  
regarding the definition of the human embryo continues’ [2014] EIPR 36(3) 155, 162. 
69 
 
et. al. criticise Brüstle opining that what is essentially a moral question was reframed as a legal one 
and the CJEU thereby failed to engage with what it was being asked.310 Tensions may emerge in the 
jurisprudence of the new specialised patent courts if and when cases are appealed to the CJEU if there 
is uncertainty as to the extent to which patent law is to be influenced by human rights discourse. 
Moreover, to date the EU has not acceded to the European Convention on Human Rights and it will 
not aid harmonisation if separate definitions of human life in all its stages emerges through EU patent 
law combined with human rights concerns. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether life and dignity 
acquire different meanings under the EU Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The case law at both the EPO and the CJEU indicate that there is no consensus about what constitutes 
morality and ordre public in the EPC or the Biotech Directive. Given that technology is advancing 
rapidly and new ethical issues arise regularly, some academic commentary criticises the paucity of 
public input. The critique envisages more public involvement than our representative system of 
politics allows. The European Parliament does engage robustly with ethical issues related to 
biotechnology but the debate does not engage the wider publics. It could be argued, of course, that 
public voices are not heard more often because of lack of interest but awareness is not high because 
there is a paucity in the provision and transmission of information. Criticisms of the lack of public 
involvement are explored in chapter four, yet few writers elaborate on an alternative model that would 
address this critique in a thorough manner. This matter encapsulates the normative quest of this thesis: 
to adjudicate effectively the decision-making process of such patents prior to grant so that pluralistic 
public voices are engaged. This may cause oppositions, appeals and post-grant challenges to be 
reduced – or not: its effect may be unpredictable. It is also aimed to achieve a more holistic approach 
towards what Europeans truly consider to constitute morality within the context of this work. This, I 
will argue, can be achieved using the executive body in the form of patent office officials to engage 
public opinions and to initiate an educative process on the advantages and disadvantages of patenting 
biotechnological inventions. This thesis focuses on the process of such engagement and not the 
outcome. 
 
The publics do care about moral issues and this is evidenced by public and individual participation in 
opposition proceedings, which is permitted under Article 99(1) EPC.311 However, at present these 
views do not have a broad means of expression. To highlight the disengagement between what might 
constitute public opinions and those of patent attorneys, in a recent publication on the matter of Article 
53(a) in opposition proceedings, the authors, both of whom are European patent attorneys and 
practitioners or lecturers, have the following to say: 
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[A]part from the grounds of “novelty”…and “inventive step” Article 100(a) EPC also covers 
the following grounds for opposition: The subject matter of the patent is excluded from 
patenting pursuant to Article 53 EPC, e.g., where the subject-matter relates to a plant or 
animal variety (Article 53(b) EPC) or to a method of treatment of the human or animal body 
(Article 53(c) EPC);… However these grounds are invoked less frequently in opposition 
proceedings and will not be dealt with in this book.312 
 
The authors do not mention Article 53(a) at all and they dismiss the role of the other sub-parts in 
opposition proceedings claiming that they are rarely invoked. This juxtaposes in an interesting way 
with the actual evidence of the case law, above. Moreover academic commentary, such as the 
following by Crespi who has written extensively on the issue of morality in European patent law, 
shows that the morality bar to European patents, in EPC Article 53(a), “has a long history of attempted 
usage by the Greens, animal rights campaigners, and others in formal opposition proceedings against 
specific patents granted by the EPO”.313 The case law supports Crespi’s claim and shows that the 
publics, embodied by environmental, animal rights and other campaigners regularly challenge patents 
to which they are opposed. The practitioners’ comments demonstrate their lack of knowledge of 
higher order norms. For them, administrative efficiency may trump moral content but this 
interpretation of the law is illegitimate. Morality bars to positive law are in a sense part of the 
constitutional order whether they be written or not and cannot be sidestepped without creating a crisis 
of legitimacy. Whilst one can sympathise with patent attorneys not versed in ethics who are 
responsible for administering the morality bar which overarches the granting of the patent, ignorance 




This chapter has carried out a chronological account of the introduction and development of patent 
legislation. It has noted the internationalisation of patent law and the expansion in the subject matter 
which it covers. The inclusion of mandatory provisions of morality and ordre public within patent 
legislation such as the EPC and the Biotech Directive (along with TRIPS) was traced. The confusion 
surrounding how to define morality and ordre public was palpable from the documentation: whilst it 
was agreed that there was no European definition of morality or ordre public, no attempt was made to 
bring clarity to the area. Instead, European institutions, whose identities were not revealed were to be 
charged with applying these vague principles. The buck, essentially, was passed to the boards and 
courts which had to grapple with a fast-moving technological field, a paucity of legal – and moral or 
ethical - guidance. Little publicity ensued over plant patents but when patents were granted on animals 
and sought on human embryos, public voices became more audible. This chapter has examined 
relevant case law in this context, focusing especially on the interpretation of morality (and ordre 
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public), principally at the EPO and its boards but also in the CJEU. This chapter has sought to 
demonstrate that morality is not currently being arbitrated appropriately, due to inherent uncertainty in 
the application of this norm for two reasons. The first is that it lacks definition and the second is that 
those charged with its administration do not have a grounding in its meaning or how it should be 
applied. Moreover, there is little space for public input and it may be argued that little interest has 
been shown. However, many NGOs, other groups and individuals take part in opposition proceedings 
suggesting that among the knowledgeable, public interest is keen. The question as to how to 
accommodate a multiplicity of views and make decisions on the basis of these views is an ongoing 
research problem. The normative focus of this work is to broaden possibilities for public involvement 
as much as possible. 
 
Having identified the problem in this chapter through a doctrinal approach to the legislation and case 
law, the next chapter will explore morality further in the context of its locus in the patent system. It 
will consider academic commentary on aspects of the legislation and case law from the perspective of 
public input. It will also investigate the calls for more public inclusion. Its principal task will be to 
analyse whether traditional processes of reform can produce a better manner of adjudicating morality 
























Chapter Three: Patent Moralities and Their Traditional 




The last chapter charted the history of patent law, noting its internationalisation and the increasingly 
important role that morality plays in patent legislation. However, it also highlighted that morality is 
not well defined and that judgments are unpredictable, leading to legal uncertainty. This thesis 
assumes that the morality clause will be retained in patent legislation and any advocacy of its abolition 
is outside the scope of this thesis. This work does not delve into whether morally controversial 
biotechnological patents should or should not be granted. It is not a moral treatise which seeks to find 
the “right answer” to questions of morality in patent legislation. It is concerned rather with developing 
a robust process for reaching decisions that are inclusive of a plurality of viewpoints and so rejects 
any fatalism which might assert that change from without is not possible. It discusses who should 
have the right to have an input into these decisions, drawing on literature which deals with public 
involvement in decisions of magnitude. It is argued that the populace in general should be involved in 
patent grants and refusals when the morality bar under Article 53(a) EPC has been triggered. It bases 
this normative claim on a number of premises which include the following.  
 
The EPC mandates a morality bar and yet does not postulate what morality actually is or how it comes 
to be decided that the patent application potentially falls within this exclusion. A clear set of principles 
could address this in part, but this is not the proposal of this thesis for reasons which will emerge in 
this chapter. At present, officials at the EPO must assess morality in a vacuum of definition and yet, as 
executive or administrative officers they are no better versed in ethics and what it may entail than 
society in general. Nor do I advance a proposal for ethical training, which will be explained in this 
chapter, too. Morality is a subject of much debate in a pluralistic world and this thesis argues for a 
decision-making model which will better accommodate a multiplicity of views. It is not a quest to 
develop expertise among a cohort of decision-makers but, rather, the thesis seeks to represent as 
broadly as possible the plurality of viewpoints that exist, or would exist with sufficient information, 
on matters of morality in controversial biotechnological patents. This chapter will critique the utility 
of the “usual solutions” in the context of these patents, concluding that in order to facilitate inclusivity, 
such solutions do not go far enough. 
 
This chapter seeks to achieve a number of tasks. It will distinguish between general moral issues 
raised by biotechnological inventions, which sometimes get mixed up with the more specific matter of 
the morality bar in Article 53(a) which refers only to the role of morality in the patenting process. 
Next, it will consider whether morality constraints can simply be ignored and concludes that this is not 
possible. It then highlights the current outlet that public voices have to express concerns about 
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morality, holding that this can be expanded. Subsequently, I explore and critique traditional remedies 
such as legislation, precedent and patent office practices to show that the various branches of 
government are poorly equipped to adjudicate morality and that ethics committees will not provide an 
adequate solution either. If arbitrating morality is left to the legislature, it risks fossilising this 
changing standard where laws are drafted too tightly and if too loosely, then it falls upon the courts to 
decide the matter. Judges tend not to relish being foisted with this responsibility and often chide 
legislatures for their inaction. For instance, in the US case of Diamond v Chakrabarty314 the court 
noted that the legislature had not pronounced on whether patent law extended to micro-organisms and 
they regarded this as a matter best decided by Congress. Furthermore, judges may be obliged to 
grapple with scantily drafted legislation, such as in the Brüstle315 case where the term “human 
embryo” was not defined in the Biotech Directive. Consequently, the understanding that parthenotes 
constituted human embryos was overturned two years later in International Stem Cell Corporation316 
where this part of the decision was deemed to have been erroneously made. Sometimes it is believed 
that ethics committees could step into this breach but they may just dominate the process or else be 
sidelined by only being afforded an advisory role. Ethicists often are in search of an objective good 
but they can play a valuable role in helping to identify which applications raise novel moral issues. 
 
Finally, this chapter also shows that citizens are increasingly being included by governments in their 
own governance and so many conventional paradigms of law making are undergoing a process of 
change. This will be explored in subsequent chapters but briefly, the human right to participate is 
being utilised in a number of policy arenas to include different interest groups in matters which 
concern them, such as under the Aarhus Convention and this, I will argue, can and should be 
expanded further. This chapter explores some paradigms that point to a more deliberative and 
participatory approach to resolving dilemmas in the ethical realm which, if well designed can assist in 
the resolution of ethically fraught issues. In doing so I propose to build a nexus between the 
adjudication of morality within the patent system and public input, which will be explored in more 
detail in chapter four. 
 
3.2 Untangling morality of the invention and morality in patent grants 
 
Before exploring the entwined skeins of morality and patenting in Article 53(a) EPC, it may be useful 
to identify some of the moral issues which pertain to biotechnological inventions prior to their coming 
within the ambit of the patent system. Ethical aspects of the creation of biotechnological inventions 
sometimes get confused with the morality bar in the granting of the patent. As morality is difficult to 
define objectively, no consensus as to which model of morality should predominate is likely to be 
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reached either when dealing with inventions or patenting such inventions. It is argued by some that 
biotechnological inventions are not just another small, almost routine extension of human ingenuity 
but, rather that they touch core questions regarding what it means to be human itself before the patent 
system is ever engaged. Habermas has written:- 
 
the breadth of biotechnological interventions raises moral questions that are not simply 
difficult in the familiar sense but are of an altogether different kind. The answers touch on the 
ethical self-understanding of humanity as a whole.317  
 
Discussion of these broader issues is outside the scope of this thesis but where morally controversial 
biotechnological inventions are allowed and patents applied for, the morality bar in Article 53(a) EPC 
will be engaged. Sandel has also said that advances in genetic and other technologies will force us:- 
 
to confront questions largely lost from view in the modern world – questions about the moral 
status of nature, and about the proper stance of human beings toward the given world.318  
 
The matter of how society is to decide such issues and whether patents should be granted on morally 
controversial biotechnological inventions is fraught: even where there is awareness of advances in 
science and technology - and the issues are so complex that they are not at the forefront of public 
consciousness - society is divided and decisions tend to get made by scientists and technocrats, largely 
out of the public eye. For example, at the Asilomar Conference in 1974, it was scientists who declared 
a six month moratorium on genetic engineering – the issue did not come into the wider realm of 
public consciousness for some two more decades nor did it fall into a tailored regulatory 
framework.319 Snead has commented that: 
 
Descartes placed moral questions outside the ambit of modern science in order to free its 
massive analytic powers to explore the composition and function of natural things. Finding 
such moral questions outside the reach of the tools of modern science, some scientists and 
philosophers have thus concluded that these questions (and the concepts on which they 
depend) are meaningless.320 
 
Despite difficulties in defining morality, it operates as a bar to patentability in European patent law 
and therefore cannot legitimately be ignored. The current manner in which it is being adjudicated is 
inadequate and, thus, various approaches will be examined hereunder. 
 
There has been considerable blurring of the lines between the morality of allowing research into 
biotechnology and concerns relating to morality provisions in patent legislation. However, the nature 
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of such ethical issues is unclear and the extent to which these matters can be accommodated within 
patent law is similarly obscure. Laurie says:-  
 
[i]n particular, there is a consistent failure to distinguish concerns about scientific or 
technical advances per se from those about the grant of a patent over the products and 
processes arising from such advances.321  
 
The decision as to whether to grant a patent is a moral issue but courts and patent examiners are 
constrained in that their task is to administer the law with little guidance. The scientific progress will 
continue, either more or less robustly but it is unsatisfactory to deal with moral issues in this indirect 
way because patent law is ill suited to regulating morality.322 Moreover, the actors charged with 
applying the morality bar tend to have a technical or legal background and no training in ethics so 
even the ability to identify applications which engage Article 53(a) EPC is not assured. The profile of 
judges in the new courts being set up in the EU under the Unified Patent System will not differ so the 
adjudication of morality is unlikely to become any more straightforward. 
 
Another way of viewing the matter is to accept the interconnectedness of the technology and the 
patents. Laurie says, in relation to Article 6 of the Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological 
inventions:- “[i]f respect for human dignity is truly the ethical underpinning of Art.6, then we must 
recognise that human dignity cannot be compartmentalised” and believes that we are in a “hopelessly 
confused state”.323 Whilst the patent system cannot be expected to regulate morality, it does not have 
to be used to provide incentives for research which commoditises humanity.324 Mills also separates the 
creation of the technology which raises its own morality issues from the patent grant as the patent 
applies to an invention which already exists and has therefore been permitted. However, denying 
patent protection for such inventions may serve to regulate indirectly by de-incentivising the creation 
of such inventions in the first place.325 This would not be a very satisfactory way of dealing with 
ethical issues as inventions may be encouraged by one set of policies and then discouraged by another. 
A more transparent and streamlined process would be preferable. 
 
Not everyone would agree with Mills’ views. For instance the court in Diamond v Chakrabarty326 said 
that denying patents on biotechnological inventions would be unlikely to end the research as much 
had already taken place in the absence of patent protection. The court stated that “legislative or 
judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown, any 
more than Canute could command the tides”.327 However, the dictum in Diamond was delivered over 
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thirty years ago and in the US there have been fewer restrictions on patenting biotech inventions 
because US patent law lacks a general morality bar. In Europe, the inclusion of a morality bar in 
patent legislation means that there is an extra step to traverse when inventors seek patents. 
 
Whilst concerns about the morality of the invention tend to question whether scientists should engage 
in research because they can, the ethical issues which arise in patenting morally controversial 
inventions include the incentivisation of this research and the granting of monopoly rights to exclude 
others from using the invention. 
 
Among anti-patenting activists, there are two different positions which are sometimes conflated and 
these are, respectively, opposition to genetically engineering higher life forms and granting patents 
over these entities.328 However, whilst these two positions are interconnected, there is still a 
dichotomy between permission for the technology for research purposes and the use of the patent 
system for its encouragement. 
 
The EPC, however, does not separate morality from patentable biotechnological inventions. The 
legislation is not Cartesian in the sense of sidelining non-scientific matters (as did Descartes)329 as it 
brings together important issues which arise in different disciplines, for instance law, science and 
ethics. Patent grants raise ethical concerns due to the enactment of legislation such as the Biotech 
Directive and the associated amending legislation of the EPC. Whilst expertise in patent law and some 
knowledge of biotechnology is necessary to apply the law correctly, the issue of how morality is 
arbitrated is important because some patents will not be granted if they do not pass this test. Patent 
officials, however, do not really have the skills to apply the morality bar. At very least, they should 
have a satisfactory means of knowing which patent applications in the biotechnological realm flag up 
ethical issues. This could avoid controversies such as the granting of the Edinburgh patent330, explored 
in chapter two. 
 
Morality in patent grants is of interest to all members of society, I contend.331 The allocation of patents 
in this area is an important means of incentivising biotechnological research which promises cures for 
serious diseases. Whether monopolies are justified for particular inventions is not always clear and 
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therefore, the manner in which such decisions are made is important. This thesis argues that the 
decision-making process should be broadly based to represent as many viewpoints as possible. 
However, given the complexity of the area, it may prove difficult to articulate concerns in a 
satisfactory way, especially within patent law. 
 
The grant of a patent over an invention and the use of a public incentivisation scheme is a profoundly 
moral matter in its own right. Whilst society may or may not be satisfied with permission being given 
for creation of biotechnological inventions, the matter of commercial exploitation is now the primary 
concern of the morality bar within the EPC: narrowed from its original scope which extended to 
publication and exploitation of the invention.332 It may be that the patent system is the first frontier at 
which those who are opposed to the morality of the invention can make their voices heard, even if 
they are not always listened to. This has the effect of potentially hindering the purpose of the patent 
system which is to encourage invention and not to regulate moral issues which could already have 
been decided. However, no right – and patents are classified as property rights in much legislation – is 
absolute and restrictions on rights are the norm, although these should be clear. Moreover, the 
patenting of morally controversial biotechnological inventions raises separate moral issues. Perhaps an 
adequate forum for discussion of technological advancement should have been provided at the advent 
of the creation of these inventions. There are now deeply conflicting interests and the forums in which 
the matter is being flexed is the EPO and its boards and courts within the EU. Various solutions to this 
dilemma have been proposed, as can be seen in the next section. 
 
3.2.1 Can morality provisions in patent law just be ignored? 
 
One solution would be to excise all references to morality from patent law. This is not the proposition 
of this thesis because I believe that the morality bar serves a distinct purpose discrete to issues relating 
to patenting morally controversial biotechnological inventions. This includes questions over whether 
we should commercialise inventions which we allow to be created, whether they should be 
monopolised, whether we should incentivise such research through the patent system and, more 
generally, whether living organisms should be the subject of a patent grant, even if the latter point is 
already moot. There are also controversies over the granting of patents on isolated DNA which has not 
been modified,333 even though this is permitted by the legislation.334  
 
Lawyers are often keen to assert that patent law is not a realm into which morality should intrude and 
that the grant of a patent is a purely administrative exercise. Once the criteria are achieved, the grant 
                                                 
332 Brüstle v Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I-9821. 
333 James Boyle, Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information 
Society (Harvard University Press 1996). 
334 Biotech Directive, Article 5. 
78 
 
can be made. In this view, issues of morality should be decided at the research stage335 and not later. 
However, monopoly grants or awards of property rights frequently attract academic criticism and 
patents do not differ in this respect.336 Patents on morally controversial biotechnological inventions 
raise various ethical issues such as monopolies and patenting living organisms. Moreover, morality is 
enshrined in European patent law and must be given its due weight. Sterckx and Cockbain have said 
that “the EPC requires the EPO to act as a moral censor…It is clearly so fundamental to the EPC that 
it was even incorporated into Art. 27(2) TRIPS and Art. 6(1) EBD”.337 To those who object to morality 
provisions within patent law and who believe that these should instead remain on the outside, they say 
“this argument is unconvincing for the patent system is the only legal arena where technologies are 
investigated on a 'case-by-case' basis”.338 
 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that as the issue of European moral exclusions from patentability has 
not been clarified, patents should be granted and can always be invalidated later by boards, national 
courts or by the new EU patent courts.339 This approach was taken in the Edinburgh case340 in which a 
patent was granted controversially as it potentially covered human embryonic stem cells. It was 
opposed and subsequently amended to exclude such cells. The approach of patenting promptly 
followed by subsequent queries has been strenuously criticised where it operates more often in the US 
as the bars to morality are fewer, although the moral utility doctrine has been invoked in the past to 
refuse patents on inventions which were injurious to the sound morals of society.341 This doctrine no 
longer tends to be cited since Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.342 in which the Federal Appeals 
Court held that inventions which could deceive some members of the public would not be 
unpatentable on moral utility grounds, given that Congress had chosen not to pronounce on the matter. 
Some patent grants generate calls for legislative reform by Congress along with queries as to how 
such patents had been issued at all. According to Bagley, the US has resisted this urging over the last 
three decades, only ceding slightly in 2011 when it amended the Patent Act to prohibit the granting of 
patents on human organisms.343 This may lead to a situation in the near future in which Congress may 
have to debate “whether patents on human-animal chimera, or genetically modified previability 
fetuses, developed to be destroyed in the fight against some dreaded disease, should have been 
granted”. Where legislation restricting patent grants is introduced, it is not retrospective and patents on 
controversial subject matter, which have already been granted, will stand.344 
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Suggesting that a provision of the law be ignored because it is ill-defined is a non-remedy and instead, 
the core problem with the system as it currently operates is that patent office officials are not equipped 
to carry out the task with which they are charged. Morality is becoming an issue of constitutional 
importance within patent law. Arguably, constitutional law should derive from the people who, in 
representative democracies, are sovereign. Instead, one finds that it is the judiciary who are extending 
the consideration of constitutional rights to some morally controversial biotechnological patent 
applications. Some cases have begun to cite human dignity concerns when dealing with human 
embryos and, indeed, parthenotes345 although the breadth of the definition of human embryo in 
Brüstle346 was curtailed in International Stem Cell Corp.347 within two years. The European 
Convention on Human Rights together with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights bring other 
dimensions to patent law, especially as more cases involving human embryos are coming before the 
courts.348 It is notable that the status of the human embryo varies greatly in different European 
countries and none of the legal instruments define its parameters. This shows the plurality of 
viewpoints which has not been helped by the fact that the CJEU has not been very comfortable 
admitting that it is dealing with moral rather than legal issues in this terrain.349 This also indicates that 
the judiciary do not appear to find the application of ethical matters an easy task. Nonetheless, Sterckx 
and Cockbain point out: 
 
The grant of patents by the EPO presupposes that there is a legal order in the Contracting 
States which allows granted patent rights to be enforced. Article 53(a) EPC can be considered 
as the expression that it would be incompatible with such legal order to grant  patents for 
inventions whose exploitation would be contrary to “ordre public” or morality. The provision 
of Article 53(a) might thus be considered as a legal norm of higher rank than the provisions 
of Article 52(1) EPC, which latter must yield in case of conflict.350 
 
This suggests that as morality trumps an otherwise valid patent, then the latter must bow on the 
triggering of the former. Ignorance of the law will not, in the adage, be an excuse to the existence of a 
hierarchy of norms. Leapfrogging over problematic applications of the law rather than dealing with 
them directly is not best practice and in any case, under the EPC, the EPO has no option in this matter. 
 
The morality test encompasses a variety of approaches taken by the EPO in its evaluations of the 
Article 53(a) patent eligibility bar, as seen in the last chapter. Llewelyn and Adcock observe: 
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The issue of how to define and apply morality is a difficult one for the Office. It is primarily 
concerned with the granting of patents over inventions which meet an agreed, technical, 
threshold for protection and arguably it should not be concerned with more nebulous 
concepts such as defining morality. However…the EPO is required to make such a 
determination, and the unease with which it undertakes this obligation is palpable.351 
 
Kass characterises as a weakness in the relationship between science and society that:- 
 
[t]he patent laws assume that innovations proposed by inventors are...simply good for the 
community at large...they reflect a once little questioned faith in progress. Thus, as they are 
instruments for encouraging innovation, they are poorly designed for regulating or 
controlling it.352  
 
This suggests that patent offices are not well placed to bar patents which are morally controversial 
when their function is to grant patents that fulfil certain technical criteria. One should not forget the 
general principle of not being a judge in one’s own cause and as patent offices are funded by the 
patents they grant and renew, it may be that impediments to patents are read narrowly. Bagley asserts 
that patent applicants and their attorneys are fundamental to the creation of patent law and policy and 
argues that the US has an approach of patenting first and questioning such grants later, saying: 
 
Although the determination of whether to allow the research to continue is a critically 
important issue, the availability of a government imprimatur granting exclusive rights over 
morally controversial inventions is a separate but important issue, as well...So if Congress 
has not yet spoken directly to the issue, and the USPTO and courts have no say in the matter, 
then who gets to decide what gets patented? The answer is biotech patent applicants, also 
known as scientists or researchers.353 
 
Clearly, morality when specifically included in legislation cannot legitimately be ignored. First of all, 
law and morality, as the legislation stands, are not separate because of the specific provisions of 
Article 53(a) EPC. Secondly, morality cannot be sidestepped and later invoked to revoke patents of 
dubious validity because it exists as a bar to controversial applications. Third, morality occupies a 
higher rank354 than the patentability criteria of novelty, inventive step and usefulness in industry. 
Despite difficulties in interpretation, its place must be respected. There is evident discomfort in its 
application by patent officials and by the judiciary. However, this does not preclude the seeking of a 
better means of arbitration and of seeking to define morality and ordre public. Who does so and how 
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3.2.2 Opposition on morality grounds: public voices 
 
European opposition to patents on biotechnological inventions, including animals,  continues and 
derives from a number of different premises. Various positions include those who believe that 
patenting animals is inherently wrong because it offends moral values.355 Antoine Goetschel, a former 
prosecutor appointed to protect animal welfare in Switzerland has questioned who represents the 
interests of genetically modified animals.356 Professor Andrew Linzey of the Oxford Centre for Animal 
Ethics advocates a Christianity based respect for God’s creations357 and this includes the rights of 
animals. Some NGOs such as Greenpeace358 and Friends of the Earth359 advocate an instrumental 
view of morality and focus on potentially negative consequences that both such engineering and 
patenting would have on the environment and on the economy. Of note is that the above positions are 
represented by privileged individuals or NGOs and it is currently difficult to discern public views. 
Morality provisions have been used as a broad vehicle to challenge patents in controversial areas such 
as environmental risk,360 stem cell research361 or experimentation on animals.362 Furthermore, it is 
feared that genetic diversity will be lost and there is a concern that risk calculations are difficult, if not 
impossible, to make.363 However, the response from patent advocates has been robust and they 
observe that humans have a long history of objectifying animals for their own purposes – buying and 
selling them at will and using them to satisfy several human needs and desires.364 As aforementioned, 
however, the approval of the use of animals for one purpose does not mean that all uses of animals 
would gain public approval365 and biotechnology raises different moral issues such as the genetic 
engineering of animals to suffer, for instance.366 
 
The morality provisions within the patent system are the vehicle through which NGOs can exercise 
their opposition to patents which, in their view, should not be granted.367 Morality and ordre public are 
a broad umbrella, as can be seen from the sample of positions in the previous paragraph. Sommer 
asserts that European opposition to patent grants is often mounted by Greenpeace and other special 
interest groups or organisations and this is borne out in the case law. Their efforts are often either 
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wholly or partly successful in that some patent applications have either been withdrawn or 
modified.368 There is much to be said for the relative openness of this process at the EPO. The 
logistics of participation are, nonetheless, problematic unless individuals or groups seek out education 
and are able to fund themselves. Such opposition is very costly monetarily, temporally and also in 
terms of expertise. Without substantial resources, participation is a paper-based right only. There is a 
disparity of means between grantors, grantees and objectors. Patents must be opposed in order to face 
revocation and this process is onerous for the challenger. 
 
It has been suggested that if patent office examiners and patent courts were allowed to access surveys 
and opinion polls which deal with issues of “morality”, this would identify whether or not European 
publics understand the technology sufficiently for them to have formed an opinion.369 Some effort 
could then be made to address any knowledge gap. However, discussion and public awareness of such 
issues is not uniform across Europe. Kuře points out that there is no such public discussion in new EU 
Member States regarding the patentability of hESC lines. Patentability is discussed only within the 
relevant scientific community in these countries. Yet, the scientists do not publish papers on 
patentability and neither are patent lawyers overly focused on the area.370 Public voices are not 
universally engaged and often the media are an important but not necessarily accurate source of 
information. Wider public discussion of the issue of morality would enhance its understanding and the 
various positions which people hold. In order to partake in challenges to patents, a considerable 
grounding in a variety of disciplines is required. 
 
In further proceedings, a post-grant challenge can be mounted by members of the public within nine 
months of the publication of the EPO’s grant of the patent. The EPO is still constrained, nonetheless, 
by the lack of clarity in relation to morality exceptions in the applicable legislation. The dicta from 
various judgments are not of much assistance. They do not really establish a comprehensive precedent 
or consistent interpretation of the legislation. Whilst the statutes are quite general – and this may 
provide a desired flexibility, on the one hand -  on the other, it can result in “arbitrary, overly broad, or 
overly narrow interpretations, which are arguably problems exemplified in the balancing, 
unacceptability, and public abhorrence tests under the EPC”.371 Viens argues that on the issue of 
patenting stem cells, there is an array of moral theories available to guide this practice and that there is 
no agreement among reasonable people on which approach is better.372 His comments describe a 
plurality of perspectives which have not been aired widely. Regardless as to the extent to which these 
views differ, it will be shown that well managed public education and debate tends to soften polarities 
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and facilitates mutual comprehension of and respect for such differences.373 Whilst opposition and 
appeal procedures broaden the decision-making process to other influences, the processes involved are 
onerous for the challenger. 
 
By way of contrast with the European regime, the US lacks a post-grant proceeding which would 
facilitate public intervention in patent grants. Bagley believes that, in addition to some other reform, 
Congress should adopt such a scheme as it would at least facilitate some public input, allowing for the 
registration of opposition.374 This would be especially useful given that at present, the public lack 
standing to challenge a patent’s validity in court, as set out by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg.375 It remains to be seen whether the new courts set up 
in the EU evolve to resemble their specialised US counterpart or whether they retain their engagement 
with the essence of Article 53(a) as expressed, more or less, in Article 6 of the Biotech Directive.  
 
It has been recommended by Harmon that the EPO recognise that there are different interests at stake 
which should be identified and their underlying values understood. There needs to be a way of 
measuring the extent of society’s reaction to the commercialisation of given inventions. Heed should 
be paid to the views of several interested stakeholders that “genes are the ‘heritage of humanity’”. He 
notes, however, that although it is improbable that the EPO will adopt a “robust and critical” approach 
to Article 53, which could engage stakeholders in the patenting process, he would expect it to do a 
number of things. First, to: (i) acknowledge and articulate competing interests and their underlying 
moral theories; (ii) arrive at a means of measuring society’s abhorrence to the commercialisation of 
opposed products/processes; and (iii) use its “moral compass” to formulate a comprehensible and 
cross-jurisdictional commercialisation morality.376 This thesis takes Harmon’s prescription further by 
developing a model of how such stakeholders can be engaged by accommodating a plurality of 
viewpoints within a deliberative and participatory structure. The EPO can develop their skills in 
administering debate rather than deciding moral matters for signatories across 38 states. It is the 
contention of this thesis that as morality in a pluralistic world cannot be defined in a manner that will 
represent public views, publics rather than patent officials should have the opportunity to make up 
their minds on whether patents should be granted when they trigger the morality threshold. How this 
can be achieved is the subject of chapters four, five and six. Before embarking on this normative 
quest, more conventional methods will be assessed against a benchmark of whether they do better at 
reflecting the multitude of potential public voices in this realm. 
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The next section will consider whether traditional methods of reform would be useful in resolving the 
problem of how to arbitrate morality in controversial biotechnological patent grants and whether 
publics can be given an input. 
 
3.2.3 Traditional methods of reform 
 
In this chapter we have seen already that there is a legal obligation to deal with the question of 
morality and ordre public: they cannot be sidelined. It has also been made apparent that their 
definition is not easily made and, moreover, opposition proceedings have shown that there are keen 
public voices, which often manifest interest through NGOs, which wish to be heard. It has been 
suggested that courts rather than legislatures could adjudicate the issue of morality more effectively. 
Smith believes that a balance needs to be struck “between judicial activism...and deliberative 
democracy”, expressing a scepticism about the legislature’s ability to deliver in this arena and 
claiming that reliance on legislation will necessarily lead to delays.377 Some traditional mechanisms 
for reform including the judiciary, legislature, patent offices and ethics committees will now be 
scrutinised. 
 
3.3 Would specialised courts better address the issue of morality? 
 
This thesis has shown that there is a lack of clarity in the decisions emanating from the EPO on the 
issue of morality and ordre public. Arguments have been made for the establishment of specialised 
courts which already exist in the US.378 Some academics hold that we should seek to achieve a better 
model with a European patent court staffed with professional judges.379 With the introduction of the 
Unitary Patent System this will soon become a reality in most countries in the European Union. This 
section will look at judicial and academic commentary in the US about the role of judges in this realm, 
noting the establishment of a court which handles patent appeals. It will then comment on some 
features of the new patent court system in the EU and can only speculate as to morality’s role in the 
regime. 
 
3.3.1 The US 
 
Whilst judges in specialised courts will have considerable expertise in patents and biotechnology, they 
may not be experts in ethics and even if they do have training in concepts of the public good, these 
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would not necessarily reflect the myriad moralities in a pluralistic world. In Diamond v 
Chakrabarty,380 the court stated:  
 
The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for resolution within the 
legislative process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative 
bodies can provide and courts cannot.381  
 
Judges often do not feel equipped to make such decisions without legislative guidance and can be 
particularly ill prepared in seeking to apply the law to new technologies. The US Supreme Court in 
Diamond went on to say that the legislative process: 
 
involves the balancing of competing values and interests, which in our democratic system is 
the business of elected representatives. Whatever their validity, the contention now pressed 
on us should be addressed to the political branches of the Government, the Congress and the 
Executive, and not to the courts.382  
 
In the context of such reflection, it is somewhat strange that the court did not exercise judicial restraint 
and refer the matter back to the legislature but it chose not to follow this course. The majority of the 
court in Diamond v Chakrabarty adopted a very modernist approach to the issue of patents and 
genetic technology, especially notable in the language of Mr Justice Douglas, when he talked about 
inventions of benefit to humankind. He referred with emphasis to those which “push back the frontiers 
of chemistry, physics, and the like”.383 Hence the debate as to where responsibility should lie and how 
the balance of power should be honed continues without resolution nearly forty years later. It has been 
suggested that, in order to aid their deliberations, the judiciary could rely on expert evidence and 
witnesses. However, Smith has commented: 
 
[I]f non-scientific, non-expert judges and juries are not regarded as competent to judge the 
content of expert information, how then are they to be recognized as competent to judge 
credentials of those who would give expert information? Epistemic competence may be 
thought of correctly as but a matter of degree – for not all experts are equally competent, just 
as not all non-experts are equally epistemically incompetent.384 
 
Judicial activity in the US differs somewhat from Europe, given that patent rights there emanate from 
the Constitution. The legislator’s inaction has been criticised, where laws become outdated and new 
ones are not enacted to deal with emerging issues and Smith suggests that the solution to this problem 
may lie within the power of the courts. He advocates that judges’ interpretation should be steered by 
reason, fairness, common sense, and comparison. He advocates the creation of a “common law of 
biotechnology” where principled decisions can be made and predictability assured. Otherwise, in his 
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view, science will be the driver of the direction in which biotechnology will evolve and law’s role will 
be solely reactive. He does believe that other disciplines should have some input but does not 
elaborate as to the form this may take.385 The moral utility doctrine, which in the past was used for 
inventions considered, among other things to be immoral,386 has not been invoked to date in any court 
cases involving biotechnological patents. 
 
It has been argued that the judiciary shares with the legislature the responsibility for law-making, in 
the common law tradition. In this view, the courts’ task is to find an equilibrium in their approach 
between interpreting existing statutes in line with modern standards of justice and delegating law-
making responsibilities to legislatures, where appropriate. Their role is not just of interpretation but 
also of policy formulation and it has been argued that it is especially important that courts embrace 
this multifaceted role, “[g]iven an unsophisticated citizenry”.387 This raises an important question: why 
is the citizenry ignorant and is this immutable or susceptible to change? What role do government and 
other parties play in their education? Are judges not also citizens? Judges may also lack competence in 
technology and policy formation. Education in such matters that this thesis advocates will benefit the 
judiciary as much as citizens in general but it will not give them any more expertise in arbitrating 
morality than anyone else. Morality in a pluralistic world will require public input in its arbitration to 
ensure representativeness and to avoid paternalism. However, education will broaden everyone’s 
knowledge of different perspectives and rationales for various viewpoints. Elitist democracy – a 
system in which only experts decide on broad-ranging issues in the belief that the populace in general 
are ignorant and disinterested - often prevails where government is secretive and does not give easy 
access to information. 
 
The US patent system is now more specialised in that it set up the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (CAFC) in 1982. This court replaced the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals and it reviews appeals from USPTO decisions and is also able to craft uniform interpretations 
of any statutory provisions. Although the CAFC appears averse to making patent policy in the absence 
of statutory authority, it is quite comfortable in the role of statutory interpreter.388 This court does seek 
to harmonise the application of patent law and is considered to be “decidedly pro-patent”.389 It has 
jurisdiction to hear all patent appeals. It will be instructive to compare the new specialised EU court 
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With the setting up of specialised courts within the EU, the regime in Europe will become much more 
intricate. Sir David Kitchin, a Lord Justice of Appeal in the Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
also believes that it will become more patent-friendly390 and it may, therefore, not prioritise the issue 
of morality and ordre public.391 He has the following to say about the new court structure in the EU, in 
a commentary that highlights the increased complexity of the new system: 
 
Defendants may face claims for infringement of national patents, EP patents outside the 
scope of the UPC, EP patents within the UPC and unitary patents – four different co-existing 
systems with different rules, a challenge for any business, let alone small and medium-sized 
enterprises...and if he loses in either the local division or the central division he must appeal. 
For that he must go to a third country, Luxembourg. So to protect his main UK business he 
must go to three jurisdictions…bifurcation has been shown to provide a patentee with 
significant advantages…392 
 
It remains to be seen whether the new EU courts follow the tendency but experience is likely to prove 
to be a good teacher. The operation of specialised courts and how they will work in practice in the EU 
is thus unpredictable. Recent academic work raises some concerns. For instance, Pila and Wadlow 
contend that non-specialised courts such as the CJEU are better positioned to take EU Treaties and 
laws into consideration when applying patent legislation393 and it has also been argued that patent law 
should not be applied in a restrictive manner, in isolation from other relevant laws such as those 
associated with rights and freedoms.394 Moreover, as already argued, morality cannot be sidelined as it 
is a higher order norm within European patent law. Pila and Wadlow say of the new patent courts in 
the EU:-  
 
the attempt to limit the role of the generalist EU Courts in patent law...will almost certainly 
be – as it was apparently designed to be – to minimize the influence of general law and 
policy on the European patent system.395  
 
They call for the supervision by a generalist court of patent subject matter,396 given that new 
thresholds between “nature and artefact on which patent law depends” are arising and the fact that 
both nationally and internationally, human rights are receiving more consideration: “patents in all 
areas are increasingly relied on to solve social and economic problems” and these problems should not 
be ignored. Thambisetty argues that patent courts often develop in a peculiar manner due to the highly 
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specialised subject matter and the fact that more time is now dedicated to litigating intellectual 
property. Specialised courts often add to an extension of the scope of patent rights,397 and this is likely 
to occur in the new court system in the EU, given that many judges will have technical expertise but 
lack training in ethics and complainants and respondents are likely to be confined to a relatively small 
cohort of biotech corporations, university researchers and NGOs of various colours.  
The granting of patents involves a balance between private rights and the public interest. Specialised 
courts are likely to narrow the remit of the morality bar further and how this will interplay with the 
increasing constitutionalisation of patent law is unpredictable at present. This section has shown that 
courts are not best placed to deal with ethical issues which arise in morally controversial 
biotechnological inventions. As the judiciary struggle to apply the morality bar consistently, the next 
section explores legislative options for resolving this ongoing dilemma. 
  
3.4 Legislative clarity 
 
Given that courts can make this area quite unpredictable, an alternative approach to the problem of 
arbitrating morality is legislative reform. As the legislature is elected directly and has more research 
tools at its disposal it may be better placed to regulate complex areas, rather than the judiciary. 
 
One of the problems with relying on the legislature in its traditional framework to stabilise norms was 
identified by Von Savigny, who opposed the codification of law in 19th-century Europe. Such 
codification had increased vastly during that era and he believed that this phenomenon would lead to 
rigidity in the law – clearly not desirable in a fast-moving technological field. In Von Savigny’s view, 
one of the main functions of legislation is to help to clarify uncertainties. However, the law may not 
be able to clarify easily uncertainties about morality. Legislation may still become detached from its 
societal roots and as lawyers acquire an increasing monopoly over legal knowledge, the more 
removed from society it becomes.398 This is especially true in the realm of law connected with science 
where terminology is highly specialised and decisions are effectively made by technocrats who tend 
not to have a grounding in matters of ethics. For instance, if the judgment relating to parthenotes being 
classified as human embryos399 in Brüstle400 had been legislatively enshrined, departure would have 
been much more difficult and certainly not amenable to rectification with the stroke of a pen once the 
error in the scientific knowledge was realised. Once written down, according to Von Savigny, rules 
could no longer evolve in a fluid way. As he conceptualised law as an expression of the spirit of the 
people, and therefore reflective of culture, written law would cease to be connected to society, the 
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conduct of whose members it regulated. The increase in codification also facilitated the rise of 
political power, where society’s functions become divided.401  
 
Patent laws’ evolution has attracted more and more regulation over the years in Europe in the form of 
treaties such as the EPC, the Biotech Directive, the amendment to the EPC and also the inclusion of 
patent law within a trading environment, epitomised in the TRIPS Agreement. The scope and subject 
matter have also become extended. New specialised courts are being set up. Von Savigny’s ideas 
illuminate the extent to which the legislative process can become removed from society402 and are of 
relevance to this thesis in the articulation of morality in public law and policy. In the US in the area of 
biotechnology patents, the legislature is underactive,403 leaving important decision-making to the 
courts whereas in Europe, the courts and patent offices grapple with a concept of morality, the 
definition of which causes much disagreement. 
 
Once the courts or legislatures of various jurisdictions act, the executive body in the form of patent 
offices simply administer and apply the law. In the US, in order to address this lacuna, it has been 
suggested by academics who think that there should be some consideration of morality, that Congress 
could restrict the enforcement of a granted patent on a case-by-case basis. An example is given of 
government limits on the enforcement of medical process patents against medical practitioners.404 
Another way in which Congress could engage in regulating the issuance of patents in this area would 
be to have a pre-grant procedure to evaluate any potential ethical impact. It could oblige the USPTO 
to consult a designated evaluator, such as an ethics advisory committee, either within or outside of the 
USPTO. Then, if the applicant did not receive notice of an objection within a specified period of time, 
the patent would be granted.405 Alternatively, Congress could assess the eligibility of a patent on an ad 
hoc basis. These measures could help enshrine the notion of government as being “of the people, by 
the people, for the people” rather than the current patent system of “government of the people, by the 
researchers, for their chosen beneficiaries, be they investors and/or suffering humanity”,406 in Bagley’s 
view. 
 
Despite the fact that biotech patent grants have often been controversial, the first draft of the Biotech 
Directive focused solely on harmonising the legal criteria for patentability, those being: novelty, 
inventive step and industrial application, without paying heed to ethical concerns which are, in 
essence, higher order norms which must take precedence within the European legal system. A 
consideration and articulation of the hierarchy of norms should have been carried out and this was not 
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done. Since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, questions of morality framed in the discourse 
of human dignity, are beginning to permeate the jurisprudence of the CJEU.407 The Biotech Directive 
predates the Lisbon Treaty and it distinguished inventions and discoveries. The former was considered 
patentable and the latter not, although isolated biological material which had been propagated 
independently would be patentable, even if genetically identical to its source material.408 Even though 
there is more legislative guidance in Europe, the problem remains as to how to arbitrate the question 
of morality and of note is that of late, the CJEU has taken a proactive turn. 
 
Negotiations over the introduction of the Biotech Directive took place over a ten year period and 
many viewpoints were accommodated during this time. However, as Porter points out the inclusion of 
a morality clause to assuage controversies over patenting of biological materials has not managed to 
quell doubt and debate.409 He also describes the different viewpoints: whereas the Commission’s focus 
was commercial, the Parliament advised on ethical and moral issues and the Economic and Social 
Committee was concerned with ensuring that the human body would not be commercialised.410 
Subsequent cases have shown that the interpretation of various terms is not clear and several patent 
applications have been curtailed as potentially encompassing human beings.411 Whilst much debate 
occurred, the forums are highly specialised and do not create much space for a public voice, education 
or understanding. Moreover, as Van Overwalle points out the Biotech Directive “officially proclaims 
for the first time that patent law is no longer restricted to inanimate objects, but is principally also 
accessible for living matter”.412 Regardless of extensive debate, the option of not extending patent 
protection to morally controversial biotechnological inventions was never really considered so a full 
range of options were not truly available. Whilst it is true that the European Parliament is a 
representative and democratically elected body of the European Union, it is the only one413 and 
ultimately functions alongside the Commission, which initiates legislation and the Council with which 
it works in the co-decision making procedure in the law making process. Neither the Commission nor 
the Council are democratically elected. Citizens can petition Parliament through a citizens’ initiative 
but the level of public input envisaged in this thesis is considerably more grassroots. Widespread 
public input, a model of which is elaborated in chapter six, could address this issue succinctly by 
utilising a more ground up approach, spearheaded by government ensuring an integration between 
publics and patent offices. 
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In the US, by way of contrast to the legislatively active European Union the legislature has largely left 
patent law to the courts. Despite the judges’ stated wishes in Diamond v. Chakrabarty414 that Congress 
pass appropriate legislation, the legislature did not speak directly on the issue of patents on living 
matter. It did not explicitly exclude human beings from the scope of patentable subject matter under 
§101. Instead, politicians stepped in to restrict the patentability of human organisms through the 
appropriations power by enacting the Weldon Amendment which does not permit the use of federal 
funds, provided for the operation of the USPTO, to be used for the issuance of patents on human 
organisms. This has now been made a permanent part of the patent statute415 but up until 2011, this 
legislation had to be renewed every year. Statutory criteria could be drawn up to define what being 
human actually constitutes as no statutory or constitutional source currently provides a definition of 
humanity416 and this matter is not necessarily self-evident. 
 
Similar legislative inertia can be found in Europe in some instances, even though there is a much more 
developed legislative regime both within the EU and the EPO. In the CJEU, the court, possibly 
echoing Diamond v Chakrabarty, stated the following in R v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, ex p Compassion in World Farming:417 
 
Inventions in the field of agriculture may give rise to concerns not raised in other fields - 
moral concerns about whether it is right to manipulate genes in order to obtain better weed 
control or higher yields. It is open to Parliament to consider these concerns and amend the 
Patent Act, should it find them persuasive. Our task, however, is to interpret and apply the 
Patent Act as it stands, in accordance with settled principles. Under the present Act, an 
invention in the domain of agriculture is as deserving of protection as an invention in the 
domain of mechanical science. When Parliament has not seen fit to distinguish between 
inventions concerning plants and other inventions, neither should the courts...[I]f Parliament 
wishes to respond legislatively to biotechnology inventions concerning plants, it is free to do 
so. Thus far, it has not chosen to do so.418 
 
Despite the court’s exhortations, parliamentary intervention may not provide a better solution. 
Society’s idea of morality changes over time and it is difficult to predict how long a particular moral 
stance will endure into the future, as Mills points out,419 thereby suggesting that legislative enactments 
will fossilise rapidly. It is argued that policy should ebb and flow with the tide of informed public 
opinion and this thesis endeavours to construct a framework for how this may be actuated based on 
the political structures and underlying principles of participatory models, elaborated later in this 
thesis. 
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Even where detailed legislation is promulgated, Drahos claims that patent offices often alter the 
manner in which the system works by drawing up guidelines and through exercising a legislative 
function. This penchant stems from their constant interaction with patent applicants and the latter, 
many of which are large industries or public bodies, wield considerable influence in the patent 
process. Large patent offices employ thousands of officials who work much more closely with patent 
applicants than courts or legislatures.420 Whilst patent examiners apply the law rather than making it, 
they are, nonetheless, the de facto gate keepers of the patent system. Even though courts may be the 
final arbiters of patent disputes, as the majority of patent grants are not challenged, the culture of the 
patent office in terms of how it interprets the statutes by which it is bound is significant. Large patent 
portfolios controlled by multinationals are accumulated through positive decisions taken by patent 
examiners. Moreover, dubious patents can be obtained easily but revoked with effort421 and this tends 
to stack the system in favour of patent applicants, although it is also true that in Europe NGOs, such as 
Greenpeace are prominent actors. Specialised courts are likely to intensify any pro-patent disposition 
if, for instance, the CJEU does not retain its status as the court of final jurisdiction in patent matters. 
Pila and Wadlow speculate that it may not.422 
 
Legislation may not be an appropriate means of reform for a variety of reasons, including the fact that 
morality may change and should, it is argued, be reflected in the law. Where a new technology is not 
well understood, laws could fossilise misunderstandings until they are repealed. Moreover, in a fast 
moving area of technology, different moral concerns will surface regularly and legislation can ossify 
parameters that may later need to be altered. An absence of legislative clarity also causes problems 
because it then falls on patent officials to arbitrate what has not been defined. The legislative process 
itself can be fraught where different bodies representing various areas of expertise such as the 
European Commission, Parliament and Council are engaged in drafting: ethical issues may not receive 
equal consideration across the board. Courts often are desirous of a more active legislature but when 
legislation is passed, patent officials may negotiate around its parameters if their main contacts are 
patent applicants. As can be seen, more laws are not necessarily a good thing. Another avenue for 
reform is though the patent office which will now be examined. 
 
3.5 Reform through the patent/intellectual property office 
 
There is an inherent balance between public and private interests in patent law and the first place 
where this balance is tested is at intellectual property/patent offices. According to several writers, 
explored hereunder, this equilibrium is out of kilter for reasons which include lack of transparency, 
bias, funding, collaboration among different patent offices, lobbying, internationalisation of patent 
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law, a failure to properly understand the technology and a discomfort in applying the morality 
provisions. This may lead to the granting of overly broad patents and consequently, the morality bar 
may not be given its due weight. 
 
According to Drahos, patent offices have three main functions. The first is that they are obliged to 
make sure that a socially useful invention is produced; second, that information about the invention in 
the application is diffused, and; finally, ensuring that the patent system is entirely transparent to those 
likely to be affected by it.423 He is sceptical whether this latter condition is widely observed and he 
denies that patents indicate clearly what is and what is not protected. In fact, he claims that the patent 
system may do just the opposite, given that intangible matter or information cannot easily be 
identified, regardless of the fact that patent drafting has become a highly skilled profession.424 Warren-
Jones also observes that the European patent system is susceptible to criticism that it is biased, given 
that the submissions of the patent holder are normally preferred to anyone or any group opposing the 
patent.425 Patent offices tend to be pro-patent and are not likely to receive critical scrutiny 
favourably.426 Yet they do owe duties to the public. However, the big offices “have largely abdicated 
their responsibilities to their respective publics under their respective national patent social 
contracts”.427 Some of the reasons for this behaviour are now elaborated. 
 
The manner in which patent offices are funded provides one of the principal incentives for 
cooperation with clients. When the examination process does not yield a patent, this signifies a 
monetary loss for the office in question as most patent offices are funded both through the application 
process and subsequent patent renewal fees. Organisations that get paid for services provided may 
often come to regard the one who pays as a client rather than an applicant whose rights must be 
balanced with potentially conflicting rights of the public. To view patent applicants as clients is a 
misconception on the part of patent offices which should not lose sight of their public service duty.428 
Collaboration among large businesses, patent attorneys and patent office officials may produce some 
insider governance of the patent system across a number of different bodies such as the Trilateral 
Offices club: an alliance between the USPTO, the EPO and the JPO and within WIPO and the 
WTO.429 In Sell’s account,430 a lobby group known as the Intellectual Property Committee,431 together 
with industry representatives in Europe and Japan devised a particular model of intellectual property 
rights to influence the Uruguay round of the TRIPS negotiations. Essentially, she says that the law in 
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this domain was crafted by twelve corporations. Profit rather than morality is likely to be their 
motivator.  
 
Kingston is critical of the extension of patent protection to biotechnological inventions, saying that 
before this action was taken, the matter should have been considered with more care. Patents may be 
unsuitable for biotechnology as given that the research is publicly funded, the public and private 
interest in the disclosure requirement in patent grants is difficult to calculate.432 The slotting of 
biotechnological inventions into the patent provisions of Article 1.8.8 of the US Constitution has 
meant that a small number of private firms have managed to monopolise great swathes of 
development in the life sciences without ethical restrictions. The legislation has provided little 
restriction and courts have generally been favourable towards patent applicants. Kingston also 
observes that there is a striking contrast in the manner in which the Paris and Berne Conventions were 
formulated when compared with TRIPS. Whilst the former two Conventions featured the public good 
strongly in their drafting, TRIPS was the result of purely vested interests.433 He also criticises the 
manner in which patents have been extended, noting that Article 118 of the Lisbon Treaty gives power 
to Brussels to create harmonised intellectual property rights within the EU.434 The issue of the EU’s 
reach in intellectual property law was challenged before the Lisbon Treaty’s adoption, unsuccessfully, 
by the Netherlands435 when the Biotech Directive was introduced and this judicial outcome has now 
been given legislative weight. How disputes may be resolved under the Lisbon Treaty is as yet 
unclear. 
 
There is a perception among some academics that patents have been granted fairly easily and Waelde 
et. al. assert that broad patents are often granted on new technologies before they are properly 
understood.436 Issues pertaining to morality may thus be swept aside in the drive to monopolise the 
development of new technologies. The significance of overly broad patents is described by Laurie 
who, in addition to identifying their injustice, explains that they may inhibit the development of drugs 
and therapeutic treatments or that said remedies may be too costly. This might have a negative effect 
on innovation.437 The moral issue may not be entwined exclusively with the status of the embryo: 
some inventions are not deserving of patent protection as they do not fit within the relevant criteria, 
for other reasons:- “[o]nce the patent engine begins to pick up speed, it can be very difficult to put on 
the brakes”.438 Patent applicants have incentives to make very broad claims and just because a given 
claim does not stand, the patent may still be granted in amended form at very least, an example being 
                                                 
432 Kingston, op. cit. 132–133. 
433 Ibid 111. 
434 Ibid 160. 
435 C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR 1-070709 (at para 12). 
436 Waelde, et. al., op. cit. 507. 
437 Laurie, op. cit. 64. 
438 Bagley, op. cit. 
95 
 
Harvard/Onco-Mouse the patent on which was eventually granted after the breadth of the claim was 
reduced.439 
 
The arbitration of morality may not be of prime concern where economic interests are so prominent 
yet it is a norm of higher ranking in the hierarchy of laws and thus its consideration is paramount and 
overarching. With the proposal for private arbitration in the TTIP, whether this agreement or other 
similar trade deals go ahead or not, consideration of the public interest was not at the forefront of 
negotiations. Yet despite an awareness in the academic literature of the need for institutional 
support,440 commentary in relevant case law suggests that the publics’ input is not of prime concern. In 
Plant Genetic Systems, the Technical Board of Appeal had this to say: 
 
Like national law(s) and regulation(s) approving or disapproving the exploitation of an 
invention [], a survey or an opinion poll showing that a particular group of people or the 
majority of the population of some or all of the Contracting States opposes the granting of a 
patent for a specified subject-matter, cannot serve as a sufficient criterion for establishing that 
the said subject-matter is contrary to “ordre public” or morality.441 
 
Enrobed in this dictum is the pervading notion that the views of Contracting States and their 
populations do not count, even if the views are in the majority across all states. It is as if the EPO’s 
legitimacy does not emanate from its members so accountability and transparency do not trouble its 
judges unduly. Nor do they appreciate morality’s hierarchical place in the administrative niceties of 
patenting. Patent offices are public bodies and as such are accountable ultimately to the publics. 
Whilst not downplaying the importance of other stakeholder interests and input, this thesis seeks to 
accommodate a plurality of views. Wheatley states: 
 
The deliberative model establishes the counterfactual ideal that the democratic legitimacy of 
laws depends on an institutionalisation of the principle of discourse in a constitutional order 
that recognises the equality of citizens and the voluntariness of the legal order, i.e., the 
democratic state imagines itself to be an association of free and equal persons who agree to 
regulate their lives in accordance with the principles of democratic law. The difficulty with 
the analysis is that it fails to locate the democratic state in world society and the regulatory 
framework of international law, broadly defined to include both interstate law and forms of 
international governance by non-state actors.442 
 
This statement indicates that decisions made on our behalf take place in a context that should 
represent a cross-section of interests. Arguably, the internationalisation of patenting morally 
controversial biotechnological inventions currently lacks structures to involve public voices. A 
challenge which will be faced by attempts to introduce significant deliberation into any system of law-
making is the level at which it is proposed: whether national, regional or international. According to 
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Cooke, where universal and binding legal, political and moral principles do not exist, such standards 
must be negotiated by the public through debate with the aim of providing the most convincing 
justification of particular laws or policies being proposed. Otherwise, citizens will not see themselves 
as the sources of such processes.443 Where decisions on morality are likely to change in the future, it 
may be necessary to build structures into our systems of governance in order to ensure that as many 
viewpoints as possible get aired and that this happens at regular intervals. This thesis proposes to 
extend the reach of the public voice onto the international stage. 
 
There is a strong presumption of patentability at the European Patent Office which makes the morality 
bar’s application unpredictable. Llewelyn and Adcock argue that morality only arises “where there is 
such an obvious moral repugnance to the invention concerned that the examiner, through reading mere 
technical detail, can identify this” or where a third party opposition is lodged.444 It would seem from 
this that the threshold to the morality bar is set especially high, except perhaps where the human 
embryo is concerned. They also point out that the EPO seems to accept that a purported benefit 
outweighs any possible harm and the morality bar will only be applied “where the sole application for 
the invention concerned is a harmful one”.445 Hence the exclusion will only operate in the rarest of 
circumstances. This implies that the balance between public or societal and private interests is not 
being maintained. Llewelyn observes: 
 
The overarching presumption of patentability and the consequential rights of the patent 
holder cannot just be seen in the granting stages, but are also prevalent in the extent of the 
right granted, which again brings into question whether the interests of society as a whole are 
being protected via the exclusions when it would seem that the interests of the applicant are 
paramount.446 
 
There is often a strong presumption of patentability at patent offices due to issues of funding, industry 
lobbying, a failure to understand new technologies which leads to broad patents being granted and 
insider trading. The balance between private and public interests may be tipped unduly towards the 
former, leaving the issue of morality at the sidelines. Whilst there is an awareness of public voices, at 
present there is not a defined way for these to be expressed on a broad scale. Nonetheless, in many 
jurisdictions, it is appreciated that morality has some role to play in aspects of biotechnological 
controversies. Having shown that judicial, legislative and remedies through the patent office are not 
appropriate frameworks for resolving morality, another option is to consider the establishment of 
various ethics committees. These could help to broaden the perspective of the gate keepers of the 
system to achieve a more rounded approach in accommodating a plurality of views. It is instructive to 
                                                 
443 Maeve Cooke, ‘Five Arguments for Deliberative Democracy’ in Maurizio Passerin D’Entrèves (ed) 
Democracy as Public Deliberation (Manchester University Press 2002) 65. 
444 Llewelyn and Adcock, op. cit. 285. 
445 Ibid. 
446 Margaret Llewelyn, ‘Schrodinger’s Cat: An Observation on Modern Patent Law’ in Drahos, Death 
of Patents 54. 
97 
 
examine the actions of a range of such committees to assess whether they may promote some input 
into reform. 
 
3.6 Ethics committees 
 
Given that biotechnology spans a multidisciplinary field, it has become common in recent years to 
establish ethics committees in an advisory role across a range of public sector bodies and in 
legislation, although such developments are not universal. Several articles of the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights mention the importance of ethics committees and public 
education.447 UNESCO has approved of this development, providing procedural guides for their 
establishment and management.448449450 The WHO is another such body,451 along with the EU which 
established the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) in 1991.452 The 
roles of such committees are largely evaluative, educative and consultative and mostly, engagement is 
optional. Moreover, the range of their deliberations tends to be narrow, depending, of course, on their 
brief. Nonetheless, their incarnations differ from place to place. Patents and related issues of morality 
are one of many matters they will debate, if requested. It is arguable that their role will need to be 
increased in line with the constitutionalisation of morality in patent law which is being observed in 
recent cases at the EPO453 and the CJEU.454 Ethics committees are also involved in deliberating over 
ethical issues related to biotechnological inventions. Their role will now be described and assessed 
from the perspective of whether they can facilitate the inclusion of public voices in a pluralistic 
society. 
 
An example of the use of ethics committees in the EU can be seen in Article 7 of the Biotech Directive 
which provides that the EGE evaluates all ethical aspects of biotechnology. The Group is independent, 
pluralist and multi-disciplinary and is composed of 15 experts appointed by the Commission both for 
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expertise and personal qualities.455 Ironically, however, Plomer notes that this is a committee of 
experts with no requirement for professional expertise in ethics.456 The Group is loosely linked to the 
legislative process but legislators are not bound by any of the information which it receives and 
therefore the nexus between the knowledge produced and its implementation or influence is, at best, 
tenuous. 
 
However, some consultation with ethics committees could be facilitated. Warren-Jones states that 
currently consultation with the European Group on Ethics (EGE) in accordance with Recital 44 of the 
Biotech Directive in order to identify “basic ethical principles” may occur. She does not believe, 
though, that this expert panel is perceived as being truly representative of the publics and, therefore, 
this voice is absent. She views this as an unjustified paternalism.457 They could be called upon to help 
to identify patent applications which trigger the morality bar when it is unclear especially where no 
precedent has been established. Warren-Jones argues that the decision should ultimately be left to the 
publics but an ethics committee would be very valuable in identifying novel ethical issues that engage 
Article 53(a) EPC. Even where the group has been consulted - and such consultation is not mandated - 
its advice may not be followed. For instance, in the Edinburgh patent458 the EPO followed a minority 
view of the EGE’s Opinion No. 16, rather than that of the majority. This unpredictability and ad hoc 
approach does not encourage confidence in the role held and exercised by the committee. 
 
The EGE produced an opinion in 2002 on the “Ethical aspects of patenting inventions involving 
human stem cells”, in which they postulated that ethical evaluations may need to be made where a 
patent application which raises specific ethical issues is being examined. Such evaluation should be 
routinised as part of review processes at national or European patent offices and should be conducted 
by panels of independent experts.459 They also engaged with the question of what should be patented 
and what should be accessible through open access. In Recommendation 17, they urged the EPO and 
national patent offices to pay heed to Article 7 of the Biotech Directive and to engage with the 
committee when ethical issues arose. Without empirical research on this area it is difficult to know the 
extent of their influence or the outcome, if any, of their recommendations. 
 
Such committees may have the potential to embed a multidisciplinary approach to ethically fraught 
issues. Busby et. al. opine that the EGE is very influential in the EU and often acts as a broker 
between various stakeholders in biotechnology.460 Nonetheless, as already observed, consultation is 
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optional and opinions are often sidelined or ignored. Some of their interpretations are not well 
regarded and it has been observed that where they have spoken about values such as respect for 
human life or dignity, they do not seek to ground their principles in a particular philosophy461 or, 
indeed, legal text. This suggests that their opinions are unpredictable. Plomer has written critically 
about the infiltration of patent law by abstract concepts of human rights which does not help to 
address public concern about biotechnological inventions.462 So ethics committees may not help to 
define morality any better than other bodies although better results could be yielded using different 
methodologies. Moreover, the membership seems to be ad hoc. Should there be representatives for 
people with specific genetic illnesses or based on ethnicity, age, gender, occupation, class and so on? 
All members must have a university degree. Does that mean that non-university educated people 
should not arbitrate on matters of morality in patent law? 
 
Porter identifies another committee, albeit not in the field of ethics, with influence in Community 
decision-making: the Economic and Social Committee.463 In contrast with the EGE, this committee 
purports to represent organised civil society, including interest groups such as farmers, trade-unionists, 
workers and members of the public in general. Its role is consultative and though members are 
appointed and consulted by the Council, the Commission may also seek its advice. The Committee 
criticised the first draft of the Biotech Directive, claiming that all issues had not been addressed, 
especially the implications for commodification of human beings,464 albeit during a different context 
of the legislative process. This is an example of how opinions proffered by committees are often not 
taken into account by decision-making bodies. This is a form of deliberation in a vacuum as it does 
not appear to have much influence over patent law or practices. Moreover, I argue that deliberation 
should have a deeper reach than organised civil society. Disadvantage, disability and other factors can 
impede participation and endeavours to involve the public should, I shall argue, be more proactive and 
profound. 
 
Petit cautions that national ethics committees can come to wield an unwarranted authoritative voice 
which can result in the institution acquiring a normative influence. This could be especially troubling 
if the basis of their opinions or advice is not clear. Ethics committees lack the democratic 
legitimacy465 which vests in the legislative body and the former’s voice should not outweigh the 
democratic mandate of the latter. “From a general advisory capacity such committees risk becoming a 
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normative power, if not an edict.”466 Such an evolution would go some way to eroding the boundary 
between church and state, albeit in a nominally secular environment. However, experience would tend 
to suggest that ethics committee voices are more likely to be ignored than to dominate. 
 
In terms of establishing a pluralistic model in which morality can be arbitrated, the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 2005 mandates governments to educate their citizenry 
about bioethical issues and to set up ethics committees. Of course, it is only binding if ratified. The 
following articles are of relevance: 
 
Art.19 Ethics committees – Independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees 
should be established, promoted and supported at the appropriate level in order to: 
 
(a) Assess the relevant ethical, legal, scientific and social issues related to research 
projects involving human beings; 
 
  (b) Provide advice on ethical problems in clinical settings; 
 
(c) Assess scientific and technological developments, formulate recommendations 
and contribute to the preparation of guidelines in issues within the scope of this 
Declaration; 
 
(d) Foster debate, education and public awareness of, and engagement in, bioethics. 
 
So this Declaration envisages a proactive approach from the government. It goes on to talk about the 
role states can play. 
 
 Art.22 – Role of States 
 
Art.22.2 States should encourage the establishment of independent, multidisciplinary and 
pluralist ethics committees, as set out in Article 19. 
 
Ethics committees are consulted regularly on a variety of issues, according to Drahos who 
acknowledges that this often occurs whether they specialise in policy or adopt an advisory role.467 
However, he also says that such committees are often heavily influenced by big business and the 
patent attorney profession.468 Ethics committees are not necessarily drawn from relevant university 
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departments and other representation may be only token. As pointed out earlier, identification of 
appropriate membership is likely to be problematic. 
 
The issue of delegation of decision-making powers to experts in this area is contentious. Snead claims 
that public officials have assigned important bioethical issues to be decided by a small group of 
experts and that this raises issues regarding accountability and legitimacy. This is due to the fact that 
science is perceived as an objective form of reasoning and its conclusions enjoy a standing in society 
which is lacking in other sources of knowledge. However, an ethical claim made by means of 
scientific reasoning, in his view, devalues the public sphere. When ethical concepts are sidelined in 
debates about biotechnology, values held dear by humankind may be diluted. This could include our 
conceptualisations of equality, justice, beneficence, autonomy, or even our definition of persons. He 
asks:  
 
Under such an approach, what is science for? What is medicine for? For that matter, what are 
government and law for? Modern science provides no way to answer these questions. And 
thus some are tempted to regard those questions as meaningless.469  
 
Meaning can be reintroduced to such concepts through broadening the decision-making process across 
society.  
 
Ethics committees where they exist can, of course, discuss salient issues but the outcomes of their 
discussions tend not to feed back into the legislative or judicial processes. Feyerabend observes that: 
 
Scientists and rationalists have by now almost succeeded in making their views the basis of 
Western Democracy. They concede, though with extreme bad grace, that other ideas may be 
heard but they would not permit them a role in the planning and the completion of 
fundamental institutions such as law, education, economics.470 
 
This section shows the difficulties which inhere in trying to accommodate a plurality of view on 
morality even where committees are set up to consider contentious issues. Unless opposing views are 
listened to and taken on board in a deliberative setting, consultation may prove to be a futile exercise 
or simply a tokenistic gesture. 
 
3.6.1 National committees 
 
At national level, ethics committees experience a similar status as described above. The Norwegian 
Patent Act471 obliges the Norwegian Intellectual Property Office to consult with the Ethics Committee 
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if there is uncertainty as to whether commercial exploitation would offend the morality and public 
ordre provisions of the Act. Nonetheless, Hellstadius claims that they declined to follow a 
recommendation of its Ethics Committee that a patent not be granted for genetically modified salmon 
some years ago.472 In addition to ignoring the recommendations, the Office often does not refer 
applications to the Committee. Even where there is a referral, establishing which ethics model to 
follow is most difficult.473 
 
Sweden has adopted an approach where the government has obliged courts and patent officials to seek 
out further particulars and reports on ethical matters. Legislation has been put in place to ethically 
review research on humans before examination474 and this is carried out by ethics committees.475 If it 
is decided that the research is ethically sound, the Swedish Patent Office does not engage in further 
deliberations as to morality and the patent will be granted. If, on the other hand, the research is not so 
deemed, then, in all likelihood, a patent will be denied.476 Especially fraught ethical issues in 
European patent law tend to focus around inventions involving destruction of the human embryo477 
and EU members are bound by the Biotech Directive which, as noted already, is becoming 
constitutionalised in its interpretation in that moral considerations are permeating the patent realm 
more frequently. The Swedish approach effectively signifies a shift in the moral decision-making from 
patent officials to an ethics committee. It could be argued that this is a positive step in that expertise in 
ethics is more abundant in such committees and this will depend on how they are set up. Training is 
available in ethical issues for some ethics committees478 and ethics training is available across a 
multitude of sectors by organisations such as the Institute for Global Ethics.479 Ethics and bioethics 
committees often produce detailed guidance themselves on composition and training.480 More 
specifically, other resources include the Declaration of Helsinki 1964 which is a set of principles 
developed by the World Medical Association in relation to human experimentation and is directed 
towards the medical community. However, at times committees’ membership can be random and may 
be hand-picked, depending on how they are constituted. This can create imbalances. MacDonald 
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acknowledges that ethicists can become de facto secular priests in interpreting texts and can also come 
to work closely with corporations, which may be compromising.481 The practice in Sweden appears to 
signify a shift in power and discipline from one elite groups of experts to another. 
 
Other jurisdictions’ approaches vary, many having also established ethics committees to adopt an 
advisory role in relation to biotechnology. In France, for example, the national ethics committee is 
called the Comite Consultatif National d’Ethique and its remit is to “give opinions on ethical problems 
and societal issues raised by progress in the fields of biology, medicine, and health”. It is composed of 
39 members, five of whom must represent the major philosophical and spiritual issues in French 
society. These areas are evolving especially quickly, however and members may have difficulty 
keeping up with such rapid change. The other members are chosen for their knowledge and skills in 
scientific, ethical, legal and social matters. Its influence was specifically recognised during the 
parliamentary debates on the first bioethics laws of 1994 when reference was made to the weight of 
the Committee’s opinions in the formation of the legislative principles.482 This is an example of a 
limited exercise in deliberative democracy’s role in facilitating input into these decisions, because the 
deliberators come from multidisciplinary backgrounds, although it is somewhat technocratic. It is 
nonetheless fairly limited and the extent of its representation of the public in general is unclear. The 
knowledge being disseminated and decided upon is still highly specialised – as are its experts. 
Moreover, in an increasingly diverse country and a rapidly changing ethical frontier, are national 
values set in stone, who gets to decide what constitute these values and how can these views be 
facilitated? 
 
France has also appointed a species of legal decision makers which have been designated as 
“technocrats”483 and they play a role similar to that of expert witnesses in court rooms. They receive 
specialist training in an array of disciplines, including science, mathematics, economics, law, decision 
theory, and administration. They are especially well trained in science. With such a high level of 
expertise, their decisions may be very far removed from society’s concerns and the group is also very 
small. In any case, Smith believes that the system does not differ greatly from the US where judges 
and juries would make decisions in the same terrain.484 Moreover, the US patent appeals court is now 
widely acknowledged to have built up a body of precedent and of scientific knowledge and expertise, 
perhaps rendering such attempts at multi-disciplinarity redundant. In other jurisdictions there may be 
little state regulation, such as in Finland. Alternatively, nation states may set up committees such as 
the federal President’s Bioethics Committee in the United States. All such endeavours operate only on 
a very small scale. 
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Engelbrekt485 acknowledges the positive aspects of participation but a potential disadvantage of such 
inclusion is that decision-making processes may be affected. This could lead to judicial bodies 
becoming susceptible to political pressure. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the CAFC in the 
US, which handles all patent appeal cases, is decidedly pro-patent, meaning that judicial bodies’ 
inclinations may need to be rebalanced.486 Despite the presence of ethical advisory committees within 
the European Union, the EPO lacks such structures – a point noted in Opinion No. 16 of the EGE, 
above. Amicus curiae briefs are used instead.487 Such a model of participation is limited and may not 
reflect public opinion accurately. Opposition and appeal procedures may assuage somewhat the 
apparent lack of legitimacy and accountability of the EPO’s institutions but Engelbrekt distinguishes 
between influence which may be exerted on judicial decision-making and engagement in the 
legislative process, saying that the two do not equate. 
 
Whereas European states may also adopt a model based on a national ethics advisory committee, 
which deliberates on broad ethical questions, these do not exist in all countries. Ireland, for instance, 
disbanded its Council for Bioethics in the wake of funding constraints in 2010.488 The extent to which 
the establishment of an ethics committee would affect the current operation of patent systems may be 
overstated. True engagement in matters of such importance may not be addressed adequately by 
tinkering along the fringes of the organs of government, whether it be by expert ethical input or 
amicus curiae briefs. 
 
3.6.2 Other committees 
 
The establishment and management of ethics committees is not without some detractors. Their 
existence manifests a possible interference in the smooth running of the separate branches of 
government. The selection of their members can be somewhat opaque, their expertise is highly 
specialised but they may lack expertise in law, science and economics. 
 
Callus gives an example of where the public may not feel represented by an expert group set up to 
manage ethical concerns. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority has 18 members, which 
include seven clinicians, infertile patients, a religious representative, a philosopher, a lawyer, a 
broadcaster and financial consultants. In a MORI Report commissioned by the Office of Science and 
Technology in April 1999, entitled “Public Consultation on Developments in the Biosciences”, it was 
found that the public would trust an advisory body to Government made up of people representing 
different viewpoints and that such a body should be involved in decision making.489 In another poll 
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conducted in 2005,490 there was a desire to be included in decisions but a public perception that 
government neither engaged with nor informed the population about scientific developments. There is, 
therefore, a considerable disjuncture between a minimal, delegated deliberative engagement by the 
government and the kind of representation publics may desire in such situations, were they better 
informed. Moreover, such models are very small-scale and do not normally include representatives 
from all possible groups of citizens in their remit. Housewives, carers and the unemployed are often 
notable omissions. Whilst elite democrats would argue for their exclusion, this thesis seeks to 




The judicial and legislative process, along with patent offices and ethics committees have been shown 
to be unsatisfactory to resolve the arbitration of morality for many reasons, elucidated above, 
especially if the critique is emanating from a failure to include meaningfully public voices. Judges 
have few tools in new technological realms, especially ones which are imbued with moral concerns. 
Legislative solutions can fossilise the law unduly and, in any case, legislatures tend to draft scantily 
where new technologies are being regulated in the patent realm. Patent offices administer the law but 
where it is unclear, such as in the case of the definition of morality and ordre public in the EPC, they 
are hindered in their ability to carry out their task. Ethics committees, as elucidated above, would not 
facilitate widespread inclusion and would instead merely extend a little the ambit of who gets to 
decide. This chapter has shown that traditional seats of reform are inadequate to address issues of 
morality in patent law. The next chapter will explore the calls for inclusion of public voices through 
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Chapter Four: Decision-Making in Morally Controversial 




The first two substantive chapters of this study charted the growing role that morality plays in patent 
law and the unsatisfactory nature of the manner in which it is arbitrated. Legal devices such as 
legislative, judicial or patent office reform, as a means of resolution, were explored and found 
wanting. It was noted that there is some academic literature which alludes to a perceived need for 
more public involvement without specifying what form it could take. Such literature will be explored 
in this chapter in a theoretical context and in the next chapter in a practical manifestation. Models of 
popular input will be scrutinised to aid arbitration over questions of morality in patent applications as 
enshrined in Article 53(a) EPC 1973 (as amended). These questions relate to the use of the patent 
system to incentivise or disincentivise various technological inventions. 
 
The first part of this chapter will identify some academic recommendations for more public 
participation in biotechnological decision-making and patents and will show that such claims can be 
grounded in existing human rights instruments. The human right to participate, in particular, can be 
invoked to justify democratic exemplars such as initiatives, recalls and referendums. The reform 
envisaged in this thesis goes much further than simply affirmative or negative votes on a proposition 
and instead incorporates deliberation and public debate into the participatory decision-making process. 
Participation will not be limited to referendums. This will seek to ensure that patent officials become 
better educated about ethical matters; the publics about the patent system and its incentives, and; 
politicians about enshrining information and transparency into their practices and communication to 
the publics. The thesis will then define deliberative democracy, examine it in depth and deal with its 
critics before studying participation in practice in chapter five. This will lead into chapter six which 
draws participation and patents together into a blueprint for reform. 
 
4.2 Academic calls for more public involvement in biotech patents 
 
There is a small body of academic literature in law which recommends that there be more public 
involvement in decision-making on issues of morality when patenting biotechnological inventions.491 
It is sometimes argued that morality should not permeate patent law at all and that if we allow certain 
inventions to be created, then they should be patentable. However, some of the ethical qualms in the 
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creation of the invention and in its subsequent patenting differ. We might wish to sanction research 
with public funds but reject incentivising the same research through the patent system which involves 
monopolies and property rights. Mills recommends more discussion and debate on both aspects and 
this should include social negotiation on the regulatory role the law can play in technological 
development and application if there are to be benefits for humankind.492 He acknowledges that 
morality is enmeshed with the technological creation and is therefore problematic in the patent 
system, which concerns itself with protecting the technology once in existence. If patents are opposed 
on moral grounds, this research may be stymied due to a dearth of incentives. Nonetheless, the 
morality bar in Article 53(a) EPC is a higher ranking norm493 and so an option to disapply it is not 
lawful. 
 
In Crespi’s view, in order for the discussion about the human embryo and patents to continue, we need 
to refer to a set of principles which enjoy widespread societal acceptance494 and the examination of the 
case law in this thesis in chapter two has shown that at present, such decisions are not based on such 
principles but instead are made on an ad hoc basis. There is no consistent reference point to define 
morality. Wells goes so far as to recommend that decisions regarding the use of genetic material and 
the ethics of patenting living organisms should be taken in a manner which encompasses the 
viewpoints of all interested people. He says that this can be achieved most effectively with a 
participatory decision-making process.495 He also recommends that the Government “should 
restructure patent mechanisms so as to increase public participation in the decision-making 
process”.496 No specific model is proposed, however and this gap is bridged later in this thesis. 
 
There are, of course, rules which allow access to the patent decision-making process by NGOs and an 
array of political groupings and these are a conduit for different ethical views, already examined in 
chapter two. Moreover, the EPO acknowledges that it should enter into an enquiry as to whether 
patenting an invention is immoral or contrary to ordre public,497 but they do not articulate how this can 
be achieved. They are conscious of the existence of public voices but have no means of discovering 
where public opinion reaches an “overwhelming consensus”498 for instance. Reliance on referendums 
to gauge public opinion is eschewed because it is believed that public opinion would inhibit inventive 
development. Mills urges the construction of an appropriate legal framework to accommodate and 
promote legitimate and accountable decision-making. In the absence of such parameters, patent 
attorneys cannot know clearly the legal and moral restraints.499 Putting this matter to a mediated 
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public debate and decision-making process will not lend predictability to the results but at least it will 
create a public space where a plurality of viewpoints can be advanced. Drahos500 and Bagley501 note 
that patent attorneys wield significant power in ensuring that patent grants are successful to the 
detriment of views that should be acknowledged. In addition to seeking internationally harmonized 
legislation, Mills sees it as the role of states to achieve consensus on the accommodation of morality 
within the patent system. This could be worked out through public deliberation. As its place is not 
currently clear, examiners’ capacities to adjudicate on these matters are undermined.502 If deliberation 
is to be included in the arbitration of morality in the patent sphere, different models will need to be 
explored and some will now be considered. 
 
4.3 Different ways to facilitate public involvement 
 
Some alternative approaches to the traditional ways of challenging decision-making which encourage 
inclusion will now be explored. Such devices can involve the provision of legal aid, or the creation of 
statutory bodies, ombudsmen, and commissions. These could oversee certain aspects of public policy 
and sponsor legal challenges in the public interest and this could further equality in this field.503 It may 
also be worth exploring additional ways of institutionalising debate which may serve to improve the 
connections between the interested parties and legislative drafters by way of providing feedback for 
further legislation.504 Traditionally, contestation has taken place through the courts, but given the 
prohibitive costs, this hardly affords all citizens an equal opportunity to challenge public policy. When 
contemplating the introduction of deliberative devices, expense is a significant factor. The costs of 
mounting opposition proceedings at the EPO are also significant both in terms of economics and time. 
However, it could also be cost prohibitive to conduct polls on a case by case basis on issues of 
morality for each new invention, according to Warren-Jones. Nonetheless, she believes that there 
should at least be an endeavour to involve the publics in the decision-making process.505 Some writers 
advocate the inclusion of empirical evidence to counter the perception that moral decision-making 
under the EPC is not objective506 whilst others emphasise the importance of ensuring that citizens do 
not have to incur too much expense or expend too much time, as this can discourage voluntary 
participation.507 Furthermore, cognitive access is equally important as physical access and the use of 
technical and professional terminology can be a deterrent, if such data is not explained adequately. 
This can be done by way of summaries which simplify the information508 and the provisions on 
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education in the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 2005 can also be employed as 
guiding principles, as explored later in this chapter. This legal instrument is used as an example as it 
encourages states to educate the population as well as facilitating deliberation and participation in the 
area of bioethics. Its ambit is also broad and encompasses morally controversial patents on 
biotechnological inventions.509 
 
Citizens can also play their part and get motivated to become informed about matters that concern 
them, in McBride’s view. The knowledge that they gain in such an exercise can be fed back into the 
public sphere to enhance deliberative content. He suggests that a device for triggering legislative 
review on any issue of concern could be established and this could involve formal public deliberative 
engagement between the publics and interest groups. Such processes could be initiated by way of 
popular petition and this would give publics the first step, rather than ceding this power to political 
elites. This could encourage legislators to ensure that their policies align with public views in order to 
ward off the triggering of such a process. This would go some way towards abating political 
dominance.510  
 
In a strong judicial endorsement of citizen engagement, in 2015 the US Supreme Court in Arizona 
State Legislature v Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,511 ruled that direct legislation, 
embodied in democratic devices of the initiative and the referendum allows voters to engage in the 
legislative process as equal parties with their elected representatives. The initiative is a process 
whereby citizens can initiate legislation which is approved or rejected by a popular vote, and the court 
affirmed that this entitles “voters [to] petition to propose statutes or constitutional amendments to be 
adopted or rejected by the voters at the polls.”512 The court also acknowledged that several states “had 
supplemented the representative legislature mode of lawmaking with a direct lawmaking role for the 
people”.513 The court also referred to the “animating principle of our Constitution that the people 
themselves are the originating source of all the powers of government”514 adding that “government 
derives its authority from ‘we the people’”.515 This might be indicative of a forthcoming trend in 
government and governance and this case signifies a top-down approval of the citizen’s role in their 
own governance: a right to participate. 
 
This chapter has sought, so far, to show that there is a quest among some academics to facilitate more 
public involvement in the biotechnological patenting process and that the current mechanisms are 
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fairly limited. There are tentative suggestions as to which devices could be utilised and approval of the 
idea that the law-making function ultimately emanates from the people has been endorsed by the US 
Supreme Court. Deliberative participation may not just be desirable but is also feasible. 
 
The next sections define participatory and deliberative practices showing that human rights 
instruments lend some weight to academic calls for more grassroots involvement in decisions of 
magnitude. It shows that deliberation can be slotted into a human rights framework of participation so 
that it becomes broad-based rather than narrow and elitist. This bridge forms part of the original 
contribution to knowledge of this thesis. 
 
4.4 Participation defined 
 
4.4.1 The human right to participate 
 
Participation in democracy is a right which derives from human rights instruments such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 21 enshrines the right to participate directly in 
government rather than solely through representatives. Participation gives citizens a chance to have an 
input into decisions which affect them and outcomes with which they do not agree become more 
palatable when they see that their contribution has been meaningful and not just cosmetic.516 
Participatory democracy rests on broad based public education and knowledge. Education of a 
dedicated citizenry is one of a number of factors which is favourable to the success of democratic 
participation.517 As we shall see, however, some models work better than others and this chapter will 
assess and critique different paradigms based on the extent to which they facilitate participation that 
actually feeds into policy-making and laws. 
 
The impact of public participation varies greatly according to whether or not it is truly meant to affect 
policy. It has been divided into three categories by Arnstein. The first – non participation - involves no 
more than a public relations exercise which is organised to garner support for a decision already taken 
and can involve changing public opinions through education or manipulation. The second category - 
tokenism - allows for a limited participation by the publics involving provision of information with an 
opportunity for the voicing of public opinions, which affects final decisions very little – if at all. The 
final category – citizen power - is the most influential and involves the capacity to negotiate and to 
veto government decisions.518 It is this last model of citizen involvement that is a guiding principle in 
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the context of deciding on patent grants on morally controversial biotechnological inventions because 
the participation translates into policy. 
 
Nonetheless, there has been a common perception since Rousseau that democracy is either direct, 
where the publics vote directly on issues or representative, where politicians are elected and take 
decisions, ostensibly on behalf of the electorate, with nothing in between.519 The latter has been 
described as a “pale imitation” of the former but reform of our institutions may be influenced by direct 
democracy. Representative democracy is likely to be here to stay but we can at least endeavour to 
adopt some features of direct democracy:520 it does not have to be all or nothing. Rousseau’s definition 
of direct democracy required citizens to assemble in a given venue to make decisions, whereas 
modern referendums can enable citizens to vote directly without having to converge in a specific 
place. Assembly would be challenging in modern democracies but referendums may co-exist with 
representative bodies521 as is increasingly the practice. In any case, some countries are increasing the 
use of referendums on a broader range of issues than heretofore. 
 
In general most people do not engage in participatory democracy as they do not have the chance to do 
so – representative democracy does not offer it to them. Whilst thinkers such as Habermas encourage 
the creation of a vibrant public sphere for debate, he does not delineate in detail how this feeds into 
the decision-making process.522 Rogers believes that until space has been created in which 
participation becomes viable, the current democratic deficit will not change. Society will not become 
more democratic and the technological imperative will continue to dominate societal evolution.523 
This may affect possibilities for involving the publics in decisions such as morally controversial patent 
grants. He says: 
 
Without an ongoing struggle to democratise society, there is no possibility of rewriting the 
technical codes in such a way as to empower democratic participation...it may well be the 
case that a more radical ontological transformation of social being is needed in order to 
recover the possibility of a democratic revolution in the collective participation in the 
alternative construction of our own communities, without waiting for permission and 
instruction from politicians and technocrats.524 
 
Rogers suggests that society will have to mobilise in order to achieve participation. Up until this point, 
most publics have been pointedly excluded. A potential space for discussion of biotechnological 
inventions sometimes arises where a controversial technology is developed and a period of reflection 
is sought. An example arose at the Asilomar Conference in California in 1974, in which scientists 
agreed a short voluntary moratorium on progressing with the technology but no public consultation 
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was initiated.525 Neither were public voices sought on whether these organisms could be patented or 
whether they should be labelled. It may have been wiser in light of the magnitude of the decisions to 
be taken to create a deliberative and participatory framework for discussion of the issues so that 
matters could be agreed rather than contested over such a long time. Moreover, a plurality of views 
was not accommodated. Without participation, decisions of significance have been and are being 
made, without general public awareness. The issues at stake are left to unelected experts whose 
specialities are in matters of great technical complexity but not, however, in matters of ethics or, 
indeed, social inclusion. Rogers asserts the following: 
 
We need to critically and publicly question the rationality and desirability of the societal 
goods provided by science and technology. This involves critically examining our goals and 
ideals from broad and diverse perspectives, opening public reflection and deliberation to 
neglected aspects and criteria, and, given the absence of universally agreed moral and 
epistemological standards (even among scientists), this process requires democratic 
participation.526 
 
When criteria for the evaluation of a technology are under consideration, and these are restricted to 
economic and technical aspects, and morality is not considered, consciousness of social exigencies 
may become subdued. Yet if the focus is changed to the broader perspective of societal aims, as 
Rogers suggests, everyone is potentially on a more equal footing.527 Neither should pre-conditions 
such as rationality be placed on the right to participate, given that in a pluralistic world, such a 
standard is no longer uncontroversial. Rationality, like morality, does not have a universally and 
objectively defined profile by which matters can be assessed,528 and participation in decisions relating 
to morality should be open to all, this thesis contends. 
 
As Cooke has stated in the absence of a generally recognised moral standard, such standard must be 
arbitrated by the publics in a deliberative setting, failing which the link between the citizenry and 
representative will not be perceived.529 It has been postulated by Philips that when what she terms “the 
politics of ideas” is separated from “the politics of presence”, marginalised social groups do not have 
their interests or experiences represented adequately. She says: 
 
Political exclusion is increasingly – I believe rightly – viewed in terms that can be met only 
by political presence, and much of this development has depended on a more complex 
understanding of the relationship between ideas and experience. The separation between who 
and what is to be represented, and the subordination of one to the other, relies on an 
understanding of ideas and interests as relatively unproblematic.530 
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The right to participate in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21 could be invoked to 
facilitate participation in such decision-making by a much wider sector. The UN has drafted other 
declarations that also advocate the right to participate. 
 
4.4.2 A United Nations framework for participation 
 
Soft law may have some overarching guidance on how participation can be approached in the area of 
biotechnology and patents. The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 2005 could 
provide legislative grounding and a vehicle for governments around the world to engage their 
citizenry, whether through law or policy. The following articles are of particular significance, in this 
regard, for the annotated reasons below as this instrument does contain a focus on education and 
training: 
 
Art.3.1 Human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected. 
 
Art.3.2 The interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole interest 
of science or society. 
 
This shows that individual rights do not cede to the “greater good” of groups which might have a lot 
of influence or, indeed, to the public interest. This can help make the case for individual participation 
in matters of concern. 
  
Art.16 Protecting future generations – The impact of life sciences on future generations, 
including on their genetic constitution, should be given due regard. 
 
How “due regard” is to be decided is unknown. We do not currently have a means of carrying out such 
evaluations. What impacts are envisaged? The promise of biotechnology for the treatment of disease 
and its eradication will be an important factor along with risk. Ethical issues will arise if human 
embryos are being used in research or if heritable genetic changes are being made. There will be calls, 
undoubtedly for public involvement in any such decisions and the ambit of such involvement and the 
identity of who makes the decisions will be significant. The declaration also advocates education. 
 
 Art.23 Bioethics education, training and information 
 
Art.23.1 In order to promote the principles set out in this Declaration and to achieve a better 
understanding of the ethical implications of scientific and technological developments, in 
particular for young people, states should endeavour to foster bioethics education and 
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training at all levels as well as to encourage information and knowledge dissemination 
programmes about bioethics. 
 
Art.23.2 States should encourage the participation of international and regional 
intergovernmental organisations and international, regional and national non-governmental 
organisations in this endeavour. 
 
Individuals at national level can also be included in any such participation. The model of participation 
envisaged in this thesis will go beyond the expectations of human rights instruments which tend to 
focus on engagement with groups which may belie their heterogeneity. Direct democracy can be 
accompanied by a certain baggage, including the fact that it can be very time consuming from the 
point of view both of preparation and meetings. Representation, on the other hand, frees up much of 
citizens’ time to spend on other pursuits.531 Deliberative processes involving delegates can also be 
very resource intensive in that large amounts of information may have to be digested and processed 
before one is enabled to instruct one’s delegate.532 However, participation is not mandatory and much 
time is also spent on opposition proceedings at the EPO, especially for those who do not live locally – 
which constitutes the vast majority of the EPO’s “citizens”. 
 
4.4.3 Participation as a reform mechanism? 
 
Participatory democracy does not aim to break radically from current democratic forms but instead 
seeks to enhance public participation in proportion to citizens’ willingness to engage in their own 
governance, thus increasing their autonomy and liberty. The process itself is dynamic and needs to 
respond continually to changing events.533 Just because flaws have emerged in the representative 
model does not mean that democracy itself should be abandoned.534 Nylen and Dodd comment that the 
excluded should be included in the political process and observe that we need a democratisation of 
representative democracy535 believing that the majority of people would prefer to improve democracy 
rather than abandon it as a mode of governance.  
 
It is often forgotten that there is some mutual interdependence between representative democracy and 
its participatory counterpart. The processes of representation and of delegation are part of the manner 
in which participation comes to operate in practice.536 Participatory democracy can be conceptualised 
as a complement to representation and it provides a mechanism whereby the social capital which is 
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innate in civil society’s political activity can be captured for democracy’s betterment and renewal.537 
 
Participatory democracy “needs to be seen not as an end in itself…but as a means for reforming and 
advancing systems of representative democracy that find themselves in a state of stagnation and 
decay”.538 The context of government’s role in facilitating deliberation in a pluralist society must 
occur within a constitutional setting of respect for established rights and freedoms. This will serve to 
protect minority rights and cultural diversity.539 Barber’s approach to integrating participatory 
practices into existing democratic models involves an incremental process of change from within 
where extant institutions become infiltrated by deliberation rather than being abandoned. This internal 
transformation ensures that the established values of reverence for the law and human rights together 
with an appreciation of pluralism and what it entails is not disturbed.540 Participation can be seen in 
this context as enhancing and enriching existing good practice in governance and recognition of 
human rights, rather than being in any way disruptive. Tierney also acknowledges that direct 
democracy, which is very similar to its participatory form, is a seldom-used constitutional mechanism 
which arises within representative democracy. Whilst it is often portrayed as a competing structure, in 
reality, the two systems usually operate in tandem.541 He reminds the reader of the following: 
 
It is also important to recall that direct democracy and active citizen participation does not 
take place in a vacuum but in close symbiosis with institutions of representative democracy; 
and that a micro-process should properly have a representative element if it is to meet the 
goal of allowing those affected by a decision to have a say in making it.542 
 
Participatory democracy can emerge from within the representative system, but it tends to do so by 
making the representative system obsolete in parts rather than abolishing it or destroying it. In this 
respect, the democratic revolution would be synonymous with a social evolution.543 Buhlungu states 
that it is not easy to praise participatory democracy due to prejudice that decision-making which is 
decentralised is not efficient and modern in the way in which the representative system is.544 However, 
we shall see that much will depend on the way in which devices of deliberation and participation are 
established. 
 
Santos challenges a prevailing misconception that the rise in participation diminishes the role of the 
state and infringes its sovereignty. Instead, in his study, it is experiencing a transformation in its 
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dominion and is witnessing the genesis of a new model of regulatory activity.545 Societal involvement 
in democratic processes can be perceived as an enriching and valuable practice. Such engagement 
seeks to redress the appearance that current models of democracy546 have subdued participation and 
this means that decisions of great import are taken by a small number where public voices are not 
solicited. Participation in democratic processes can be focused on specific issues such as technology-
related matters but consensus is not a prerequisite and public participation can involve interactions 
such as: 
 
a polyarchic complex of organisations, institutions, conferences, boards, and individuals 
engaged in public deliberations regarding education; the development of relations between 
science, technology, and public goods…the moral obligations and limits of scientific 
research; the relations between religion and science; and questions about how scientific 
research should be directed, funded, conducted, and communicated.547 
 
It may be argued that this is not a traditional interpretation of this right but the rights arena is fluid and 
every increment has a starting point. The main alternative to the state as a site for democratisation in 
general, and deliberative democracy in particular, is civil society, in Dryzek’s view.548 Whilst civil 
society may be more independent, it is less likely to wield influence if it does not have a means of 
access to the corridors of decision-making. Tierney says that: 
 
[O]rdinary people may feel particularly disenfranchised by constitutional processes that 
exclude them, especially when compromises are made that seem to harm vital interests, 
central to their identities...it is imperative to note that direct democracy and indeed popular 
deliberation cannot occur in a vacuum. Both are part of a broader system of elite-led 
representative government rather than divorced from it.549 
 
This observation touches on two core issues of this thesis: the first which relates to the subject matter 
concerning the importance which many people give to the role of morality and their involvement in 
decisions of this nature. The second correctly asserts that deliberation and participation tend to occur 
within the context of a pre-established system of representative democracy. 
  
Deliberation often complements participatory democracy as the state may facilitate both activities and 
they may act in tandem. Deliberation can be summed up as public discussion of issues which may go 
no further or may become the basis for decision-making. Mutz observes that some concepts of civil 
society mix participatory democracy and deliberative democracy and the latter represents merely a 
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division of political participation.550 The next section will define and examine deliberative devices to 
see how they fit within participatory practices. 
 
4.5 Deliberative democracy and its rationale defined 
 
Whilst the term “deliberative democracy” was coined by Joseph Bessette551 in 1980, it only made its 
way into the lexicon in force in the late 1990s and has come to represent a number of diverse models. 
Deliberative practices were evident in ancient Greece and Rome and also in the writings of 
philosophers such as Edmund Burke, John Stuart Mill and John Dewey. More recently, Rawls and 
Habermas have classified themselves as deliberative democrats.552 Deliberation has not always meant 
inclusion for everyone in the debate. Its practice derived from debate about science, and discussion in 
parliaments and courts. The importance of these institutions grew steadily and reason has come to be 
defined through their oratorical styles and rules. Where deliberation is confined to courts and 
parliamentary debate, the discussion tends not to be so free. Reciprocity is not enshrined: on the 
contrary, many deliberative forms in practice may be antagonistic. The ultimate goal may be to win 
the argument rather than be persuaded to change or modify one’s view.553 However, the essence has 
been expressed by Tierney, who says: 
 
The core value of deliberative democracy...is that decision-making should be conditioned by 
public reason, offering the opportunity for reflection and discussion before people cast their 
votes...we move from the thin notion of participation as simply voting to the thicker idea of 
meaningful participation as discussion that is open to compromise, a search for consensus, 
and the possible transformation of preferences.554 
 
In the absence of profound participation, public judgements may be impulsive rather than considered 
and weighted and in such cases, consent is not genuine but based on a whim.555 This can be avoided 
by a comprehensive participatory educational programme beforehand so that decision-making is 
informed. Moreover, the legitimacy556 of decisions taken after such a process is likely to be 
improved557 and often all sides modify their views somewhat in order to reach agreement or 
consensus. Such decisions should be arrived at through a process of reasoned debate where the pros 
and cons of a particular proposal are discussed. The overarching goal is to achieve an outcome which 
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is at least tolerable to everyone.558 Public debate encourages transparency and openness and lessens 
the opportunities for secretive decision-making.559 Ponet and Leib assert the following: 
 
One of the ascendant understandings of democracy in contemporary political theory is that 
democratic societies ought to be deliberative. The precise requirements for “deliberative 
democracy” are contested both as a matter of normative theory and institutional design; but 
most deliberative democrats see deliberation as essential to the legitimation of decision-
making within the polity.560 
 
Deliberative democracy is often understood as a principle whereby the concept of legitimacy561 is 
dependent on the power of all citizens to take part in genuine deliberation about any decision by 
which they are affected.562 Fishkin believes that “we the people” are given a voice through democracy 
and everyone should be included.563 People should also strive to be motivated to think about the issues 
in question. Political equality and deliberation can thus be accomplished.564 Deliberation should have 
as its goal an on-going search for democratic legitimacy565 rather than accommodating the existing 
regime.566 In addition to achieving a greater understanding of the outcome of debate, deliberation 
implies that decisions can be justified to the people from whom political authority is derived. After all, 
those bound by laws ought to have such laws explained to them, where they have chosen their 
representatives.567 Where decision-makers are obliged to justify their policies to those affected by 
them, including an educated populace, they are more likely to be accepted.568  
 
Such deliberation should not be confined to an elite group. Furthermore, deliberation should not just 
take place for its own sake but should lead to a decision and result in a vote of some sort. The making 
and taking of a decision is essential,569 otherwise deliberation just becomes a forum in which a lot of 
talk, and little else, takes place. Deliberation and decision must go hand in hand and when they do so, 
their amalgamation produces a potent vindication of political decision-making to those bound by such 
decisions. Majority vote by itself is often not enough to avoid the subjugation of a sector of the 
populace but deliberation must also culminate in action. The resolution in question may not be correct 
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but at least competing rationales will have been discussed and a greater understanding of varying 
positions achieved. 
 
This thesis holds that publics should make decisions on Article 53(a) EPC applications because 
morality is a matter of deep disagreement. It changes from generation to generation and should not be 
dominated by educational privilege or be sidelined by technocratic imperatives. Nor should it be 
overtaken by populism or ideology. Deciding on the scope and depth of penetration is a concern for 
deliberators and the physical location of the activity is also an important matter for consideration. The 
question has been raised as to whether the institutions of representative democracy are sufficient or 
whether deliberation’s domain should be much broader in a societal context.570 Deliberation is 
generally regarded as valuable because: 
 
(1) it is conducive to better decisions; (2) it can reinforce citizens’ equality, dignity, and 
capacities for self-governance; (3) it has educative value for society collectively and citizens 
individually; (4) it has epistemic value because the deliberative process – when well-
organized – can reveal or help form consensual preferences that large majorities could not 
reasonably reject; and (5) even when deliberation turns adversarial, it has a value for social 
integration and social solidarity: it can enable cross-cutting discourse in a safe and regime-
stabilising way, facilitating a public airing of many views and subjecting them to 
requirements of public reason.571 
 
Deliberative democracy can provide a platform from which to initiate dialogue. A central tenet is to 
promote the legitimacy of decisions arrived at collectively, and by increasingly using deliberative 
democracy mechanisms, citizens will have more opportunities to engage in debate. This will ideally 
result in “mutually respectful decision-making”572 in spite of moral disagreements. Deliberative 
democracy’s role is acknowledged by Smith as facilitating a forum for the commencement of a 
dialogue on biotechnological matters and he recognises its purpose in promoting the legitimacy of 
collective decisions.573 In Smith’s version of this procedure, the legislator will commence the process, 
await citizens’ responses and amend proposals accordingly once these views have been received. 
 
He gives an example of how this occurred in Oregon in the early 1990s. The state was trying to 
establish priorities for publicly funded health care under Medicaid and initially employed a utilitarian 
cost-benefit plan. However, much public criticism was encountered and thereafter a process of 
consultation was undertaken through open meetings.574 The legislators could have gone a stage further 
and invited constituents to set the budgetary priorities themselves as is now becoming common 
wherever participatory budgeting is practised. The consultation exercise was a step along this road. 
When public involvement of this nature becomes routine, the quality of the interaction between 
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legislators and constituents changes and the latter become more involved in setting the agenda as the 
relationships evolve. In the case of science and technology and the patent system which incentivises 
innovation in this realm, greater input can be made into educating the publics and also into weaving 
transparency into the decision-making process of politicians. If the publics do not have access to this 
knowledge, deciding whether research should be encouraged or curtailed cannot be made in an 
informed manner.575 This also presupposes that there is widespread public knowledge about morally 
controversial biotechnological patented inventions, which is not currently the case. 
 
4.5.1 The nature of deliberation: confrontation or comprehending? 
 
Deliberation has many hues and it ranges from what Fishkin terms as “refined” and “raw” public 
opinion:576 the latter tends to emerge from democratic initiatives of a partial participatory nature such 
as referendums, polls and focus groups, in his view. Public opinion in referendums and recalls may be 
unrefined or “raw”.577 This has been bolstered by polling which tends to anticipate and predict results 
sometimes more accurately than others. However, bringing government closer to the citizenry through 
such processes diminishes the role of deliberation.578 The former constitutes views which have been 
tested publicly, challenged, reflected on and hence refined somewhat. Public institutions can be 
distinguished in this area as between those which seek to refine public opinion and those which allow 
its unfettered expression.579 These different forms of public outlook can also be contrasted as being 
“reflective or reflected”.580 Most institutions provide a mix of these forms but in recent years, the 
“raw” has been favoured over the refined.581 Deliberative approaches tend to be associated with 
elitism whilst mass opinion is seen as impulsive and not necessarily based on fact.582 Both approaches 
often yield different results.583 This may explain in part the EPO’s dislike of taking seriously the result 
of polls as they are not considered to reflect public opinions accurately. However, a third way, 
between elitism and raw opinion may be possible. 
 
Gutmann and Thompson advocate that where deliberation reveals disagreement, especially on moral 
issues, participants should seek to minimise their points of divergence, calling this “an economy of 
moral disagreement”.584 When everyone softens their position somewhat, mutual respect among 
deliberators becomes enshrined. Where opinions on moral matters are held deeply, some citizens 
oppose policies based on reasons that will not be accepted across the board. Nonetheless, citizens who 
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deliberate are disposed to changing their views in the aftermath of such activity. This tendency has 
been noted across the spectrum of social, educational and economic class and appears to be universal 
in its application.585 Gutmann and Thompson cite examples of deliberations over research using foetal 
tissue by the Warnock Commission and the Fetal Tissue Research Commission in the United States in 
which there was a search for points of convergence rather than divergence.586 Both these bodies were 
highly specialised. They also considered single issues and, while complex, they could focus intensely. 
Values such as reciprocity become embedded in this practice so that individual citizens come to a 
heightened respect for each other in that differing positions are heard and understood.587 
 
When appropriate procedures are put in place to facilitate discussion about moral issues and to assist 
in the resolution of discord, there is no need to favour a particular outcome or theoretical approach.588 
This can facilitate fairness and, indeed, a perception of equal treatment. It will be easier to morally 
justify decisions if decision-makers seek to defend their policies to others, whether they be informed 
citizens or the representatives of those affected by the same decisions.589 Reasoned arguments are used 
to persuade people to change their views or, indeed, to accommodate those of others in deliberative 
and participatory regimes. Confidence in the ability of people to respect very different viewpoints 
even where their own are held passionately is a core value of deliberation. This will be assisted greatly 
by effective mediation of public debate. Peaceful pluralism may be achieved when discussions and 
explanations are held and it is more likely that each person will accommodate the views of the next. 
Communication is deemed to be key.590 Fishkin observes that: 
 
[a] hallmark of moral discussion is learning to view a problem from the point of view of 
those who are affected…If we are to understand competing arguments we need to talk to 
diverse others and to understand their concerns and values from their own points of view.591  
 
Deliberation enshrines mutual respect into verbal disagreements where discordant views may be held 
very deeply. It requires more than tolerance,592 which may be seen as a passive rather than active state. 
Mutual respect requires a dynamic approach to those who hold opposing views. The manner in which 
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4.5.2 Classes of deliberative democracy: elitist or populist? 
 
The literature on deliberative democratic practices has tended not to feed into the decision-making 
process on any significant scale and deliberative groups rarely are made up of more than a handful of 
people. Often, when not focused on including the citizenry broadly, they are composed of small, 
interdisciplinary groups of experts whose decisions are speculative or advisory rather than 
determinative. Examples have already been given in chapter three in discussions of ethics committees 
and other deliberative groups such as consensus conferences which advise or render their opinion but 
heed need not be paid to their recommendations. The closest that the EPO has come to dealing with 
alternative views is a robust engagement with non-governmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, 
which often successfully challenge the granting of patents, either before or after the grant.593 Certainly, 
all sides that want to be heard have a chance to do so but the current manner in which this operates is 
that the information dealt with is highly specialised and there are outright winners and losers in the 
grant and appeal process. Moreover, the publics are hardly aware of the issues at stake. 
 
In deliberative democratic settings, listening is as important as speaking and those who partake in 
deliberation should be open to modifying their stances on the issues in question.594 Deliberation and 
participation may be combined595 as is, in fact, the case in the participatory practices examined in 
chapter five. However, deliberative democracy has a number of different incarnations, and both 
elitism and populism can be a feature of deliberation that is not entwined with participation. This will 
now be explored. 
 
Two types of democrats are distinguished by Ponet and Leib: the elitist and the populist. The former 
focus on deliberation among the expert class, those being members of the judiciary, the legislature and 
possibly some interest groups, whereas the latter concentration is on deliberation among the citizenry. 
They identify what they term as “two-track” theorists, such as Ackerman and Habermas who have 
endeavoured to disrupt this dualist aspect of deliberative democracy by deepening democratic 
discourse in both spheres.596 However, an aspect of this dualism that has not been addressed 
adequately is that both systems still operate in parallel spheres rather than intersecting with each other. 
The question as to how citizen discourse is to influence formal politics has not been worked out 
because points of contact are absent. They claim that Habermas believes that a state’s legitimacy in 
part depends “primarily on whether civil society, through resonant and autonomous public spheres, 
develops impulses with enough vitality to bring conflicts from the periphery into the centre of the 
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political system”597 and is critical of any failure on the part of the state to give expression to these 
deliberative impulses of civil society.598 Habermas is depicted as being overly sanguine about the 
extent of civil society’s influence and his description of this influence is largely indirect and 
oblique.599 They perceive that many deliberative democrats bifurcate the levels at which deliberation 
and decision-making occur. One takes place among the citizenry and the other level of deliberation 
happens among the representative branches of government: the legislators and other government 
officials.600 The forum for debate between legislator and citizen is insufficiently explored and the 
reason is that it is normally a prerequisite of deliberative democracy that discussions only take place 
among equals. Legislators debate with the citizenry from a privileged position, both from the vantage 
point of their political standing and also their expertise or access to expert advice, reserving to 
themselves the privilege of vetoing any unwelcome proposals. Ponet and Leib believe that this 
unexplored space should be addressed by drawing on aspects of fiduciary law in order to highlight the 
fact that legislators hold their political power on trust for their constituents. If we conceptualise this 
relationship in this manner, it is possible to see that this dialogue is important and necessary. They 
state: 
 
If our elected political leaders are, after all, our public fiduciaries, they may be bound by 
fiduciary duties that underwrite a dialogic imperative with their constituents. Yet, most 
essentially, fiduciary law’s lesson for deliberative democracy is that a specialised kind of 
deliberation is possible and desirable between unequals – between fiduciary and 
beneficiary.601 
 
Legislators, in this paradigm, have duties towards their constituents and hold their interests on trust. 
They should strive to deliberate with the publics and neither maintain a secrecy over matters of public 
concern nor conduct a one-way conversation in which publics do not have the opportunity to have an 
input. 
 
One of the most frequently cited advocates of “communication across lines of difference” is John 
Stuart Mill602 who claims that where there is little contact with opposing viewpoints, the chances of 
developing a public sphere is diminished. He said: “If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the 
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error.”603 In this 
debate, however, I am not seeking to achieve an evaluation of right and wrong positions but, rather, a 
process whereby the morality bar is decided by publics on a case-by-case basis. Mutz concludes that 
“cross-cutting contact improves people’s abilities to see issues from the perspectives of others, even 
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when they personally do not agree”604 although she also observes that those with similar views 
communicate with greater ease and more readily than those with oppositional viewpoints.605 
 
Whilst homogeneous groups may effectuate positive political change, they can often foster extreme 
views and thus fail to represent a wider sector of the population. By way of contrast, when the 
political network is heterogeneous, many benefits accrue but levels of participation tend to be 
lower.606 Adjudicators may have to confront difficult choices: where they take a positivist stance, they 
may be perceived as defending their position. However, should they attempt to accommodate radical 
views, it may be challenging to arrive at an agreement which is perceived to be legitimate.607 Whilst 
outcomes resulting from exposure to cross-cutting views are regarded highly in democratic systems, 
they are not always positive.608 Bitter discussions can also ensue, at times ending in violent exchanges 
or hostile silences.609 However, deliberative democracy, if well-organized can minimise such conflict 
as much as possible. 
 
In addition to being feasible and desirable, politicians may also be required to engage in deliberation 
with the governed.610 Whilst much of deliberative democrats’ focus is on finding ways to facilitate 
deliberation among citizens themselves, more focus will be placed in this thesis on how citizens can 
debate with their representatives611 and ultimately be the law-makers in this area. 
 
Proponents of both popular and elite deliberative democracy emphasise the importance of deliberation 
in decision-making if it is to be deemed democratic. Such processes are enhanced by this interchange. 
This also tallies with civic republican ambitions regarding the involvement of the publics in general in 
deliberation and the legitimacy of such decisions is heightened.612 Citizens become empowered and 
the extent of their participation becomes more profound. This enhances pluralism as the formerly 
excluded seek and obtain inclusion. Participation also enhances the representative aspects of 
democracy rather than destabilising them and corruption and clientelistic politicking decrease.613 It is 
not enough, however, to approve of participation without ensuring that it is also meaningful.614 This 
means that decisions must emerge after the deliberative process has taken place. 
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The idea of exclusion in liberal philosophies may be ingrained in definitions of personhood so that 
those on the margins of society may not be deemed fit to participate due to prejudices about their 
capacity for reasonable communication.615 Where elites dominate, the very best that can be achieved 
is a democracy for the people rather than by them.616 This negates general involvement and smacks of 
paternalism. Whilst liberal thought may encourage the belief that people do not change their views 
during the participatory process, this viewpoint is not universal and critical theorists postulate that the 
process is transformative.617 
 
The mistrust of elites does not, however, require everyone to acquire expertise in order to 
counterbalance their power, although a minimum level of knowledge is necessary for meaningful 
participation and some studies would suggest that the more ignorant people are, the less they want to 
be informed.618 Much will depend, however, on the sources of information and the means of imparting 
it, which will be explored in the next chapter. A healthy dose of scepticism around advice meted out 
by experts along with inquiries into their qualifications, seeking second opinions about contested 
matters and ensuring that research has not been financed by vested interests should offer protection 
against domination by elites.619 Rogers states:  
 
The transformation from hierarchical to democratic structures will not only be a matter of 
dissolving authority and removing privileges, but it will essentially be an education process 
wherein citizens learn political efficacy and social skills.620  
 
Having established that democratic engagement between the governors and the governed is a 
creditable aspiration, the extent of information which representatives should impart forms the focus of 
some debate. When consultations with the publics are initiated by the government but the information 
provided is paltry, this form of politics is thin. When only elites are consulted, as is the case in some 
deliberative models, this is hardly representative.621 And if the elites are not within the democratic 
framework and are unelected, they themselves may be very cloistered from public perspectives.622 
 
In the context of patents and the relevance of the foregoing discussion to the controversies enshrined 
by competing interests, at present in the area of morally controversial biotechnological patents, NGOs, 
particularly Greenpeace, play an important role in Europe as they have succeeded in defeating or at 
least challenging a number of patent applications, as follows. They are active in mounting challenges 
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throughout the various processes of patent applications both at national and supranational level. Such 
cases include Brüstle,623 Plant Genetic Systems624 and Harvard/Oncomouse.625 In some respects, they 
have become a substantial moral torch-bearer in the absence of a consistent approach from various 
judicial bodies involved in patent grants in European organisations and countries. Whilst they 
represent a very different moral standpoint from that of the EPO, they are not universally 
representative and decisions, therefore, often are played out between patent advocates, on the one 
hand and powerful NGOs on the other. This thesis seeks to broaden the access to the decision-making 
process so that societal-wide discussion and decisions take place. Given that morality has many hues, 
there may be groups of citizens who would favour patents on inventions involving destruction of the 
human embryo if, for example, this held promise for cures for genetic diseases. Currently such 
arguments are not being made publicly. It may be that such debates could get hijacked by vocal 
minorities but effective deliberation is carried out in an environment where unbridled views will be 
curtailed. Deliberative democracy does not take place in a vacuum but, rather, within a human rights 
framework. 
 
The discussion above shows that the human right to participate can be used as a basis to involve the 
publics in the decision-making process in a deliberative setting so that the represented viewpoints are 
broader in scope and not confined to experts alone. This theme is explored further in the next section. 
 
4.5.3 Early and meaningful input 
 
When public engagement is meaningful, according to Harmon, genuine debates take place and these 
have the benefit of highlighting different viewpoints. Total consensus is all but impossible to achieve 
but where the debate takes place “upstream”, policy decisions and laws may be more versatile.626 
“Upstream” in the domain of patents would be at a phase before the grant, the difference to present 
practice being that there would be debate and participatory public education followed by a plebiscite. 
Whilst it could be argued that this would disfavour industrial interests, the reality is that it might make 
it easier for patents to be granted in cases such as WARF,627 where the definition of morality was 
broad, if the publics were given a say. Harmon criticises an important aspect of the processes of 
engagement in bioethical debates which relates to their timing and the way in which questions are 
posed. Only particular questions tend to be asked and whilst queries such as those pertaining to risk 
may be examined and debated at length, other matters such as values and vested interests underlying 
scientific endeavour are frequently neither asked nor answered.628 By the time the publics know about 
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the issues, it may already be too late to have influence over the direction of a particular technological 
development. The scope for potential public engagement may have already been circumscribed by 
stronger vested interests. Any meaningful debate must take place at the right time when all questions 
are still open to influence.629 Examples of where such openness has not prevailed can be seen in the 
next sections. 
 
In an exercise of public participation in a Chinese example relating to environmental issues, Zhao 
writes that under the current Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)630 regime, public input happens 
too late, lasts too briefly and does not extend to the post-EIA approval stage. Public engagement 
usually occurs in a window of time only after EIA reports are drafted and before they are submitted to 
environmental authorities for approval. There is only minimal public input before the drafting of EIA 
reports and there is no further public engagement after submission. When the reports are ready for 
submission, all the key decisions have already been taken. Moreover, the consultation time lasts only 
for 10 days.631 While public input is not stifled, it takes place “downstream” and, in the biotechnology 
arena, this has tended to be exemplified by oppositions based on grounds of morality, given that this is 
an aspect which has not been teased out or clarified in a satisfactory way to date at the grant stage.632 
 
An example of tardy downstream input was seen in the announcement in July 2006 by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) that it would hold a consultative process on egg-
sharing and donation in September 2006. However, it had already granted a licence to one clinic to 
allow egg-sharing but emphasised that the experience from the licensed clinic would feed into the 
consultation. The consultation, in that case, was going to have a limited, if any effect, on its subject.633 
Harmon also asserts that there are recurring demands for publics to be involved more in policy making 
in the area of biotechnology and that our model of legislation needs to move from “government” to 
“governance”.634 In debates where questions were being posed too late to influence matters, the stage 
of interaction was adjusted and this engagement occurred earlier. Such questions included addressing 
reasons why particular inventions were being developed, how ownership responsibility and control 
were allocated and who its beneficiaries should be. The mechanisms included “deliberative polling 
and mapping, focus groups, citizens’ juries, consensus conferences and stakeholder study circles”.635 
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All of these devices are small scale and this thesis argues for a society-wide model which will afford 
all citizens the right to express their views on morality through this medium, should they so choose. 
 
What would be the consequences of not giving the publics an appreciable input into the direction of 
patenting practice in this area? Burk indicates that if public unease in this area is addressed 
inadequately, through either belittling or dismissal of oppositional views, as was the case with regard 
to the handling of concerns about nuclear power, civil society could mobilize to resist further 
development of the technology in question.636 This also occurred during plans by the European 
Commission and some national governments within the EU to authorise the planting and putting on 
the market of genetically modified organisms.637 NGOs such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth 
resisted this activity and activists regularly uprooted these crops due to a number of reasons including 
disquiet about safety, environmental impact and the perception that the authorisation processes had not 
been sufficiently transparent.638 If the rationales for decisions are not make public, those who lose the 
argument in a given controversy will not know why matters were decided as they were and what 
influenced the judgment of the merits of the case. This approach would therefore eschew private 
deliberation in favour of public discussion of how we use the patent system to incentivise 
biotechnological research.639 
 
Dewey believed that intelligent inquiry could be used to endeavour to resolve moral matters at the 
institutional level, given that it had already been so successful in the field of natural science.640 Patents 
and the moral issues raised can also be deliberated publicly.641 Some of the literature on deliberative 
democracy does seek to address the dilemma about how to discuss public concerns regarding 
biotechnology without leading to a manipulation of this discursive space by narrow-mindedness. At 
present, the tendency is to pursue scientific inventions without paying very much attention either to 
risk or impact on other aspects of humanity’s welfare and to sideline discussion of moral 
controversies, especially when concerns are driven by religious conviction.642 Where there is little 
education, discussion or engagement, publics can demonstrate a lot of ignorance about technologies in 
question. For instance, in the US, a national survey of views on genetically modified foods showed 
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that Americans were opinionated about this technology but not knowledgeable.643 On the other hand, a 
Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2010 shows that support in Europe for genetically modified foods 
had declined, and this was in the context of a population who were quite well informed about the 
technology.644 However, much transparent debate before decision-making may soften hard line views. 
The legitimacy inherent in this sort of process trumps a model of democracy in which private interests 
are prioritised over those of the citizenry in general. Public debate encourages transparency and 
openness and lessens the opportunities for secretive decision-making.645 
 
Whilst deliberation can enhance the decision-making process, it is the argument of this thesis that in 
order for it to be meaningful, it should be as inclusive as possible. There are a large number of ways in 
which deliberation can be included in policy considerations and these vary greatly in terms of size and 
scale. The next section will examine this issue. 
 
4.5.4 Deliberative devices and scale 
 
There are, for the deliberative democrat, an array of mechanisms from which to choose in order to 
engage the publics on political issues, such as morality. These include deliberative polls, in which a 
statistically representative section of the population is surveyed, following which the group may take 
part in a weekend discussion. This involves small-group discussions, plenary sessions, expert opinion 
and a final survey of participants. McBride regards these polls as “the most ambitious attempt to 
assemble representative groups of citizens to discuss policy questions”.646 However, how such 
weekend sessions could intersect with high level political decisions is not teased out. An important 
feature to maximise the success of deliberative polls is that relevant reading material should be made 
available several weeks in advance of the subsequent discussion. This allows participants to 
contemplate the material in a reflective manner and also to discuss the issues with friends and 
colleagues. Additionally, information can be gleaned through the media, depending on the issue. Such 
preparatory work will enhance the weekend debate. Plenary sessions including experts and small 
group discussions appear to achieve exposure to cross-cutting discourse with individuals who hold 
very different viewpoints to one’s own. Callus acknowledges that difficulties inhere in the 
organisation of deliberate forms of participation, but suggests that the Internet, e-mail and the 
establishment of a People’s Panel can facilitate public engagement.647 Other devices include citizen 
juries and consensus conferences which are popular in Denmark. The kinds of meaningful 
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opportunities often suggested by leading advocates include more direct referendums at the national 
level and greater citizen involvement in community-level political institutions.648 
 
There is some disagreement in the literature about whether participation should operate on a small or a 
large scale. Fishkin believes that the size of the participatory groups must be restricted arguing that 
what should be aimed for is a diversity of viewpoints rather than societal-wide participation. This can 
be achieved, in his view, through equal representation. This suggests a choice between the 
participation of the masses and random sampling. Deliberating groups cannot really exceed eighteen 
in number, he argues, as once this number is surpassed individuals cannot interact meaningfully as 
their input is too miniscule to be significant.649 His conceptualisation of participatory democracy is 
that not all decisions need to be made directly, believing that at national level, it is impractical. 
Instead, consultation with the publics should happen often and be meaningful. A way of addressing 
this is to establish small groups of limited size to which participants can be randomly assigned,650 he 
argues. A democracy in which we all had substantive opinions would also seem to take too many 
meetings and this speculation will be explored in the context of practical examples of participatory 
budgeting in the next chapter which robustly refute this supposition. Whilst he believes that 
consultation should extend beyond elections, participation is not extended to all and sundry on the 
basis that the masses are just too substantial. Yet he still claims that “[p]articipation is the means by 
which the public will is given voice”.651 His view of what constitutes publics does not appear to be 
very clearcut. 
 
The deficiency which Fishkin identifies of small voices being drowned out can be addressed in 
another way and that would be to allow for the creation of power structures so that all voices can feed 
into the decision-making process. Parallels to the structures of representative democracy can be 
constructed so that participation is more nuanced and more connected at grassroots level. This shall be 
explored in chapter five. 
 
Structural features of deliberative democracy which seek to broaden the ambit of discussion of 
important societal and political matters include citizen juries, consensus conferences and tele-voting, 
among others. Each model seeks to reflect deliberation of a tiny percentage of the publics.652 At very 
least, deliberative paradigms such as citizen juries are intended to enhance representative institutions. 
This can be achieved through integrating “informed citizens’ perspectives” into political decision-
making.653 These examples are best understood as enshrining practices of small-scale deliberation 
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rather than being a form of participatory democracy as such, although wide-scale participatory 
democracy tends to enshrine deliberative features as part of the processes of negotiation and voting. 
 
4.5.4.1 Small scale 
 
In Denmark, as aforementioned the use of consensus conferences is popular especially where 
decisions have to be taken about technology-related ethical issues. Recruitment is through newspaper 
advertisements and diversity is sought in the selection of participants. Participants do self-select, 
however, meaning that the ambit of recruits is not likely to be especially wide.654 Moreover, it assumes 
literacy and, indeed, literacy in the dominant language or languages of a given country. Given the 
large number of recent immigrants and refugees in Europe this point merits consideration. The 
illiterate are tacitly excluded and are thus rendered invisible in such decisions as are those who lack 
access to ICTs if such methods are used. Would-be participants who do not hold strong views are 
unlikely to seek to participate and, therefore, this model attracts an arguably unrepresentative sub-
section of the population. A further difficulty with this model, which also pertains to citizen juries, is 
that it does not have a secret ballot as consensus must be achieved. Alternatively, deliberative polls do 
use secret ballots but these also only represent a microcosm of the publics.655 There are also many 
critics of such small-scale schemes and claims have been made that they are something of a sham. 
Decision-makers can select or ignore resolutions at will, although in the case of citizen juries, 
contracts can be drawn up beforehand which might mitigate such behaviour.656 
 
However, an advantage of small scale deliberation is that it is manageable and not inordinately costly. 
Moreover, participants are likely to be genuinely interested in the issues to be discussed. Undertaking 
deliberation on a larger scale is a much more complex logistical task. 
 
4.5.4.2 Large scale 
 
Citizens will also need to be more knowledgeable in matters of science and technology, in addition to 
receiving training in political participation. The techno-sciences will also need devolved, decentralised 
democratic governance which will involve the elimination of technological and political hindrances to 
democracy.657 This vision, of course, would extend beyond the realm of patent reform but it may be 
that participation would spread to different areas over time. Rogers, in contrast to Fishkin, believes 
that participation cannot be achieved on a small scale, so deliberative models such as random 
sampling are not recommended by him. Instead, deliberation should include the entire population,658 
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although he does not advance a model of how this might be achieved. This entwines both deliberation 
and participation in its practices. He also advocates public funding for furthering the education of 
second and third level teachers in matters of the interconnections amongst science, technology and 
democracy.659 Patents, ethics policy and public interests could potentially be added to that list and 
governments will play an important role in such developments. 
 
4.5.5 Government oversight 
 
The context of government’s role in facilitating deliberation in a pluralist society must occur within a 
constitutional setting of respect for established rights and freedoms. This will serve to protect minority 
rights and cultural diversity660 and the sensibilities of various groups as there are many different 
conceptualisations of morality. Satisfactory resolutions will not be achieved by one group’s 
dominance, by a ballotocracy in which people vote without deliberation once every five years or so, 
nor will any good ultimately come out of secretive and hidden agendas. Benhabib describes pluralism 
as “the defining feature of modern democracy” and as such consideration will have to be given as to 
how to address this in an inclusive fashion.661 This should not be avoided, as moral difference will 
often be reflected in political discord. One of the main challenges is to find the best possible ways of 
reaching binding decisions when disagreement continues.662 Of course, pluralists aim to ensure that 
deliberation achieves agreement wherever feasible but where disagreement persists they also strive to 
maintain a harmonious co-existence where such disparities cannot be resolved. Some acknowledge 
pluralism as intrinsic to humanity but others differ in perceiving it as a problem which needs 
resolution through deliberative means.663 
 
Governments can involve citizens by allowing them to assist in defining the issues or in setting the 
questions. Information may be circulated to foster discussion and rules regarding fair financing may 
be implemented.664 These measures will not always meet with success where parts of the electorate 
are disinterested. However, such concerns are not confined to referendums and the malaise of 
disaffection among voters affects democracy on a much wider scale. Voter nonchalance or ignorance, 
however, is never cited as a ground for restricting the franchise and, arguably, neither should 
disengagement, for whatever reason, be used to exclude people from meaningful participation. 
Moreover, the town of Ovar in Portugal has achieved a participation rate of 25% in their participatory 
budget by using gamification, or the use of game design elements in non-game contexts.665 Of note is 
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that gamification has been found to have positive effects on voter engagement666 and the use of certain 
technologies may, therefore, incentivise participation. 
 
Where participation is not mandatory, often better educated, wealthier citizens are more active. Those 
at the lower echelons of society are less likely to participate as often their struggle is not for an 
improvement in resource allocation but simply to survive. Much will depend, therefore, on the subject 
matter of the participatory practice. Their mobilization may be patchy. Compulsory voting will not 
necessarily have a positive effect on outcome as much voting will have been impulsive and ill-
prepared.667 Dryzek believes that not everyone will seek to participate in deliberative processes and 
that there should be a right, and not an obligation to do so.668 Indeed, obliging participation among the 
disadvantaged could be unduly burdensome. Participation should be encouraged, but not forced. 
 
It is incumbent on politicians to facilitate this process and not to adopt an inactive approach. However, 
citizens too should be proactive about their participation in establishing their rights to information and 
to question innovation relating to technological development and also the role that morality plays in 
patent grants. This will most likely further citizen interest in technology and will undoubtedly increase 
public awareness of its potential.669 Far from freezing technological advancement, the incorporation of 
citizen voices may have the opposite effect and could soften the battle lines currently drawn between 
private commercial interests and some specialised NGOs. Our pluralistic society is a pre-condition to 
decisions about the direction of our development and where participation is not allowed and public 
information and discussion discouraged - or not encouraged - we risk creating a totalitarian 
technocracy. Moreover, a broad ranging input will greatly enhance the collective font of knowledge, 
along with experience and perspective that will help pre-empt the unforeseen. Such governance cannot 
be established in a hierarchical and centralised mode and in any case, genuine democracies 
incorporate pluralism. Participation on a broad scale should augment the ability to think laterally 
about objectives as well as means.670 
 
A twofold task presents itself to those who would lay down ground rules for deliberation where there 
is moral disagreement. The varying stances require attention but so too does the manner in which 
these are maintained or articulated and viewpoints which are morally worthy can be defended in 
dishonourable ways. Ultimately, even though the losing side may disagree with the outcome, they 
should still treat the victors in a respectful manner.671 This will help establish ground rules for future 
disputes about moral matters. When mutual respect is practised, a more widespread political 
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consensus may emerge as to how moral disagreements should be conducted, regardless of people’s 
private moral beliefs.672 
 
Some deficiencies in the interrelatedness of deliberative democracy with actual representation have 
been posed by Squires who asks whether public spheres which are both pluralistic and informal can 
permeate more formal political arenas. Whilst the literature addresses some of the challenges involved 
in establishing diverse public spheres, it is relatively silent when it comes to the mechanics of how 
public deliberation, if located outside of formal politics, can influence the decision-making process.673 
A vibrant public sphere or civil society is the other principal site in which deliberation can take place 
and democracy will flourish in its presence as it provides scrutiny of the state and ensures that its 
obligations to the citizenry are fulfilled. Dryzek also argues that public opinions can be converted into 
political power through a variety of mechanisms which include, but are not confined to, discursive 
devices and elections.674 
 
In addition to facilitating participatory involvement, governments should ensure that citizens are 
sufficiently informed about the issues at stake so that their input is valuable and meaningful. 
 
4.5.6 Education of the citizenry and inclusion 
 
The words of Thomas Jefferson still appear to hold true, even today:  
 
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; 
and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome 
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by 
education.675 
 
The citizenry must be well educated in order for democracy to flourish. This has been recognised for a 
long time by democratic theorists. The ability to deliberate on a prolonged basis – for sufficient time 
to ensure the accountability of elected representatives – is an intrinsic part of this education. A civil 
society which affords space to practise political deliberation will help this endeavour.676 Such 
processes should be facilitated by governments committed to enhancing the role of deliberation and 
participatory activity. Santos indicates that the government in Porto Alegre arranges training sessions 
for councillors and delegates every time a new budgetary committee is set up,677 so the commitment to 
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and awareness of the empowerment and necessity of education is deeply appreciated among certain 
sectors of the political class in Brazil. 
 
Rogers argues in favour of the extension of literacy in science across society and believes that this will 
enable citizens to communicate their doubts about scientific development to each other. Such dialogue 
will also heighten public comprehension of technological advancement. This will serve to 
contextualise science more broadly and site it in a more interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary setting. 
A more expansive perspective will thus be brought to bear on considerations of civil society. Instead 
of excluding citizens from such debates, the intricacies of science justify a more inclusive approach to 
the weighing of the implications of the direction of technological development.678 Any such debates 
should also extend to the patent system in that it is deeply enmeshed in incentivising such progress. 
 
The importance of education should not be underestimated as it plays a significant role in citizens’ 
ability to change their position. Tierney advises, however, that public education campaigns, if 
dominated by elites with vested interests may not present an entirely balanced viewpoint and, 
moreover, they may seek to embed further established opinions.679 Whilst meaningful participation is 
a commitment of republicanism, the matter under discussion must be comprehended. Dismissing the 
publics as unqualified indicates an elitist approach but it is also vital that publics understand the issue 
which they are being asked to consider.680 Public involvement brings more transparency to the 
scientific process and makes it more accountable.681 This can be elucidating in the context of morally 
controversial biotechnological inventions. It will be difficult to educate and engage citizens. This is 
not a search for an ideal but seeks a process of improvement of democratic legitimacy in the decision-
making process.682 
 
Deliberative discussion by itself does not herald the existence of democracy and where disputes are 
dominated by spin doctors or manipulative orators they suffer from a deficit of democracy. 
Deliberation can be conceptualised as democratic where participants hail from a plurality of 
backgrounds and are able to debate in an environment free from intimidation and exploitation.683 For 
instance, where specialists highlight their expertise so as to quieten contested points, this can 
constitute a form of verbal pressure.684 Of course, it may also be a reasonable and helpful interjection, 
depending on the context. In any case, it has been noted that the majority of moderators of deliberative 
forums are aware that discussions, if not well managed can be controlled by assertive individuals. For 
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a substantial percentage of the population, public speaking is a daunting prospect.685 There are 
examples, of course, where public groups debate and articulate well with experts – examples being 
radio shows such as those hosted by Professor Michael Sandel on BBC Radio 4 – but these groups are 
self-selecting and therefore are likely to be in the minority who enjoy such public discussions.686 
 
The majority of people are not confident public speakers and this leads to a significant criticism of 
Habermas’ concept of the public sphere. Whilst he claims that this space is potentially open to all, 
many voices cannot find a means of expression through fear, being oppressed or lack of articulateness, 
for instance.687 There is also the relatively narrow conception of the exclusively discursive rationality 
that is operative in this sphere and the delimitation of communication to rational verbal discourse. In 
short, this universal arena, even within the confines of a nation or a political unit, is less than universal 
in its constitution.688 The design of such deliberative sessions requires adequate planning and care 
should be exercised in ensuring that cogs to the flow of free and fair deliberation be anticipated. 
 
A common objection to participatory democracy and deliberation among the masses is that the public 
are insufficiently educated to make such debate meaningful. For instance, Judge Richard Posner is an 
ardent opponent of deliberative democracy for a number of reasons, not least of which is his scathing 
conclusion that “most people are ignorant about most matters”.689 Posner also asserts that as half of 
the population’s IQ is below 100, he is an advocate of “elite” democracy690 - quite the antithesis of 
deliberative and participatory democracy – which he defines as:- 
 
a method by which members of a self-interested political elite compete for the votes of a 
basically ignorant and apathetic, as well as determinedly self-interested, electorate.691 
 
It very much depends on how publics are treated and Posner does not appear well versed in the 
nuances of deliberation and participation. In somewhat less harsh terms, Smith reiterates Posner’s 
concerns about the knowledge gap between the representatives and the represented. He agrees that 
whilst it may be an attractive idea to consider deliberative democracy’s role as a complement to the 
legislative process, the main disadvantage is that the majority of people do not have enough 
information to deliberate meaningfully on any ramifications of biotechnology. Such debate can get 
swamped with emotion which determines the outcome. Scientific language is out of reach for the 
average citizen692 and this is a gap into which government can step, providing education and 
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facilitating debate. The government can be constrained from using public money to favour a particular 
outlook and models exist where education is not just a series of lectures in which the masses are 
passive. Neither Posner nor Smith appear to have any plan to deal with an educated citizenry whose 
views contradict those of their rulers and their default view is patronising. Nor do they suggest how 
morality is to be arbitrated where it is enshrined in law, as is the case of the EPC. 
 
There may be drawbacks to deliberative democracy, however but these revolve around the fact that 
debate among average, reasonable citizens is meaningless if they are insufficiently educated about 
biotechnology. Debates, therefore may become overly emotional.693 Resistance to citizen participation 
goes back to the times of Plato and Aristotle, according to Fischer.694 It was feared that democracy 
could lead to the less intelligent ruling over their more brainy counterparts, hence Plato argued that 
“philosopher kings” should rule.695 Yet some of these reservations could be addressed by Fishkin’s 
advocacy of refined debate – which involves some education - and such engagement with the publics 
may lead to a governance which involves educational programmes so that they come to citizen 
engagement with a knowledgeable background. The language of experts can be inaccessible so the 
courts and legislature have stepped into this breach to date. However, we have seen that neither the 
legislative nor judicial branches of government are operating in a predictable manner in this realm. A 
change from one expert body to another may not improve matters. In any case, how, in a pluralistic 
world can we talk about “expertise” in moral issues? This would suggest that an objective truth is 
knowable and in reality all we have is a plurality of viewpoints. Petit comments that “the privatisation 
of living organisms is an issue for all society and must be broached in an institution that supports 
public dialogue”.696 Institutions may not have the capacity to provide such a forum. 
 
Why is it important to re-engage the citizenry? Arguably, if they choose to absent themselves, then 
that is their prerogative. However, there are views that liberty is threatened more by disengaged 
citizens than by those who are active in society. Putnam claims that the least tolerant people and 
communities in the US are also the most disconnected.697 If they are not accessing others’ views on 
moral issues, for example, their minds will not be changed easily and this may be important as public 
views are being sought on biotechnological patents. In examples from China, when citizens 
congregated to deliberate about infrastructure options, they were inclined to act expansively and 
choose projects that would benefit a larger number of people rather than individual villages.698 This 
may be due to the fact that discussion broadens perspective. 
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Arguments are often made that the most deprived are the least likely to participate. However, if given 
the chance, the marginalised most often succeed in sourcing delegates from amongst themselves who 
advance their interests effectively. This contradicts what critics of participation tend to believe. Such 
representatives are often very dedicated. It has been said that groups which have been side-lined suffer 
from a lack of power rather than an inability to argue effectively. Disadvantaged groups often utilise 
passionate debate in order to progress their claims and relying on emotional and heated appeals may 
be an effective mobilising strategy. Critics may assert that passion has no place in the rational basis of 
deliberation but this dichotomy is a false one, according to Gutmann and Thompson. The truth is that 
privileged groups equally resort to passionate debate when their own interests are threatened.699 It has 
also been postulated that deliberation may discriminate against disadvantaged groups, especially if 
their oratorical skills have not been honed. However, many opponents of deliberation may gain from 
its quieting and where decisions do not have to be subjected to public scrutiny, they may be 
inordinately beneficial to such opponents or, indeed, indefensible.700 
 
Even where education is provided, access to the locus of decision-making is changing in a globalised 
world, as explored in the next section.  
 
4.5.7 Location of debate and expert bodies 
 
Deliberative democracy also necessitates a public sphere where discussion and debate can take place 
among citizens and various civil society organisations. This facilitates a focus on the constraints that 
can be placed on discussion in some detail. It also serves to highlight some of the opposition between 
liberalism and deliberative democracy. The former model of governance does not favour the input of 
the masses and tends to foment institutions in which particular modes of communication are 
enshrined, which may serve as an exclusionary force for the majority of the public.701 
 
Squires identifies the diversity of views within the literature on deliberative democracy relating to 
where such deliberation should take place. Among the different examples cited are formal or informal 
spaces among representative or unrepresentative bodies. She also mentions deliberative forums, town 
meetings and designated deliberation times, among others, as considered models, adding that 
parliaments, executives and judiciaries should also be examined. She states that: 
 
[t]his would require, however, greater specificity about the procedures for ensuring that both 
the unregulated deliberation of the informal spheres and the regulated deliberation of these 
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formal spheres are rational, inclusive and therefore legitimate – and that the former filters 
directly into the latter.702 
 
Meaningful deliberation occurs where there is a nexus between deliberating and decision-making. 
Civil society frequently provides a more favourable location than formal political structures for 
deliberative practices which involve democratisation, due to the different functions provided outside 
of rigid political formats, according to Dryzek.703 Civil society discourse involves contestation rather 
than voting and, therefore, strategic behaviour is less likely to be problematic due to the more 
transparent nature of discussions.704 However, at the level of discourse, as opposed to decision, it is 
improbable that any important determinations are imminent so its ambit will most likely be broader 
and, indeed, freer. The gap between civil society and government bodies has become greater in recent 
times as the latter have come under the influence of unelected bodies, which will be explored in the 
next section. 
 
A significant challenge to modern democracy is the rise of national and international unelected entities 
which operate in the interstices of law and politics.705 The role and influence of technical experts in 
policy making has been termed by Jasanoff as the “fifth branch”.706 The nature of the unelected bodies 
may vary greatly: some having a human rights focus while others are commercially-orientated. 
Whether their influence is positive or negative will depend on their enterprise and will also determine 
whether they can serve to enhance transparency. Elsewhere Vibert acknowledges that these entities’ 
powers may be abused if interests other than the publics’ are prioritised. Relationships which do not 
rank citizen interests highly may develop at an insufficient distance to ensure objectivity and 
fairness.707 Rogers believes that “[t]he public has a reasonable claim to the right to legislate and 
administrate public effects, which includes the dissemination and application of knowledge and 
innovation”.708 Technological innovation would thereby be scrutinised by the publics, by other 
scientists and democratic assemblies,709 some of which, of course, may not be elected but could 
contribute positively in terms of facilitating knowledge. He speculates how such public participation 
would take shape saying that it would halt unelected officials and vested interests who may think that 
they have a better right to govern from making decisions out of public view.710 It would also be 
important to consider such innovation in decision-making at the international level, and not just 
domestically, as follows. 
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At present, even if deliberative processes were established nationally, we are still left with the problem 
in the patent sphere that important bodies involved in decision-making such as the EPO would not be 
subject to such processes. Participation that gets encouraged at national level might find itself being 
stymied at its physical boundary.711 The relevance of this commentary is that patents on morally 
controversial biotechnological inventions are decided often at a regional rather than national level and 
so the political structures are less amenable to deliberation and participation. These bodies have been 
denominated as “non-majoritarian institutions” in political science circles and they are effectively 
entities of the government to which some form of specialised public authority has been delegated. 
They are not elected as such and neither are they directly answerable to any elected officials.712 The 
EPO would conform to this description. They do not fit neatly within traditional models of either 
participatory or deliberative democracy which centralise the role of the vote and the act of bargaining, 
or discussion respectively, nor do they adhere to precepts of the rule of law.713 Where these novel 
bodies misuse their powers and perform under par, there needs to be a mechanism through which this 
can be improved. Otherwise, they will lose the publics’ confidence.714 If the lack of deliberation in a 
trans-boundary context is not redressed, democracy will be absent from important scientific issues in 
today’s world.715 That is likely to fuel both discontent and apathy. 
 
Political engagement by the citizenry has declined and growing globalisation may deplete public faith 
in the representative aspect of democracy as the migration of power to either supranational, quasi-
constitutional realms or to private multinational corporations and entities means that citizens’ concerns 
are not centre stage. The rising interest in direct democracy may be as a result of the emasculation of 
democratic governance during these changes.716 The move by technocratic government away from the 
scrutiny of public oversight in the context of a heightened vigilance on the part of the media and civil 
society activists, along with countervailing tendencies of private interests all impinge on the 
development of a healthy domain for deliberation.717 Whilst global governance is permeating the 
discourse on democracy, a blueprint for the democratisation of institutions that would arise in such 
political internationalisation has not been conceptualised as public involvement persists in being 
perceived in a domestic context. This makes it easy for international entities to operate relatively free 
from concerns about accountability or representation of external interests.718 However, if an effort is 
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made to encourage international bodies to become more deliberative they, in turn, may gain greater 
respect.719 
 
Whilst some theorists such as Held720 believe that new global institutions can effectuate an 
international integrative approach to deliberative practices, Gutmann and Thompson advocate a 
nuanced method. Their rationale is that in some cases, new institutions may be necessary but 
increasing the number of entities which have a role in decision-making might have the opposite effect. 
The fact that many international institutions are fundamentally undemocratic would have to be 
addressed721 as their influence has outweighed what was expected of them. Consideration would also 
have to be given to the breadth of the extension of deliberation. Whilst some matters are appropriate 
for national negotiation only, arguably, such as taxation and education, where the effects will be felt 
more widely such as in cases of trade and economic development, there will be a greater need to 
deliberate across national boundaries, at an international or supranational level.722 Patents on morally 
controversial biotechnological inventions in my hypothesis fit in the latter category. 
 
There is a demand that international organisations be amenable to public scrutiny in order to establish 
democratic accountability by NGOs, which have sought to influence policies on a plethora of issues 
on the grounds that civil society’s perspectives may otherwise be sidelined.723 Greenpeace, for 
example, is one of the principal opposing forces to patent applications before the EPO and the CJEU 
(in cases such as Brüstle,724 Plant Genetic Systems725 and Oncomouse726). Nonetheless, where moral 
issues are played out between hierarchical international organisations and NGOs which may also be 
internationalised and administratively tiered, deliberation might not receive much public attention.727 
 
When publics are invited to get involved in public consultations on environmental matters or health 
care expenditure, for example, they can display an early mastery of complex events.728 If a patent 
application involved a technological cure for genetic diseases, public views may differ greatly from 
NGOs which often mount challenges to such patents on environmental or other grounds. Publics may 
not always arrive at the same decision that competing vested interests have in a particular outcome of 
a given debate. Moreover, the use of the patent system to incentivise this type of research is not 
simply a matter of economics or scientific development: ethical concerns also figure in the equation 
                                                 
719 Gutmann and Thompson, op. cit. 39. 
720 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Polity Press 1995). 
721 Gutmann and Thompson, op. cit. 62. 
722 Ibid 37. 
723 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Governance in a Partially Globalised World’ in David Held and Anthony 
Grew (eds) Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Polity Press 2002) 
325-47. 
724 C-34/10 Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV [2011] ECR I-9821. 
725 Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace [1995] EPOR 357. 
726 T315/03 Transgenic animals/HARVARD 6 July 2004. 
727 Dryzek, op. cit. 100. 
728 Vibert, op. cit. 93. 
142 
 
and cannot be brushed aside lightly. Those with technical expertise are experts in one area only of a 
multidisciplinary arena. 
 
The various developments in modern governance, including government’s expansion, and the 
increasing globalisation of political decisions where external bodies hold more and more sway, 
contribute to the perception that citizens’ influence over policy-making is decreasing. This has 
augmented apathy when it comes to participation in traditional politics although involvement in 
protest and mobilisation via the Internet has not abated. The desire to participate has not disappeared 
but conventional means are being resorted to less and less.729 
 
It has been argued that democracy is not necessarily incompatible with technology and science but the 
discordance lies in the way in which society is currently organised. If society is reorganised to become 
more democratic, it should follow that science and technology will similarly become more 
democratic.730 The patent system can then be restructured to follow suit, although democratisation 
does not have to progress in this order as this thesis does not advocate societal reform on a broad 
scale: it focuses specifically on the application of some deliberative and participatory democracy 
principles and actualities to the decision-making process on morally controversial biotechnological 
patent grants at the EPO. The environmental movement has pioneered the establishment of more 
transparency through a number of means, including public inquiries, freedom of information 
legislation, public input and mediation, as examples. Rogers argues for the democratisation of 
technological and economic development by wresting it out of the exclusive domain of experts. This 




This chapter has shown that deliberation is cited in some of the literature on morally controversial 
biotechnological patents as a desirable feature of the decision-making process. It has examined several 
devices and has concluded that they are small-scale and would be unlikely to bring about significant 
change. However, when coupled with participation and appropriate structures, deliberation can be 
meaningful if it feeds into policy making. There is a human right to participate within whose 
framework deliberation can be housed. If combined with education, public input into complex 
decisions can be made in a constructive way. It can avoid both elitism, which excludes many potential 
participants and populism which can lead to rash, ill-informed decisions. This chapter has looked at 
this matter largely in a theoretical context and the next chapter will explore participation and 
deliberation in action where it exists in Brazil in the structure of the participatory budget. It will then 
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seek to glean principles which can be applied to the decision-making process on morally controversial 












































As seen already in this thesis, although moral criteria are taken into consideration in patent grants by 
the European Patent Office and national patent offices, a number of difficulties arise from the design 
and functioning of the current system. There is no consensus on what morality actually is, nor is 
agreement ever likely to be achieved. It is also debatable whether a universal standard of morality can 
be defined in the context of the scope of this thesis, which comprises morally controversial 
biotechnological patents in Article 53(a) EPC 1973 (as amended). When regulated too tightly, laws 
may become formalistic and not allow for flexibility. A popular alternative is for judges to exercise 
their common law jurisdiction in the absence of legislative guidance. However, the judiciary tend not 
to favour shouldering this burden732 and often comment on and even protest at glaring lacunas in the 
law.733 This raises a question as to who gets to decide on such issues when decisions have to be taken, 
and which means are optimal (or at least legitimate and effective) in doing so. 
 
One of the primary arguments of this thesis is that judiciaries, legislatures and executive bodies, such 
as patent or intellectual property offices are not appropriate forums because they have difficulty 
arbitrating such issues for the population at large. Morality is not easily defined but is even less so in 
fast-moving technological realms and the responsibility for adjudicating morality for such a large 
jurisdiction as the EPO is a considerable burden. Nor do I favour the shifting of decision-making in 
this matter to ethics committees as the proposal of this thesis is to decentralise these decisions to the 
grassroots. Moreover, it is not sought to achieve an objective moral good but, rather, to maximise the 
number of voices who can have their meaningful say, in the context of a deliberative arena. The quest 
is to find practices and principles for reform which can guide the EPO in its future activities so that 
the heavy burden on administrators of arbitrating what constitutes morality is divested to the publics.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out a model of participatory democracy which involves 
deliberation, epitomised by the participatory budget in Porto Alegre, Brazil. I have selected this 
particular case study as its structures and principles can be adapted as a model for wide-scale 
deliberative participation. It does not exist just as a theoretical construct but has had several 
readjustments over the years to maximise inclusivity. No such paradigm exists in patent practice, yet 
in the controversial realm of morally controversial biotechnological patents, some academics argue 
that deliberation and participation should be a feature of the decision-making process. The budgetary 
model will serve as a blueprint for a radical reimagination of the manner in which the patent system, 
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at the decision-making stage as it relates to morally controversial biotechnological patents, currently 
operates in Europe. 
 
This chapter will address issues such as the involvement of the population, how information and 
education are dealt with and it will chart this evolution. The purpose is to show that there are 
principles of democracy – both participatory and deliberative – that are operating in a long established 
regime and these provide a model of public involvement in decisions of magnitude. This chapter links 
theories of deliberative democracy with their practice in this participatory regime in Brazil where they 
have been in use for nearly 30 years. This chapter will identify a set of principles extracted from the 
participatory budget for the proposed reform of the decision-making process under Article 53(a) EPC 
1973 (as amended).   
 
5.2 Participatory and representative democracy: some general points 
 
It is important to be cognisant of the different climate in which participatory democracy has developed 
in Brazil when compared to older democracies. Its current Constitution dates from 1988 and was 
drafted in the era of international human rights law where pluralism and the notion of citizen 
autonomy were becoming enshrined. The citizenry has pushed back against repressive regimes and a 
significant emphasis has been put on endeavouring to ensure that the state transforms itself into an 
agent in making democracy function more effectively where structures are built to move the state 
closer to rather than further away from the public at large. 
 
The Brazilian incarnation of participatory democracy is in the form of the participatory budget which 
allows the citizens to determine how a portion of public funds are spent. The principles and the 
evolution of citizen involvement have some lessons for the patent granting process on morally 
controversial biotechnological inventions. Whilst involving the publics can be time-consuming and it 
can require a significant adjustment in the manner in which decisions are taken, if executive bodies 
reconceptualise their relationship with the publics, the manner in which information is imparted can 
change. Education, deliberation and discussion become part of the interchange between patent office 
and citizen. Participatory democracy goes far beyond the remit of representative democracy by 
holding that citizens can be involved in decision-making and not just wait passively for 
representatives to make decisions for them. Participation in decisions, and not just in choosing those 
who make the decisions, is vital to this process. This evolves into a kind of power-sharing model 
between civil society and elected politicians which Santos describes as “co-government”.734 The state 
                                                 
734 Santos, ‘Two democracies, two legalities: participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil’ in Santos 
and Rodríguez-Garavito (eds) op. cit. 331. 
146 
 
becomes more accountable to the society which it governs and, in fact, ultimately becomes more 
susceptible to control by that very society.735 
 
The endeavour shall be to glean from the budgetary process an adaptable structure that can be used to 
put to a mediated vote the morality issues which arise in Art 53(a) EPC. This would involve an 
opportunity for individuals, as well as civil society groups to vote on patent grants where the morality 
bar is triggered. The participatory budget has not been confined solely to interest groups as 
ideologically, inclusion is maximised. Such structures also tend to invigorate civil society – sometimes 
to the consternation of NGOs which may lose out, as civil society engagement with government 
inevitably spurs an evolution and transformation of civil society itself and, indeed, in the mode of 
governance. The participatory budgeting model is especially useful given its longevity as many of the 
potential objections to such political change, such as low participation or an ignorant public have 
already been encountered and the success, or otherwise, of attempts made to resolve such issues has 
been documented. An account of the participatory budget shall be set out below, describing the 
changes this has brought about to governance and the “growing pains” of the structure will also be 
analysed. Its potential relevance to patent law reform in the aforementioned area will also be 
discussed. I will demonstrate how the seemingly unrelated model of budgets and patent grants is, in 
fact, highly relevant to the core problems of the democratic deficit within the European patent system 
and morality. 
 
The participatory budget provides a blueprint which can be used to explain the complexities of the 
interaction between representative and participatory democracy models. Participatory democracy 
interacts with representative democracy at a number of levels. One is where it meets municipal 
institutions which are a manifestation of representative democracy. The other is its evolutionary 
creation of ground-up representative institutions as its own practices become more sophisticated and 
some representative structures emerge at community level. It creates an intermediate political layer 
between governors and the governed. It is at this level of abstraction and operation that the model 
offers lessons for European patent reform. 
 
5.2.1 Background to the participatory budget 
 
The Brazilian Constitution 1988 provides that:- “All power emanates from the people, who exercise it 
either through representatives or directly, in accordance with this constitution.”736 There is also a right 
of assembly, a right to petition public authorities and the Law on Fiscal Responsibility provides that 
“transparency will be ensured by promoting people’s involvement in public meetings during the 
                                                 
735 Ibid. 
736 Article 1. 
147 
 
drawing up and discussion of budget plans and guidelines”.737 There is therefore an intention to embed 
deeply the notion of participation within political decisions. Of note is that this participatory space has 
been created within a constitutional framework and in the context of a human rights climate. Direct 
democracy in this manifestation does not seek to exclude representative democracy but endeavours to 
improve it from within. A new conceptualisation of rights emerged during this time which involved 
new relationships between civil society and the state and new forms of social relationships mediated 
by the state738 which went beyond the simple acquisition of pre-existing rights. It extended to the 
citizenry who were enabled to redefine the rights that they desired. This has enshrined the principle of 
participatory democracy in civil society and also in broadening the ambit of human rights 
attainable.739 
 
Seeking to merge class struggle with citizenship, and so bring civil society activism together with the 
mechanics of the political system, the Workers’ Party evolved a concept of good governance, based 
around citizenship and embodied in participatory democracy. It was known as a party which gave a 
voice to social movements and it broke with tradition in that it sought to move away from the 
clientelism which had dominated Brazilian political life up to that point.740 Citizenship was promoted 
through participatory institutions.741 In contrast to the Eastern European form of socialism, it sought to 
encourage popular participation, expanding the ambit of its programmes beyond organised social 
movements, unions and neighbourhood associations to reach the poverty stricken. Sectors of the 
working and middle classes which did not traditionally participate in organizations were also sought 
out.742 During the 1990s, there was a move to decentralise governance which spurred the drive to 
experiment with new institutional forms.743 
 
Some aspects of democracy in Brazil have become transformed.744 Such changes have been founded 
on grassroots political activity, especially in the “global South” where democracy reputedly was not 
deeply embedded. These practices have rejected the idea that representation is the only form of 
democracy available and, instead, have come to rely upon other forms such as participatory or 
deliberative democracy. The interaction between representative and participatory democracy “may 
include confrontation as well as complementarity”.745 
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Theories of participatory democracy have been translated into practice in Brazil and other 
jurisdictions which have adopted participatory budgeting. This has been achieved by adapting existing 
and creating new power structures which permeate formal decision-making – a question raised earlier 
by Squires who wondered how and whether this could be achieved.746 This also occurred both at local 
government and state level where the Workers’ Party had political influence. As Nylen and Dodd have 
indicated, participation had allowed the process of democracy to be reformed by the addition of a 
citizen-led tier of checks and balances to the representative system in Brazil.747   
 
Where participation is widespread, the political process is legitimated by the consent of the people and 
outcomes are approved, giving government a mandate for the policy in question. However, three 
factors are enmeshed in assuring a more democratic approach, in Fishkin’s view. These are 
“deliberation, political equality, and mass participation... Attempts to realize any two will undermine 
the achievement of the third”748 which constitutes “a trilemma”.749 However, this observation may not 
resonate too strongly in some Latin American democracies which have enshrined participatory 
mechanisms in their constitutions, thereby diluting the danger of descents in the perceived anarchy of 
citizen participation on a grand scale. Porto Alegre’s participatory budget has developed peacefully 
within the structures of the state.750 The establishment of the participatory budget epitomises a model 
of co-government or of sharing political power “by means of a network of democratic institutions 
geared to reaching decisions by deliberation, consensus, and compromise”.751 This is true involvement 
and interaction between the governed and the governors where the latter become scrutinised by the 
former but where both ultimately work together to achieve common, rather than opposing, goals. 
 
5.2.2 The participatory budget and how it operates 
 
Prior to the introduction of the participatory budget, Porto Alegre already had a rich tapestry of 
community groups, organised through neighbourhood associations, which were referred to as popular 
councils. These had been involved in the political struggle against the military dictatorship752 and most 
of these organisations were brought together in the mid-1980s by the creation of the Union of 
Neighbourhood Associations of Porto Alegre (UAMPA).753 UAMPA has come to play a significant 
role in the administration of the participatory budget, examined below. 
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Municipal power in Brazil is divided between the mayor’s office, which hosts the executive power 
and the Chamber of Deputies, which is the legislature. The Constitution provides for legislative 
approval of the budget.754 In theory, the legislative branch of the municipal government is vested with 
the power to approve the budget under the Constitution of 1988 and they have a significant degree of 
autonomy to decide on the allocation of funding in relation to works and equipment.755 From 1989, the 
Workers’ Party controlled the Executive but not the legislature in Porto Alegre756 and they used the 
Executive to involve the public in the administration of the budget. 
 
The participatory budget, known in Portuguese as “Orçamento Participativo”, was introduced in 
1989757 and its genesis was not entirely smooth. The budget is founded on three major principles and a 
set of institutions serve to maintain participation in the municipal government’s decision-making 
process. The principles comprise the right of everyone to participate; the rules of participation include 
a mixture of representative and direct democracy which are conducted through institutions whose 
rules are determined by the participants, and; investment is decided based on an objective method 
which comprises general and technical criteria.758 Nonetheless, most public monies are spent on 
paying the wages of the city’s workforce and cities are also obliged to spend over 40 per cent on 
education and on health,759 not leaving very much for participatory budgeting works. In the first 
decade of the Workers’ Party governance, locally raised taxation increased almost 200 per cent.760 
Although it is the best known example of the participatory programmes which had become 
commonplace in Workers’ Party dominated municipalities by the mid-1990s, it is also now prevalent 
in municipalities dominated by other political parties,761 either because they have inherited it or have 
sought to introduce it themselves. 
 
As part of the evolution of the budgetary process, as of 1990, two plenary meetings were held in each 
district. Additionally, civil society groups could assist in the coordination of intermediary meetings for 
delegates heightening involvement, thus creating a kind of parallel democratic structure. The 
municipal government assisted in the organisation of all these meetings, ensuring that participation 
was widened beyond such movements. This involvement could be a source of controversy in that 
government may be accused of trying to micromanage what is, essentially, an independent and 
autonomous structure. However, their involvement surmounts Squire’s doubt as to how formal 
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political structures can be made permeable to civil society’s input.762 This is not deliberation in 
parallel spheres where the people talk but do not have any realisation of their views in policy. The 
creation of a parallel sphere of democratic structures, however, where civil society mobilises and gets 
involved in seeking election to the decision-making bodies does have the effect of influencing policy 
and decision-making. 
 
Any participant can attend the plenary meetings and delegates are chosen from among these to 
deliberate in the districts. Councillors are chosen from among the delegates to participate at the 
Budget Council. Every year there is a fresh intake of participants, which number between 15 and 20 
percent, who lack previous experience of the Budget and who are without ties to neighbourhood 
associations. Many progress to become delegates and councillors.763 
 
In relation to its structures, the participatory budget may manifest itself in a variety of forms. It can be 
revolutionary but it need not be so and reform is another of its incarnations. This is relevant in the 
sense of principles which may be extracted in order to construct a particular model of patenting 
approval in the realm of morally controversial biotechnological inventions. It has been observed that 
where deliberative devices such as consultative assemblies are used, indirect representation is 
optimised and this does mobilise the population but this does not build a power structure.764 However, 
participatory devices can be revolutionary and transformative and the following commentary 
elucidates this point: 
 
When the PB [participatory budget] is revolutionary... [i]t’s beginning to build...an 
autonomous power structure within the society. From a theoretical point of view what you’re 
doing is building structures of control within the state apparatus, whereby civil society begins 
to exert control over the state...It oversees public works and breaks down the cosy 
relationship between public administration and private contractors. It demystifies the notion 
that the budget is something technical, fixed in stone, out of reach, and shows it to be 
something very basic. It’s about what money comes in and where it goes. And that is 
something that people can control and supervise, month after month. That’s a revolutionary 
proposal. But when you hold consultative forums so you can say you are listening to people, 
you’re not opening up spaces for them to exercise power or creating new forms of power.765 
 
The participatory budgeting structure has evolved over its lifespan and priorities are not set solely by 
the government. In this way, new forms of citizen power have been created. The relevance for patent 
law reform on morally controversial biotechnological inventions is that if publics are more involved in 
the process of incentivising technological developments, biotechnology and its promises may advance 
much more speedily. More voices will also be heard on the varying moralities and a greater 
understanding of different viewpoints may be achieved. 
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5.2.3 Increase in scope of issues and political organisation 
 
In Brazil, during the development of the participatory budgeting process, more and more issues came 
under the collective decision-making umbrella. In 1991, the administration created a Budget Council, 
which had two representatives from each district, along with one each from the Union of 
Neighbourhood Associations of Porto Alegre (UAMPA) and the municipal employees’ union.766 
Participants came to be involved in all stages of the budgetary process from making demands, to 
assessing overall priorities and monitoring outcomes.767 Administrators eschewed organising 
participation around pre-existing neighbourhood associations in order to facilitate the participation of 
all citizens. This was inclusive beyond what is normally seen in participatory politics where citizens 
may be given a chance to vote in a referendum or else attend consultation sessions but not actually 
delineate the content of what is to be decided. 
 
The administration became more involved in mediating societal needs and in coordinating 
participation. This broke with previous political practice in which civil society operated under a 
system of tutelage.768 This favoured politically partial sectors but also created resentment and protest 
among associations not so favoured.769 Massive participation from poor districts was encouraged and 
relied upon. The administration no longer privileged certain groups or political allies but, rather, 
facilitated citizens in formulating their own demands.770 It also sought to include the middle classes, 
many of whom supported the Workers’ Party but who did not participate in forums which focused on 
urban infrastructure needs. This outreach extended to NGOs, unions and social movements and this 
was done by setting up new thematic meetings on issues such as transport, health, education and 
culture, economic development and urban planning. Community members now are able to deliberate, 
propose, decide and vote on how a portion of the city’s budget is spent. In subsequent years, these 
same participants can monitor the progress of works they have chosen to see implemented. Such 
organisation took some years to consolidate.771 District level meetings were not appropriate forums for 
matters such as education and culture, for instance, because they deal with local issues. Thematic 
meetings were set up for this purpose to impact on daily running of these departments rather than 
focusing solely on investment in the area.772 This shows that the budgetary process is an evolutionary 
one which has adapted to tackle new challenges and has not become fossilised. 
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There was also a greater willingness on the part of the administration in Porto Alegre to adapt when 
certain complaints were made about the small number of meetings held at the outset. It responded to 
criticisms by increasing the number of district meetings to 16 and a representative was elected for 
each district. They participated in a committee set up to select the actual projects for 1990.773 Other 
changes wrought in response to criticisms included the fact that originally, a single meeting was held 
in each district without any preparatory meetings. This meant that participation equated to merely 
articulating demands – and no more. Participants were not satisfied with this model of participation 
and they requested that the process be commenced earlier in the year, that the yearly budgeting cycle 
be explained and that a yearly meeting be held to update those present on the progress of continuing 
projects. The municipal administration responded positively and a day of accounting also became a 
regular feature of the budgetary cycle.774 Decisions are not just taken, therefore but results are 
expected to be shown so there is a sense that the budget is seen through to its outputs. This 
demonstrates that the Brazilian model of participatory budgeting is a continuing process of 
engagement between politicians and civil society, along with activists who have become involved in 
the budgetary process. Communication occurs in both directions, debate is mediated and potential 
weaknesses in such a system are minimised by the mutuality that exists between governors and 
citizens. 
 
The principles of participation which can be extracted for the reform of Article 53(a) EPC decisions 
will similarly require some adjustments over time and it is to be expected that much interaction would 
occur over issues such as whether Article 53(a) EPC had been triggered along with information 
campaigns, location and voting procedures. In principle, the executive body in the form of the EPO 
could use its skills to administer debate once an ethical issue is identified. An ethics committee would 
need to be established for this purpose. This will be elaborated further in the next chapter. 
 
5.2.4 Obligatory participation or encouragement to participate? 
 
Whether participation should be encouraged or made obligatory is sometimes raised. In a comparative 
sphere, in Brazil, voting is mandatory, and a poll carried out in 1998 showed that 75% of respondents 
could not recall whom they had voted for in the previous elections.775 Whereas statistics for 
participation remain relatively low in that often below one per cent of the population will participate 
regularly in budgetary decisions,776 arguably, an essential component of democracy is that the option 
to participate is open. When voter turnout is low, it does not mean that the right to vote will be taken 
away and the same applies to the rationale of allowing and encouraging participation. While only 
about 20 per cent of delegates in the participatory budget were inactive in civil society before taking 
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part in this process,777 almost half of those who were previously disinterested became involved 
subsequently.778 
 
The participation rate at the first round of participatory meetings, held in five different venues in the 
city, was under 1,000 people in total. These meetings were somewhat chaotic as the organizers were 
not well prepared. Moreover, given that the city has a population of over one million, transport for 
some community members proved to be cost prohibitive and time consuming.779 These issues are 
pertinent to the prospect of the creation of a patent suffrage as the logistics of accessibility will have to 
be considered, for example. Advance planning on locations, transport and accessibility along with 
times of any meetings will be important. Fishkin opines that turnout is imperative780 but the only way 
that this could be assured in participatory politics would be to mandate participation or the vote and 
this option tends not to be popular. 
 
In terms of citizen involvement, the numbers have increased progressively over the years, rising from 
3,000 in 1991 to 6,000 in 1992, 7,600 by 1996,781 and by 2000, more than 14,000 participants attended 
the first yearly participatory budget assembly.782 Some biographers point out that normally between 
two and seven percent of the population participate.783 The profile of the average participant is 
someone who is less well-off and less well educated than the citywide average. This shows that 
common myths about disadvantaged people not participating in schemes to address their own 
inequalities can be inaccurate. Significant improvements have been made to the city’s poorer areas in 
particular. Between nine and 21 percent of the total municipal budget784 is ring fenced for 
participatory budgetary investments and poorer areas get the largest share of investments. Numerous 
projects, such as improvements in infrastructure, education and health have been approved and 
completed. The participation of the poor has been secured by connecting their participation to 
redistributive outcomes.785 When the poor see that their participation yields results, they are 
incentivised to participate. Without a similar connection to patents on biotechnological inventions, it is 
unlikely that participation rates around moral issues would be high. However, with more public 
discussion on the promises for disease prevention, especially given a rapidly ageing population and 
diminishing resources along with an understanding of the costs involved for the biotech companies, 
participation could be incentivised. Publics may also decide to look more favourably on technological 
development than do many NGOs which often challenge patents successfully. Involvement of the 
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citizenry in decisions relating to morally controversial biotechnological patent applications could 
similarly encourage more participants in the shaping of genetic research upstream which attracts this 
intellectual property protection. 
 
The participatory budget is not a panacea for the ills of citizens’ perception of a democratic deficit in 
their dealings with the political class. Most of those who do get involved have already been activists 
in civil society786 and tend to continue their participation beyond the first year, which is when many 
people get exhausted. Furthermore, the most deprived were among the least likely to engage with the 
participatory budget.787 Yet, the activists are not members of the elite but space has been created for 
their participation in municipal administration and when the participatory budget was rolled out at 
state level in Rio Grande do Sul for a few years at the beginning of the twenty-first century, non-elites 
were empowered at that level too. The participatory budget process provides a means of empowering 
non-elites and providing space for their political activity. This has the effect of bringing diversity and 
it pluralises political structures somewhat, which helps to ensure that there are checks and balances to 
political power at society’s upper echelons. In Brazil it has been found that allowing decision-making 
through a direct vote has attracted ordinary, non-activist citizens to the process and civil society 
organisations can also mobilise participants to engage and vote.788 It has been reported that regular 
participation took off when individual citizens with a particular concern started attending meetings.789 
The vote is direct but community groups are also represented and alliances can be formed because it is 
appreciated that there is strength in numbers.790 Over time, participants mobilise neighbours who 
share their concerns and this often eventually matures into an association. This ignites activity in civil 
society and foments the growth of new organizations.791 
 
In the realm of morally controversial biotechnological patents, citizens may engage more if they are 
aware of the issues and it concerns them in some way such as in the case where there is a patent 
application for a morally controversial invention which promises to treat disease. Genetic diseases 
such as cystic fibrosis are becoming increasingly difficult to manage given growing resistance to 
antibiotics and a genetic “fix” paid for by a patent monopoly may well encourage advocacy groups to 
decide that morality is on the side of the patent applicant. Biotech firms could also benefit from the 
opportunity to counter negative publicity from the press and fringe groups by the holding of public 
debates. Moreover, at present, there is not a lot of public awareness of biotechnology and its 
associated patents, either from the perspective of pertinent moral issues or possibilities for improving 
human health. It may be that this will not change significantly as patents do not affect as many people 
daily as do municipal budgets but principles of the right to participate in debate still apply. Moreover, 
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more public debate may lead to a greater awareness of the technologies, the moralities and the 
interests at stake. 
 
5.2.5 Education and educating the educators 
 
There are a number of erroneous assumptions in the academic literature about the identity of 
participants in participatory democracy in general – for instance, that they are educated and rich which 
is challenged by empirical work on the participatory budget. In studies of two cities in Brazil, Nylen 
and Dodd found that most of the participatory budgeting delegates did not have a high school 
education. They were drawn mainly from the working class or were housewives, had retired or were 
unemployed.792 Many participants have also emerged from living under a long period of dictatorship. 
They thus differ significantly from traditional, archetypal public sphere participants in much western 
literature.793 Whilst taken in the context of Brazil’s hierarchical political structure which does not 
engage the citizenry very much, the disadvantaged tend to be prepared to engage in substantial 
numbers in local administration, given the chance. This leads to a “pluralisation of democratic 
activism” and a “democratisation of democracy”.794 
 
Those at the very bottom echelons of society can be difficult to reach, (and certainly very easy to 
ignore), although the problem of their disengagement is likely to have very deep roots.795 What has 
tended to tilt the balance towards engagement somewhat is when those persuaded to get involved see 
results: that promised works are actually carried out and that voices have been heard. 
 
When you open up the black box of the federal budget you begin to understand the relation 
between the state and society, and the political choices available in terms of fair taxation and 
spending. You see how most of the budget is committed to paying interest and capital on the 
public debt, severely restricting what is available for social spending. You grasp the 
implications of guaranteeing respect for the budget surplus targets contained in Brazil’s 
agreement with the International Monetary Fund.796 
 
Steps have been taken in Brazil to educate where needed, recognising that participatory institutions 
and processes enable the placement of decision-making in the public sphere.797 Education and 
capacity-building is essential and this facilitates a greater understanding among delegates of the 
limited choices that sometimes face politicians. For instance, delegates come to comprehend that 
public funds are significantly limited. During negotiations in relation to the budget, being able to 
access and understand pertinent information is, in all probability, the most basic prerequisite for 
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effective communication. Much of the information is technical and, so, local government has made an 
effort to render it more comprehensible whereas before, this was monopolised by staff with technical 
know-how.798 The transfer of this practice of educating both technical staff and the populace in, 
respectively, effective communication and response and comprehension of the subject matter can be 
modelled closely on what has proved effective in terms of citizen knowledge and participation. Issues 
surrounding morality under Article 53(a) EPC are complex and, therefore, an educational process is 
likely to be required on matters relating to science and economics as well as ethical foundations such 
as deontological and utilitarian approaches. Before engaging with the public, anyone imparting 
knowledge in their discipline would have to make sure that the language that they use is accessible. 
An educational process would involve training citizens in matters such as relevant aspects of 
biotechnology, ethical issues, what the patent system seeks to achieve, business interests, animal 
experimentation and matters relating to the status of the human embryo, along with other ethical 
issues which could arise. The recent cases at the EPO and the CJEU of WARF799 and Brüstle800 
respectively could be used to explain some of the issues with which Boards of the EPO and courts 
within the EU are faced. Given that both these cases were not expansive when it came to patent law, 
they would be a good place to start the debate. 
 
The participatory budget involves a society-wide negotiation of access to public resources through 
deliberative means, in Avritzer’s account. This model replaces elitist customs and approaches the issue 
of technical control over decision-making in an alternative manner to that of our established concept 
of democracy.801 The educative process is as important for the communicators as for those to whom 
communication is made. Santos observes of participatory budgeting: 
 
The technical staff has been increasingly submitted to a profound learning process 
concerning communication and argumentation with lay populations. Their technical 
recommendations must be conveyed in accessible language to people who do not master 
technical knowledge; their reasonability must be demonstrated in a persuasive way, rather 
than imposed in an authoritarian fashion; no alternative hypothesis or solution may be 
excluded without showing its unviability. Where earlier a techno-bureaucratic culture 
prevailed, gradually a techno-democratic culture has emerged.802 
 
In other words, the technical staff must learn to communicate in layman’s terms. Continual 
engagement between elite holders of knowledge and their electors will facilitate such mutual 
understanding. This thesis recommends that such techno-democracy be extended to the area of 
morally controversial biotechnological patent grants. This can be achieved by an educational process, 
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to inform the publics about such technologies which potentially attract intellectual property protection. 
The publics will then deliberate and decide on whether these be granted or otherwise. In two Brazilian 
cities where the participatory budget has been adopted – Belo Horizonte and Betim – the executive 
has provided courses at a highly regarded school of public administration,803 signifying that 
participation is taken seriously and delegates’ competence is valued and cultivated. Moreover, the 
simplification and distribution of complex information by way of pamphlets and hand-outs, 
sometimes in comic format, is routine.804  
 
It would be within the capabilities of the EPO to deal with issues relating to morally controversial 
biotechnological patents in a similar manner. Adapting the presentation of information is essential, not 
only for people from different disciplines, languages and educational backgrounds but also for 
different types of learners. For instance, the use of diagrams and entertaining presentations could be 
used to explain biotechnological inventions as a supplement to dense text. Broader discussions about 
morality and how to navigate controversial issues could also be held. The establishment of an ethics 
committee to oversee the morality provision in Article 53(a) EPC could be considered and it could 
contribute to and manage these debates without offering an opinion. 
 
Informed negotiations over limited budgets often encourage compassionate approaches - exemplified 
where disadvantaged neighbourhoods vote for projects in worse off areas. Much of this change of 
perspective is achieved through informed deliberation: where delegates and participants have had a 
chance to see for themselves the needs of particular areas. When they also deliberate, they may 
increase their comprehension of what will benefit them both individually and collectively.805 
Moreover, the participatory budget can be seen to be effective so that citizens do have a genuine 
perception of goals being set – and met. Santos gives an example of how redistribution has been 
effected. Whilst in 1989 only 49 per cent of Porto Alegre’s population had water and sewerage 
services, by 1996, 98 per cent were connected to the water supply and 85 per cent had secured access 
to sewage facilities.806 The increased transparency over the way in which budgetary resources were 
allocated is believed by a former mayor of Porto Alegre, Tarso Genro, to have increased the 
motivation to pay taxes. When tax revenues increased, more funding became available for 
participatory budgeting projects.807 
 
The participatory budget in Brazil has addressed the issue of the need to educate public contributors to 
budget negotiations by providing training for delegates. The EPO can pro-actively pursue a strategy of 
a more educated citizenry in terms of technology and morality, so that awareness of the manifold 
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moral issues which arise in biotechnological inventions is increased and this may foster participation. 
Indeed, the politicians who do not have a good grasp of the issues which they are delegating to 
unelected experts may choose badly and may be no more suited to assessing the competence of said 
experts than the uneducated public at large. This stark polarisation has been alleviated in Brazil by the 
training of delegates and, although arguably this creates a specialised class of grassroots participators, 
their states can be understood as intermediate to the elite class and the masses in general. This 
intermediate class may help bridge the current divide between the educated and educators. 
 
Rogers discusses the introduction of deliberation whereby the populace could question scientists about 
their work, however, such communication would be in one direction only, involving the imparting of 
information to the citizen without a concomitant right of the citizen to reply. A more appropriate 
approach could be to educate the scientist simultaneously about the publics’ trepidation regarding the 
research being conducted and this could foster greater cooperation in a cross-sectorial fashion.808 This 
could also be stressful for scientists but were this to become routine, people from different 
backgrounds may find a common language. Principles for such an approach can be gleaned from the 
participatory budget where a bridge has been built between administrative expertise and participatory 
citizens. NGOs could benefit from learning how to communicate better and everyone could also 
receive instruction on ethical issues in a deliberative and participatory environment. 
 
5.2.6 Quasi-legality or legislation? 
 
According to Santos, the participatory budget lacks formal legal recognition and is a “hybrid entity 
politically sanctioned by the Executive branch of the local government but illegal and politically 
illegitimate from the point of view of the legislative branch”.809 Once the budget has been deliberated, 
the mayor’s office is supposed to submit the proposal to the legislature. From a legal perspective, the 
legislature has the options of approving the proposal unconditionally, seeking some changes or 
rejecting it outright. However, given that the budgetary proposal has already been negotiated through 
the mechanisms of the participatory process and, therefore, has been approved by the citizenry, in 
political terms, it would be highly risky to raise objections and be seen to vote against the popular 
will. This subversion of the legislature’s function is a cause for ongoing conflict between the executive 
and legislative branches of government in Porto Alegre.810 The Mayor’s Office actively helped to 
bring about the legislature’s exclusion. In terms of principles applicable to Article 53(a) EPC, officials 
at the EPO currently responsible for deciding issues of morality could instead be charged with the task 
of facilitating civil society deliberation and voting rather than making these fraught decisions 
themselves. The costs could be absorbed by the patent grants, thus increasing these somewhat but this 
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process may also result in more patents being granted as currently there is a bar on patenting 
inventions involving the destruction of the human embryo. WARF811 would have an opportunity to put 
its case to the public in a mediated debate where participators are already well versed in the issues. 
The EPO should also have an ethical committee to advise on which applications engage Article 53(a). 
These changes in responsibilities would require a revision of the EPC and the Biotech Directive. 
 
Some Brazilians would like to see the budgetary process codified.812 As matters stand, the budget is 
part of a political contract between the Executive and the citizenry. An ongoing debate revolves 
around whether it should be enshrined in law in order to preserve its existence. To do so, however, 
would bring it under the control of the legislature and such codification could threaten the manner in 
which it has been able to evolve.813 Whilst legislative protection could buffer it from future political 
interference or change, codification would serve to subordinate the participatory process to 
representative democracy. This debate is likely to continue, especially as in the newly demarcated 
political spaces of the participatory budget, the legislature will continue to try to carve out a niche for 
itself.814 
 
In terms of the relevance of this debate to any change in the decision-making process at the EPO, 
codification can be quite final and it would also take some time to achieve, given that reform of an 
international convention is an onerous process. It may be possible to let public involvement to develop 
as a practice before legal reform is considered and to allow for the establishment of an ethics 
committee that would be charged with identifying patent applications that engaged the morality bar in 
Article 53(a) EPC. From the point of view of proponents of the participatory budget that favour 
legislation, participation could be disempowered by a hostile executive and therefore there is an 
argument in favour of legalising and clarifying its status. It would be best to legislate for public 
involvement after a period of trial and error in which unexpected issues can arise and the legislation 
can then be based on experience rather than exclusively on theory. In any case, the participatory 
budget does exist in a legislative framework, in some places, as will be shown. 
 
Peru is the first country in the world in which municipal authorities are now legally required to devise 
participatory development plans and budgets as the participatory budget has been put on a legislative 
footing. Co-governance has developed through this practice and Hordijk observes: 
 
The act of citizen participation that achieves social change can, however, be effective only if 
it is also accompanied by institutional change from a responsive government, which creates 
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new space for civic participation. Participatory governance and active, practising citizenship 
are thus intertwined.815 
 
She claims that the law emerged from discussions between government and civil society and 
incorporated suggestions from both.816 This raises the issue as to when it may be necessary to 
formalise the participatory process. Without an adequate legal structure, there is a danger that it will 
not survive. On the other hand, if it is formalised, it might be sabotaged or heavily bureaucratised. 
What is important for its continuity is that it becomes institutionalised so that there is a point of no 
return.817 In that way it survives changes in government. 
 
Santos opines that its force lies in its potential for destabilising existing practices and that its survival 
will depend not on any consolidation of its legal status but, rather, in the extent to which it becomes an 
entrenched practice and the breadth of its penetration in other areas, not currently within its domain. It 
may well succeed in permanently ending the former political practices which its establishment sought 
to address. Its principal positive influence to date has been the promotion of the involvement of the 
citizenry in the actualisation of greater distributive justice, with all that that implies in terms of 
accountability and political transparency. As it matures as a political project, participants continue 
their involvement but the community representatives will steadily become more specialized. Over 
time, a balance will have to be achieved between its subversive traits and the limits of such 
insubordination.818 
 
Political scientists and constitutional theorists have been accredited by Tierney with identifying 
several conundrums with the modern incarnation of representative democracy. These can be 
categorised as “institutional imbalance; partisan control; and external influence”.819 The doctrine of 
the separation of the powers is not fully operational in that the Executive, in many cases, dominates 
inordinately the legislature and this allows the former to monopolise the latter’s agenda.820 Such 
controversies have caused ongoing political disagreement in Brazil but before the establishment of the 
participatory budget, it was the legislative wing of government – certainly at municipal level, if not at 
state and federal levels – which dominated the Executive. Its clientelistic version of politics saw the 
legislature often undermine Executive plans and the latter therefore in turn subverted the function of 
the former by opening the vote on how some of the budget was to be spent to the people in general.821 
By not putting these practices on a formal footing, the participatory budget retains an almost anarchic 
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character which seems to disturb a common trend in which the institutions of representative 
democracy become fossilized and far removed from the electorate after a time. Again, any grafting of 
this scheme onto patent matters will require a significant degree of oversight and fine tuning and a 
legislative framework rather than an ad hoc process would be necessary to achieve this. It is unlikely 
that any such modification of the role of officials at the EPO would be subversive in the manner 
described of the Brazilian participatory budgetary process where there was political struggle over 
limited resources. The change in focus of the activities of the EPO would be delineated clearly and 
carried out. 
 
5.2.7 Effect on civic life of participation 
 
Brazil’s transition to democracy witnessed the emergence of an active civil society against a backdrop 
of a corrupt political system dominated by patronage.822 Civic engagement is often assumed by 
scholars of social capital and the public sphere, according to Baiocchi to take place entirely outside of 
the realm of the state.823 In Brazil, whilst it is true that the popular council meetings are autonomous 
and voluntary, nonetheless they are encouraged and supported by government. Their activities are also 
integrated with the municipal administration. 
 
Many citizens who began taking part in the participatory budget because of a particular issue got 
involved in popular councils and neighbourhood associations.824 These latter associations at times 
engaged with politicians in order to facilitate communication between the state and citizens. There 
were, therefore, strong bonds between these groups and municipal administrations.825 Popular councils 
at times serve as intermediaries between these associations and the municipal government but this is 
not always the case.826 Some popular councils oppose the participatory budget, especially where 
neighbourhood associations may have felt wronged by an adverse decision in the budgetary 
process.827 For the most part, however, the budget has become central to life in the community. 
Participation in civil society is affected by participation in the budgetary process: surveys reveal that 
ten percent participate less in civil society, 27 percent report no change but an equal number claim that 
their involvement has increased. Some start their civic life through the participatory budget whilst 
others do the opposite.828 
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The routinization of the participatory budget has brought about an evolution in civic life. Access to 
governmental decision-making has been democratised and new community figures have emerged.829 
Moreover, the institutionalisation of the participatory budget has changed the relationship between 
community leaders and the people that they represent. There is now a new political tier through which 
negotiation must occur. Clashes are frequent but are also often resolved through the intervention of 
experienced activists.830 Those experienced at deliberation in a participatory setting will be aware that 
individual preferences are likely to be transformed in order that collective decisions may be taken. 
Moreover, these will generally be regarded as fair.831 Baiocchi speaks of Robert Putnam’s 
investigations of what makes democracy work. Civic networks are deemed to be important in 
promoting and facilitating cooperative behaviour in order to reach the point of “turning an I into a 
we”.832 
 
Many societal activists became part of the Workers’ Party which sought to democratise society further. 
Formal political institutions have thus been connected with informal ones involving political activism. 
This has dynamised the political system which appears to be addressing to some degree the above-
mentioned stagnation associated with representative democracy.833 Baiocchi puts it thus:  
 
This empowered participatory regime has translated the innovation of social movements of 
the 1980s in Brazil, movements that sought to “politicise” and expand citizenship, into 
citywide practices of demand making that radically democratised access to resources and 
services.834 
 
In the case of the budget, processes tend to be ongoing because many meetings are needed to become 
informed, to elect delegates, to monitor the processes and also, of course, to vote on issues eventually. 
Fishkin believes that participation does not privilege prior deliberation835 but this is not true in the 
Brazilian example expounded in this thesis and much will depend on the manner in which any 
reforming or revolutionising system is designed. The patent reform envisaged in this thesis requires 
deliberation because of the complexity of the issues at stake and the fact that education and debate 
would need to take place before decisions could be made. Participation without deliberation and 
education would be meaningless and, indeed, could be very counter-productive. 
 
5.2.8 The role of the state in approximating representation to 
participation 
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Supporters of the participatory budget argue that a new concept of democratic efficiency is nigh, 
believing that the optimal way of reforming the state is not to take it apart but “to democratise the 
State by setting up participatory instruments of non-elite empowerment and public accountability”.836 
A gentle revolution from within can be achieved by refocusing the functions of some of the bodies of 
the state. As Tierney observes: 
 
[P]opular sovereignty and representation can never be separated one from the other. “The 
people” is too large and diverse a body to manifest itself without the intervention of 
representational forces; popular sovereignty insofar as it survives constitutional instantiation, 
must live with this practical reality and hence with the constraints that constitutionalism 
imposes upon how popular sovereignty might be exercised; this is the very promise of 
popular republicanism’s own democratic manifestation, if it is not to fall prey to 
manipulation.837 
 
The upsurge in participatory democracy has been detailed by Santos who describes it as a mechanism 
for resistance against exclusion that has been used by disadvantaged communities and civil society 
groups. Many of these initiatives arise both in rural and urban settings and are beginning to 
interconnect at national levels so the scope is expanding. He says that a point of conflict between the 
North and South emanates from a confrontation between representative and participatory democracy. 
These are not always seen as complementary forces or practices and the polarity derives from efforts 
by democracy’s representative face to suppress its participatory facets. This can only be addressed and 
remedied if both forms of democracy are made work together in a complementary fashion.838 
Participatory practices undermine elitism in that they demonstrate that change can be effectuated 
simultaneously with administrative competence. It appears that the complexities of modern 
democracies are no bar to the infusion of participation in practice. In fact, greater justice can become 
enshrined in the manner in which public resources are shared out.839 
 
Some experts on the operation of the participatory budget in Brazil, while acknowledging its 
ideological roots in the popular councils of the Russian revolution, distinguish it sharply from power 
structures in Eastern Europe. The participatory budget’s function is not to legitimate the state: instead, 
it must be autonomous. However, this does not mean that its operation is anarchic. Instead, the 
participatory budget structures require organisation and encouragement while still maintaining 
independence from the state. 
 
Porto Alegre’s participatory budget is based on three main tenets – two of which are relevant to this 
discussion: that all citizens can participate equally – local associations are not favoured. 
Representative and direct democracy rules apply in combination and participants decide on the rules 
                                                 
836 Nylen and Dodd, op. cit. 120. 
837 Tierney, op. cit. 136–137. 
838 Santos, ‘Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre: toward a redistributive democracy’ in Santos  
(ed) op. cit. Preface x. 
839 Ibid Preface xiii. 
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which govern the channelling institutions.840 The budgetary model shows that wide-scale participation 
of individuals is possible over a long period of time. Much depends on structure, communication and 
that participation is conceptualised in a deliberative climate where matters get discussed. 
 
5.2.9 Global recognition and transplantability 
 
Porto Alegre has achieved international recognition for its participatory budgetary scheme by activists, 
international organizations and from policy makers from all over the world.841 In the last 20 years, 
different varieties of the participatory budget have been adopted by over 200 cities in Brazil.842 
Countries including Peru, the Philippines, and the State of Kerala in India have legislated in order to 
mandate that citizens have an opportunity to express directly their budgetary priorities at local 
government annually.843 International organisations include the UNDP-funded International 
Observatory of Participatory Democracy (also the International Budget Network, the European-based 
Budget Participatif network, International Forum of Local Authorities). The charter of the “Radically 
Democratize Democracy Network”, a group based in Europe with members in over twenty countries, 
reads as follows: 
 
We have gathered because we all agree upon the fundamental innovation launched by Porto 
Alegre’s Participatory Budget policy: the whole town’s budget is discussed, decided and 
controlled by the citizens, in close contact with the mayor. The working rules of the process 
are co-elaborated and discussed again yearly by the municipal authorities and the people 
citizens [sic]. On a day-to-day basis, a new relationship is established between the legally 
 elected municipal authorities and the civil society.844 
 
At the United Nation’s Habitat II Conference in 1996, the participatory budgets of the Brazilian cities 
of Porto Alegre and Betim were chosen as being among the world’s most exemplary models of public 
administration.845 Santos believes that the participatory budget could be employed at regional and 
national level846 and Portugal has become the first country in the world to introduce the participatory 
budget nationwide in 2017.847 Bruce argues that the federal budget should also be debated and notes 
that the participatory budget has had a presence at state level in Rio Grande do Sul.848 The population 
of Portugal and Rio Grande do Sul, at approximately ten million each, are similar in terms of scale. 
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This thesis advances the hypothesis that it could be extended to international level, specifically to 
Article 53(a) EPC decisions and it also advocates that it should be, given the fact that many 
international institutions could adopt more robust democratic structures. 
 
There is a need to search for and demand a more inclusive mode of governance, given that so much of 
the world’s population has little or no input into policies which affect us, in Crawford’s view. He 
advocates the adoption of a model which utilises participatory and representative democratic 
mechanisms in the context of climate change governance849 and, of course, other areas could also be 
decided in this fashion. Participatory governance is believed to be adaptable to a number of different 
areas in addition to budgets. It has been described broadly, in the following terms: 
 
not functionally specific; that is, the realm of issues addressed was not limited to education or 
health, and the types of social issues touched by municipal budgeting ranged from human 
rights to sewage service. It was not uncommon for a discussion about funding a cooperative 
to lead to a discussion of unemployment, or for a discussion about a park to lead to a 
discussion of the environment, while a discussion about building up a slum might lead to 
discussion of land tenure and migration.850 
 
This would not, however, involve substituting representative democracy by participatory but, rather, 
would introduce a participatory element to representative democracy, involving the adaptation to a 
new form of governance: co-governance.851 
 
Proponents of representative democracy sometimes argue that Grecian models of direct democracy 
cannot work in the modern world as size is a constraint along with the complication of more diversity. 
Absent in this mindset is public discussion of notions of the common good and in its place resides a 
liberal adherence to diverse viewpoints which render common goals unattainable. This consideration 
tends to encourage the idea that the champions of rights do not need to be beneficiaries and that 
effectively anyone can act as a representative of any viewpoint or circumstance and this thesis rejects 
this proposition. 
 
The questions of how deliberation influences policy and whether it needs enabling mechanisms are 
interrelated and tested in Brazil but the Workers’ Party agenda was to encourage civil and political 
society to connect. Societal mobilisation is channelled through structures, which reverses traditional 
hierarchies, culminating in a situation where civil society starts to control the state. The intermediate 
layer of parallel democracy which has emerged as a unifying feature in the twilight between civil 
society and the political class has survived for over two decades and continues to evolve and may help 
                                                 
849 Colin Crawford, ‘Our Bandit Future? Cities, Shantytowns and Climate Change Governance’ (2009) 
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to inform reform of the current decision-making processes at the EPO when Article 53(a) EPC is 
triggered. 
 
The deployment of participatory democracy mechanisms could change the nature of political 
practices, encouraging organisations to educate and engage citizens and to become involved in the 
development and implementation of plans and ventures. Society would, in this system, become more 
decentralised and citizens would wield more power over decisions which affect them and their 
communities directly. Rogers envisages the decision-making process in the following terms: 
 
Citizens would make decisions through enrolment into cooperative efforts, resulting in a 
decentralised structure of local-outwards efforts to build networks of participants, through a 
process of enrolment, rather than either a top-downward hierarchy or a bottom-upward 
process of consensus formation. In this respect, it would radically differ from competitive 
elitism and democratic centralism.852 
 
 
5.3 Principles of participation for patent reform 
 
There are elements of the participatory budget’s structure which, when abstracted from the subject 
matter can be applied as a means to reform the decision-making process of the patent system at the 
EPO when the matter of morality arises. In brief, these are as follows: 
 
1. Participation is a human right which is open to all – individual input is welcome as group 
membership is not prerequisite. This would constitute a right to be heard or the right to have a voice. 
 
2. Where there is an information gap, efforts to educate can be made in a deliberative setting where 
those imparting information can be questioned. Their language must be pitched at the appropriate 
level. In this way, there will not be a need to glean one’s information from various state bodies and 
NGOs which tend to use highly specialised language. Communication would comprise the essence of 
this principle. 
  
3. Those imparting information will learn to listen as well as to speak and hierarchical structures are 
not favoured, facilitating a two-way interactive audience. 
 
4. Participation and deliberation go hand in hand and these democratic processes culminate in 
societal-wide decisions. This has the effect of reforming the structures of representative democracy 
from within and can be epitomised by the concept of influence. 
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5. There should also be feedback loops along the lines of the day of accounting853 in Porto Alegre’s 
participatory budget to ensure that deliberation and participation are not purely tokenistic. This would 
ensure that accountability is in-built into participatory practices. 
 
These principles can be mapped onto the system of arbitrating morality in controversial patent 
applications and will involve the Executive body – the EPO and national patent or intellectual 
property offices in managing the debate. An ethics committee will need to be appointed to identify 
patent applications which raise ethical concerns. Every Member State could appoint or elect a well-
renowned ethicist so that each country would have a voice. An educational programme can also be 
devised whereby the nuances of the patent application and its underlying invention can be studied. 
Public programmes and debates can then be held in which all concerned parties can give their views 
and a public vote subsequently can be taken to decide whether the patent should be granted or not. 
Portugal’s recent decision to introduce a national participatory budget has raised the issue of how best 
to facilitate the vote. They have decided to make it possible through ATM machines, thus minimising 
risks of votes being traded or going astray, which can be a problem with postal votes. Moreover, 
people will tend to be quite careful about guarding the secrecy of their ATM cards. They also hope to 
increase participation significantly using this method of voting.854 As one of Portugal’s cities has 
achieved a participation rate of 25% using gamification, participation could become a mainstream 




This chapter has drawn together deliberative and participatory democracy practices in a case study of 
the participatory budget in Brazil. The purpose of this is to show that some of the ills of various forms 
of democracy such as elitism or populism can be avoided if the democratic structure’s design is 
adaptable and well planned. Roles of public and government bodies can be adjusted and this chapter 
has also demonstrated that participation can be facilitated on a large scale. The final chapter of this 
thesis will propose a model for how a patent suffrage can be constructed, based on principles and 
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The last chapter showed that participation incorporating deliberation can engage the publics in 
complex matters such as budgets. The study of the participatory budget in this thesis has aimed to 
show that morally controversial biotechnological patent applications could similarly be put to a public 
vote in a participatory and deliberative setting which would address the issue of deliberation and 
participation in a non-elitist and non-populist way. My reliance on participatory budgeting as a model 
for reform was not done on the basis of the subject matter of the budget but, rather, on the principles 
of public education, deliberation and participation embedded in participatory budgeting practices. 
These are of relevance when decisions are made on matters of public importance. I believe that 
patents on morally controversial biotechnological inventions are of general concern given the promise 
such inventions hold for human advancement coupled with the moral issues that these present.  
 
This thesis thus fills several gaps in the knowledge. It analyses deliberative democracy with a focus on 
patents utilising a practical example to propose reform of the decision-making process at the EPO 
when these patent applications arise. Furthermore, it designs a loose model of how such a scheme 
could work, detailed below, with tentative answers to some anticipated difficulties. It is not the only 
possible model of reform to change controversial decision-making practices, of course, but I believe 
that if the aim is to seek a more inclusive, deliberative and democratic way then this can address 
many, if not all of the concerns raised in the legal literature about elitism and lack of transparency. It is 
a model worthy of consideration if carried out in accordance with principles of mutual respect in 
debate and deliberation. It should also involve the education of delegates so that they become 
equipped to debate more meaningfully. Thus society in general can acquire a greater understanding of 
the importance of the patent system in biotechnological inventions along with moral issues which may 
arise. 
 
This chapter will now offer a blueprint as to how the manner of decision-making and who gets to vote 
in the proposed inclusive regime can be addressed. 
 
6.2 Proposed structure of a universal patent suffrage at the EPO 
 
This section sketches a paradigm of how a public vote on morally controversial biotechnological 
patent applications could be managed. When a patent application is made that potentially invokes the 
morality bar, most of these being for biotechnological inventions, we do not currently have much 
guidance on whether morality even needs to be considered and as the case law shows, new areas not 
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alluded to in the legislation or case law sometimes arise. I would propose the following structure 
could be utilised and it would be held in three phases. 
 
6.2.1 Phase one 
 
1. First of all, the EPO should establish a permanent patent ethics committee to manage the process 
involved in deciding whether the morality bar is engaged and also to identify all the relevant ethical 
issues which a particular invention raises. Each EPO Member State should select a national 
representative with expertise in ethics who would sit on this committee. International courts could 
provide an example of how nation states can address national representation. Vibert believes that 
unelected bodies have a role to play in the development of democracy in which they can increase the 
amount of information available.855 However, such national representatives could either be selected or 
elected: a public consultation could be held in order to engage public opinions on this process.  
 
2. When the EPO receives a patent application for a biotech invention, they should be obliged to vet 
this with the patents ethics committee. The committee would decide whether the application raised 
any significant ethical issues of public importance. This would be useful as committee members 
would be trained in what sorts of questions to ask. Their role would not be to make any decisions or 
offer any opinion on the outcome of the patent application but that they advise on whether Article 
53(a) EPC has been triggered. Tierney has observed in the context of agenda setting for referendums 
that this tends to be managed by executives and that this stymies citizen involvement and the 
availability of deliberation.856 The EPO’s role would be administrative only and would oblige their 
involvement with other bodies and, of course, with the publics. Thus they would not monopolise 
either the process or the outcome. 
 
3. The patent officials at the EPO would then be charged with administering a public education 
campaign to inform the publics about the patent application, what it promised, who was making it and 
why. Some details on how this educational process can be approached will be explored further after 
detailing the design of the voting process. This would be the first phase of public engagement. 
 
The committee would give a grounding on ethical issues relating to the patent application and 
contribute to this aspect of the public education campaign. Publicity for public information sessions 
would be made through traditional and digital media with ample notice. National patent or intellectual 
property offices would assist in the organisation of national venues and logistics. The education could 
be carried out by video and also live media and with televised sessions available to view after the 
event. Phase one would comply with the second, third and fifth principles, of communication, 
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audience and accountability set out in the framework developed at the end of chapter five. This public 
education would be a prelude to the second phase of the process, as follows. 
 
6.2.2 Phase two 
 
This second phase which would involve public deliberation and debate would give an opportunity for 
interested parties such as civil society groups, NGOs, charities, individuals, industry, researchers, the 
health service and special interest groups to organise participation in a deliberative setting in public 
debate. These debates would be arranged by national patent offices and synchronised centrally with 
the EPO so that they would be held on a designated day or days. In order to avoid a descent into 
partisan, rabble rousing, it would be very important to design these sessions well and to follow 
principles identified in this thesis of mutual respect and refined debate. The sessions should have a 
goal in mind and that is to inform and prepare people to reach a decision about whether a given patent 
application merits a grant, when all factors are weighed up. There are plenty examples in the literature 
of where deliberation is not successful, where opinions are raw and possibly ill-informed and this is 
not envisaged in the model proposed. Instead, the debate should be mediated, rules about how long 
people’s contributions can be should be put in place and these can be revisited if they are not found to 
be appropriate. If managed well, the ultimate outcome should be more palatable to those who disagree 
because they will have had an opportunity to hear the other side and also to question it. This process 
may result in the eventual need to revise parts of the EPC and the Biotech Directive as they relate to 
morality and ordre public. However, it would be recommended that this process proceeds slowly in 
order to avoid rash decisions being taken. 
 
I would not expect the process to run smoothly at first. Where officials are obliged to engage in this 
manner with the public for the first time, they often communicate poorly in inaccessible language and 
may not be receptive to concerns. Rogers has said: “The greatest obstacle to the realisation of 
participatory democracy is not the competence of citizens and the complexity of societal development, 
but is from the entrenched privileges of the political, technocratic, and economic elites.”857 The 
reciprocal process developed in participatory budgeting can assist in helping to train officials in the 
need to listen and adapt as well as to inform. A period of education would require significant input 
initially but as societal understanding is increased, each new application would possibly not require 
similar effort as a store of knowledge would have been built up. There may be some concern that 
patent or intellectual property offices would not manage the debate fairly, given that they have a 
vested interest in granting patents. However, rules can be put in place that would oblige them to act in 
a non-partisan way and just to administer the process rather than direct the outcome. For instance, in 
Ireland, the government cannot use public money to encourage a “yes” or “no” vote on a referendum 
which they have proposed and if they do, the outcome can and has been challenged in the courts, 
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sometimes successfully.858 The public can be informed, educated in a deliberative environment and 
decisions regarding incentivisation can be taken together in the form of a mediated vote, based on an 
adaptation of the participatory budget in Brazil. This novel form of governance is referred to by 
Santos as “co-government”859 and reforms existing structures from the inside. 
 
Where no effort is made to enshrine mutual respect, emergent policies will be disputed by a significant 
number of people therefore it is very important to establish a robust framework for deliberation and 
participation. The procedure to be followed can be focused on to ensure a result which can be 
tolerated. This will involve a learning curve both for citizen and official where both come to regard 
each other as moral agents. Instead of bargaining solely for self-interested gains, weight can be given 
to moral reasoning. New rules for the conduct of such debate can be drawn up860 and institutional 
design is vital if the public sphere is to be opened up to more dialogue and participation. In addition to 
being able to talk, one must also have the leisure to listen. It is much less likely that a respectful zone 
for deliberation will occur organically or without a framework.861 And Tierney observes that 
deliberation often changes participants’ views of particular matters.862 The resolution in question may 
be controversial but at least competing rationales will have been discussed and a greater understanding 
of varying positions achieved. Moreover, the legitimacy863 of decisions taken after such a process is 
likely to be improved864 and often all sides modify their views somewhat in order to reach agreement 
or consensus. The deliberative process itself incorporating an acceptance of having to defend one’s 
views within a forum where others are doing likewise with potentially polarised opinions signifies a 
willingness to debate in this manner. Whilst seeking to bring others around to their view, they 
similarly accept that their own minds may be changed.865 Whilst consensus may often be attainable 
locally, within relatively homogeneous communities, at societal level this participation inevitably 
becomes pluralistic and this can result in society forming “a polyarchic plebiscite”.866 Phase two 
corresponds to the principles of participation, communication and audience (one, two and three) in 
particular of the framework set out at the end of chapter five. 
 
After a period of deliberation and debate, the next phase would invite a universal vote on the patent 
application. Voting would be open to everyone, even if they have not taken part in deliberation 
because they may not have been able to access the information sessions first hand. This obviously 
raises some danger that large swathes of ill- or uninformed citizens could sabotage the vote and it is a 
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matter which would need to be borne in mind. Participation tends to start off in quite low percentages 
so such a risk would be difficult to predict but registration and attendance requirements could be 
introduced at a later point. 
 
6.2.3 Phase three 
 
Several methods of voting could be considered. Electronic voting without a paper record has been 
unpopular in some jurisdictions due to fears about transparency and traditional methods with a paper 
trail could be used alongside if this were chosen. Public buildings used in local elections such as town 
halls, schools and libraries could be employed and a postal vote would also be possible. In Portugal, 
where a national participatory budget has just been announced, it has been decided to facilitate the 
vote through the use of ATMs which is likely to enhance the integrity of the vote and diminish the risk 
of votes being traded. People are reluctant to share their PIN numbers. There are members of society 
who do not possess bank accounts but skeleton accounts with cards could be offered to address any 
such impediment to voting. A threshold number of votes would not be a prerequisite for the validity of 
the vote because participation would be optional. 
 
The opposition proceedings at the EPO would be undisturbed. When citizens engage in deliberation 
about moral issues and reach agreement, there should be a possibility of revisiting such decisions at a 
later stage by way of appeal. It is important to be able to reopen resolutions867 because opinions and 
standards can change over time as can information, as seen in the partial backtrack on the judgment in 
the Brüstle868 case in ISCO869 where new information about the viability of parthenotes came to light. 
The route of taking part in deliberation involves recognition by citizens that their opinions may alter 
and that their current demands may not remain the same in the future. 
 
Moreover, opposition may be less likely to occur if voices that have wanted to be heard had an 
opportunity to do so during, rather than after, the application process. During participatory budgetary 
negotiations, for instance, even though the legislature can override the Executive’s budgeting, once the 
public voice has been expressed, decisions are largely respected. This would offset some of the costs 
involved in setting up a system of public voting at first instance. 
 
Phase three would reflect the principles of influence and accountability (four and five) especially 
which were developed in the framework at the end of chapter five. 
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Of crucial importance in any such reform is that if the aim is to maximise societal engagement, 
education must be provided. Such programmes could be modelled on experimental paradigms which 
exist, especially in the area of disseminating knowledge on ICTs. Having laid out the three phases of 
engagement, above, the next section considers one such example which could provide a useful 
educational structure for the EPO to consider.   
 
6.3 A model for public education on technology-related issues 
 
Conducting public education campaigns is not an easy task and if elitism or attempts to influence 
outcomes are to be avoided, careful design will be necessary. I give an account here of a large scale 
public education project in a region in Western Spain called Extremadura of one million people which 
was put in place some years ago. It answers some logistical questions which are likely to arise where 
such education is being rolled out. Important questions include how to achieve outreach and genuine 
engagement. 
 
In 1999, the regional government or Junta of Extremadura introduced a Digital or Technological 
Literacy Plan of which the aim was to introduce the entire population to Information Communication 
Technologies (ICTs). It sought to ensure that everyone had access to the internet and knowledge of 
how to use it. Stimulating interest among the population so that they would engage was also deemed 
to be important. The Junta considered technological illiteracy to be harmful. It was decided to carry 
out this digitisation plan by setting up a type of internet cafe throughout the region which were called 
New Knowledge Centres and their number peaked at 45. Each centre employed two people 
comprising a technical expert and an outreach person, each of whom designed software programs and 
other programmes for the local community. The outreach person did not have a set profile. This was 
because it was appreciated that skills would be dictated by local conditions, depending on whether 
they were situated in cities or small, rural areas. Programmes were designed not only for the 
populations but in conjunction with them because it was the understanding of the Junta that the 
Information Society was a two-way street and not one where unilateral decisions should be taken. In 
order to ensure that older people engaged with the centres, the outreach person would liaise with other 
points of contact in a given region such as churches, bridge clubs, active ageing groups and other 
similar organisations. It was found to be more effective to attract local populations on a peer-to-peer 
basis and through friends and so a devolved approach was taken. This management style could also be 
used to encourage participation in voting on morally controversial biotechnological patent 
applications.870 
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In addition to these centres, 1,500 internet points were set up in the region and all secondary schools 
were equipped with one computer per every two students and the ratio was five per pupil at primary 
level. This had a transformative effect in the classroom as students were often able to help out the 
teacher and keyboards were shared between two, ensuring collaboration among classmates. Although 
a TCO was never carried out, the Junta estimated a saving of 18m euros on licensing fees as a version 
of Linux rather than proprietary software was used. This wide-scale deployment of ICTs created many 
job opportunities, spurred an interest in computer science at university and had the unexpected effect 
of aiding the market for proprietary software too as some programs such as games may be developed 
more effectively with private funding. General knowledge of ICTs was heightened in the region 
during this period. This case study demonstrates that knowledge of technologies can be deployed 
widely, although the initial set up would require an investment of both monetary and temporal 
resources. 
 
The relevance of this model to the topic of education is that there will need to be a receptive approach 
on the part of officials engaged in public education on technology and debate facilitation. Initial 
structures and arrangements will have to be flexible and amenable to change. Effective outreach can 
be a useful way of reaching a widespread number of citizens. It may be argued, however, that science 
is too complex to be decided on in this way and this issue will now be addressed. 
 
6.3.1 Does education about science present specific challenges? 
 
Literature on the issue of how best to educate the general public about science so that decisions can be 
taken indicate a number of difficulties with its delivery. De Bruin and Bostrom observe a dichotomy 
between the information that experts tend to convey as contrasted with what people actually need to 
know. This can arise because scientists are accustomed to converse mainly with others in their field.871 
They recommend that surveys should be composed at an appropriate level for the target audience and 
cognitive pilot interviews, in which it can be ascertained whether questions have been understood as 
intended, should be conducted.872 There may be a financial incentive to do so: it is claimed that 
intangibles including goodwill and reputation constitute up to seventy percent of private firms’ assets 
and that these can be depleted where communication is inadequate.873  
 
Some theories of decision making hypothesise that decisions are based both on beliefs and values. 
Beliefs include facts, which should be informed by science and when science informs decision 
making, facts and values ought to be separated.874 However, it has been found that science 
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communication often comprises only facts and it will need to address values too. This can be achieved 
by including public participation which can help to integrate facts and values in the decision making 
process.875 Good practice in public participation includes iteration in which public concerns are 
integrated into the issues which science addresses. It has been shown that public participation can 
have a positive effect on foreseeing policy effects that science’s exclusive lens would have missed. A 
multi-faceted approach together with two-way communication is effective and Dietz notes that the 
literature demonstrates a greater likelihood of success when there is genuine rather than unilateral 
interaction.876 
 
Any public education scheme in the area of morally controversial patent grants should include the 
following principles: 
 
1. The facts relating to the technology should be ascertained in an exercise conducted by scien-
tists and put into language which can be understood by the publics. 
2. Patent officials should then put together a brief on controversies which arise through the use 
of the patent system to encourage such research and the development of the inventions.  
3. Members of ethics committees could contribute to highlighting the advantages and disad-
vantages of the technologies. 
4. The language could be refined in conjunction with representatives from NGOs and civil soci-
ety groups through a consultation process. 
5. Pilot interviews could be carried out with a small cross-section of the population chosen 
through random sampling to ascertain whether the language is comprehensible. 
6. Adaptations would most likely have to be made. 
7. Public discussion and debate could then take place and the information available would also, 
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6.3.2 The participatory right in morally controversial patents 
 
In terms of the human right to participate, this should be permitted to permeate the patenting process 
where it concerns morally controversial biotechnological patents. Perhaps guidance can be sought 
from the United Nations’ Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. When commenting on 
Article 15(1)(c) of the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, they had 
the following to say: 
 
Human rights are fundamental as they are inherent to the human person as such, whereas 
intellectual property rights are first and foremost means by which States seek to provide 
incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the dissemination of creative and 
innovative productions, as well as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the 
integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions for the benefit of society as a whole.877 
 
They went on to state: 
 
…In contrast to human rights, intellectual property rights are generally of a temporary nature, 
and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else. While under most intellectual 
property systems, intellectual property rights, often with the exception of moral rights, may 
be allocated, limited in time and scope, traded, amended and even forfeited, human rights are 
timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human person.878 
 
It has been the contention of this thesis that the issue of morality in patent law is unsettled and that the 
current framework by which it is decided is unsatisfactory because patent office employees have no 
tools with which to arbitrate morality. It is contended that no one can really have expertise but that 
everyone has an interest and, therefore, should at least have the right to participate in the decision-
making process. Many arguments could be made against the proposed reform model of this thesis and 




Objection 1: There are other ways of dealing with the problems in applying the morality bar: this 
model is not needed. Reform can be brought about through legislation, judicial activism or patent 
office practice. 
 
                                                 
877 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural  
Rights, General Comment No. 17: Article 15(1)(c) – Right of everyone to benefit from the protection  
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of  
which he or she is the author, introduction and basic principles para 2 (E/C. 12/GC/17), (Geneva, 12  
January 2006) http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/ TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&   
TreatyID=9&DocTypeID=11, (accessed June 14, 2017). 
878 Ibid para 2. 
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Answer: Every solution to a problem will produce a different outcome and the normative claim of this 
thesis is that all the publics should be given a chance to be involved in this decision-making process 
and to influence the outcome. Legislative reform could achieve more clarity, judicial activism may 
establish precedents over time and patent office reform could achieve more transparency. As this 
thesis seeks, however, to ensure inclusivity, representation and participation, the result will not be 
achieved through reform from within the system, hence the reliance on participatory and deliberative 
mechanisms. 
 
Objection 2: The publics are disinterested, therefore there is no justification for the envisaged reform. 
 
Answer: We currently have no way of assessing this, although the polls and surveys advanced as 
evidence by Greenpeace in Plant Genetic System suggest that there is interest in this issue, even if it 
has not been heeded. Among cohorts of the population that are educated on this matter, there is plenty 
of concern as seen from the variety of NGOs, civil society groups and individuals prepared to oppose 
patents. The state along with the news media should educate us more. We are much more likely to die 
from a disease that could be treated by a therapy developed from a patented invention than in a 
terrorist attack but this is not reflected in public communications.  
 
Objection 3: This thesis is advocating a very paternalistic approach, which smacks of a nanny state. If 
people don’t want to engage, they should be left alone. Being overly protective goes against the trend 
in international governance where the state apparatus is being reduced in the age of austerity.  
 
Answer: Part of the normative claim of this thesis that the state should be more proactive in engaging 
the public, but not mandate participation, in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Article 21 and also the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, Article 23. The state is 
currently very paternalistic in manipulating data, news and finance but not too generous with 
information and this model would redress this balance in the context of patents. 
 
Objection 4: The right to participate was never intended to be used in this area, or if it was, it was not 
intended to engage with individuals over NGOs. 
 
Answer: This is not necessarily true in light of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human 
Rights which encourages states to engage with groups such as NGOs on the issue. The right to 
participate in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an individual right and this is reflected in 
the Brazilian and other constitutions that interpret the right to participate as an individual, as well as a 




Objection 5: Some elite democrats argue that many people have insufficient cognitive capacity to 
understand these very complex issues and they are best left to experts who can be trusted to decide for 
them. 
 
Answer: It is becoming less acceptable to speak ill of people who are less privileged than us, whether 
by class, age, disability, education or other perceived disadvantage. We live in an era when our 
definition of capacity is changing. It behoves us to communicate better and to work harder to include 
others who do not look, sound or behave like us rather than excluding them because we have judged 
negatively their right to participate on our own subjective standards. This would also include 
bidirectional engagement in addition to unidirectional effective communication. 
 
Objection 6: The right to participate is fine for budgets, but will not work in other areas as the issues 
are far too complex. You cannot translate systems, whether legal or political.  
 
Answer: The reform proposed in this thesis is not a legal transplant – it is a study of a democratic 
practice, an extraction of its principles to an abstract level and their subsequent application to an area 
of patent law which some legal academics believe is in need of reform. Academics such as Sampaio 
recommends the adaptation of the participatory budgetary process to the issue of climate change in 
Denver where he argues if the citizens could influence decisions about investments, the process would 
be legitimated. An environmental scheme in Denver known as the Greenprint Denver Plan, has as one 
of its guiding principles to “[p]artner with community organizations, cultural institutions and business 
to achieve broad impact”.879 This shows that participatory principles can be applied elsewhere. 
Moreover, legal transplants can be very successful and a good example is the Ombudsman, which 
originated in Sweden. 
 
Objection 7: Some academics may argue that this sort of model would be cost prohibitive. It may also 
be unduly time-consuming and inefficient. 
 
Answer: This is difficult to calculate and depends on what metrics are being used. The cost of medical 
care for an ageing population whose illnesses may be treated by patentable medicine may be much 
higher. A “stitch in time may save nine” approach may require some initial expenditure to avoid much 
great expense at a later stage. 
 
The model may, of course, involve a substantial cost and be less temporally efficient as compared with 
the current regime. Substantial investment both in terms of monetary and other resources would 
certainly have to be made at the outset and ongoing training would require oversight. However, cost 
                                                 
879 R Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, 'Regulating Climate Change Risk at the Local Level – the Denver 
Experience: Greenprint or Greenwash?' (2010) 17 Mo Envtl L & Pol'y Rev 356, 387. 
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should not be a reason to fail to implement the recommended model and it is argued that such are the 
benefits of the reform, that any costs accrued should be borne. The increased costs would be 
outweighed by the improvements in the decision-making process. 
 
Objection 8: A public vote would be a huge deterrent to industry and it will hold back research. Many 
patents are sought after research has commenced and this represents a significant investment by 
private firms. They would not be comfortable being subject to public whimsy. 
 
Answer: At present, the application of the morality bar leaves firms or researchers in very uncertain 
terrain as they cannot predict how decisions may be made. The WARF and Technion cases are good 
examples as is the Brüstle case in the CJEU where human dignity concerns have started to occupy 
centre stage as the EU Charter starts to eclipse the European Convention on Human Rights in the 
Court’s jurisprudence. Concepts of human dignity in the Charter, for instance, were relied upon in 
Brüstle and this may also affect judgments from the EPO and its boards, given its willingness to align 
closely with legal developments in the EU.880 Public engagement would afford patent applicants the 
opportunity to justify their monopoly to the publics. If their invention merits a patent, they can learn 
how to convey this. If it holds great promise but is morally dubious, there will still be a need to weigh 
up the ethical qualms and decide outcomes. How this is done and by whom is the focus of this thesis. 
Moreover, perhaps more publicly funded research should take place, putting less of a risk burden on 
the private sector.  
 
Objection 9: The publics cannot be trusted, any debate on morality will be hijacked by special interest 
groups and descend into populism. 
 
Answer: The reason for indicating throughout this thesis that a deliberative and participatory 
paradigm entwined with education, communication and engagement is proposed is to avoid the 
populism, sabotage and extremism which can sometimes permeate public debate. The design of such 
debates will be crucial. They will have to avoid any attempt to shape public views and information 
must be impartial and multi-faceted. As public moneys would be used in such campaigns, restraint can 
be put on any expenditure which favours one argument over another.881 Otherwise decisions could be 
open to challenge. 
 
Objection 10: Participation rates in the budgetary processes are too low to justify reform of the nature 
proposed. 
 
                                                 
880 The Biotech Directive 1998 was effectively incorporated into the EPC and major departures in  
patent decisions at the EPO have not occurred. 
881 McKenna v An Taoiseach [1995] Ir Rep 10. 
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Answer: Participation in Brazil, as seen in chapter five, averages between two and seven percent and 
it has also been shown that whilst up to ten percent of the population may have participated at one 
stage, some participation is fleeting. However, the Portuguese administration in Ovar achieved a rate 
of 25% by the use of gamification and other technologies could help to encourage further participation 
and make it more worthwhile. These figures show that participation rates can vary greatly, depending 
on the manner in which public participation is organised. Whilst the level of engagement on issues to 
do with morality in biotechnological patent grants remains to be seen, the Portuguese experiment 
suggests that different technologies can have a significant effect on the electorate’s interest. 
 
Objection 11: There is nothing new here – the criticism of the patent system as not being inclusive 
could be applied across the board, as there is nothing special about patents.  
 
Answer: There is something special about patents because of the fact that monopoly and property 
rights are allocated to an invention which has already been sanctioned so we are dealing with a 
separate regulatory regime. It may be that there is a case for more deliberative participation in a whole 
host of different areas that lack democratic inclusion and accountability to which this thesis can make 
a significant contribution in terms of its abstract principles. Moreover, the approach that this thesis 
takes to the problem of the democratic deficit in the decision-making process of morally controversial 
patent grants is original in that it seeks a Latin American paradigm as a guiding principle.  
 
Objection 12: There is no way that the EPO will consider this reform. It would require amending the 
EPC and as can be seen from the incorporation of the Biotech Directive into the EPC, there is a 
reluctance to engage in legislative reform where a diplomatic conference has to be convened.  
 
Answer: Whether or not the EPO considers such reform will depend on the manner in which it is 
presented and on the extent to which it is receptive to criticism. Industries whose patent applications 
have been unsuccessful may be persuaded to publicise their research activities and may well relish an 
opportunity to convince the publics of the merits of monopoly. Moreover, NGOs may relish the 
opportunity to benefit from a more participatory process as may individuals. 
 
Objection 13: The participatory model would be extremely disruptive and could become viral, with 
everyone wanting a say on everything. 
 
Answer: The participatory budget has spread extensively around the world and participation is now 
part of the zeitgeist. It may be that its time has come: as participation becomes more widespread, so 
too will positive and negative experiences be built up and efficient, low cost, truly representative 
models will serve as exemplars of how to engage an enthusiastic population in matters of deep 
concern. For the purposes of this thesis, patent system reform in morally controversial 
biotechnological inventions is deemed necessary by some academics to be nigh. It has been the aim of 
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this thesis not just to criticise the functioning of the system but, in particular, to identify a way in 
which this might be done and also to anticipate some of the hitches than can be expected along the 
way. Furthermore, this model would be kept under review and would be subject to adjustment over 
time. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has established a model structure of how the proposal of the thesis, which is a public vote 
within the EPO on the availability of patents for morally controversial biotechnological inventions 
should be conducted. It has identified a potential procedure by which existing structures and personnel 
such as the EPO and its officials remain in place but their functions alter. It adds a permanent patent 
ethics committee to the bodies involved to ensure that moral issues are identified and it sketches how 
public information, deliberation and the vote can be administered. It envisages hurdles if heed is not 
paid to experience which shows that there is an array of means to carry out public education and 
deliberation and that some models are more successful than others. Best practice should be followed 
throughout and administrators of this decision-making process should be receptive to criticism and 
suggested improvements, based on good practice elsewhere. The EPO can initially decide to run a 
pilot so that logistics can be estimated prior to rolling out the scheme. While not aiming to be a 
panacea to cure all ills involved in the current decision-making process, the model proposed in this 
thesis is not just theoretical but is grounded in real examples to test its viability. The conclusion of the 
thesis is that the solution proposed can address the qualms about opacity, lack of transparency and a 
democratic deficit in the current decision-making process on morally controversial biotechnological 
inventions. 
 
This thesis adopted a pluralistic methodology of doctrinal, socio-legal and interdisciplinary methods 
to achieve a critique, analysis and proposal for reform of the decision-making process involved in 
morally controversial patent applications at the European Patent Office. It gave a chronological 
account of relevant legislation and discussed key cases and literature which pointed to tensions in the 
arbitration of the morality bar. Reform from within the system of legislation, case law or patent office 
practice was examined but it was found that reforming these artefacts would not address the 
democratic deficit. Ethics committees were also considered but as the research problem of the thesis 
was to find a way to increase inclusion, universal rather than elite discourse was favoured. The thesis 
then embarked on a scrutiny of deliberative democracy in which various small scale devices are used 
to articulate a voice but the nexus between this voice and policy change is not in evidence. Having 
established, however, that deliberation can occur among myriad groups and that debate can be 
constructive, the human right to participate was identified as a potential grounding for public 
inclusivity. A model of participatory budgeting was used as an example of the practice of deliberative 
participation in Brazil where budgeting is both discursive and participatory. A case study of the 
participatory budget was carried out and principles which could be used to establish a framework for 
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participation in morally controversial biotechnological patents were identified. These principles were 
then mapped onto the intricacies of patenting and a blueprint for a three stage process of engagement 
and voting was designed. Some of its weaknesses were identified and discussed, showing that radical 
reform can be enunciated when we cast our nets wide and seek to learn from countries which were 
themselves inspired by political devices such as popular councils from the Russian revolution. Brazil 
adapted these models to its own environs, eschewing a strong centralised state role in the deployment 
of participatory budgeting and instead developed a matrix between grassroots groups and top-down 
institutions. 
 
This thesis did not confine itself to conducting a critique: instead, it developed an original 
architecture, identifying and extracting principles from a long standing participatory practice – as it 
happens, in the area of budgeting – and applied it to the EPO’s fraught decision-making process in 
morally controversial biotechnological patents, extending and crafting the ideas of academics who 
argued that the participatory budgeting principles could be used in other realms. This work, “Morality 
Patently Matters” crystalises these ideas in the domain of patent law for the first time, making it a 
significant contribution to knowledge and addressing a chasm in the literature between law, science, 
political science, sociology and philosophy. Its originality also consists in the drawing up of a feasible 
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